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This issue of Policy Quarterly leads with an important 
co-authored article on the challenge of balancing two 
of the fundamental constitutional principles embodied 
in the Official Information Act (OIA). The first is that 
governments should be open and transparent, thereby 
enabling effective democratic participation and political 
accountability. The second is that government officials 
should provide their ministers with ‘free and frank’ 
advice (i.e. advice that is well-informed, empirically 
robust, honest, non-partisan and, when appropriate, 
hard-hitting), thereby ensuring that decisions are 
based on robust information and analysis. The 
article in question is doubly important because of the 
authoritative positions held by the two authors: Andrew 
Kibblewhite is the Chief Executive of the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet and Head of the Policy 
Profession for the public service, while Judge Peter 
Boshier is the Chief Ombudsman. That they have joined 
forces to provide insights and commentary on an issue 
that goes to the heart of governmental integrity is most 
welcome. 
While occupying different institutional roles, the 
two authors agree on several basic considerations: 
first, the principles of governmental transparency and 
the provision of free and frank advice are both critically 
important; second, the two principles are sometimes 
in tension – hence, neither can be fully realized across 
all policy areas without some loss to the other; third, 
for good government a balance must be struck and this 
requires the exercise of wise judgment; and fourth, in 
striking such a balance it is possible to identify some 
useful criteria. For instance, there is generally a stronger 
case for protecting the confidentially of advice provided 
by officials at an early stage in policy deliberations than 
that tendered towards the end of the process.
What lies behind the tension between transparency 
and hard-hitting advice? In many ways the problem has 
to do with political risk. A brief explanation must suffice.
Democratic accountability requires a high degree 
of governmental openness. This includes parliament 
and the public having access to official papers and 
documents, not least those which contain policy 
advice to ministers from public officials. Only if such 
information is publicly available is it possible to 
ascertain the basis upon which ministers have made 
their decisions and assess the quality of the evidence 
and advice that informed their judgments. Citizens also 
need such information sufficiently early in the policy-
making process in order to participate effectively in 
democratic deliberation. 
Against this, government officials may be reluctant 
to provide ‘free and frank’ advice – and/or ministers 
may be deterred from seeking it – if such advice is likely 
to become public, all the more so if it will be released 
soon after its provision. To start with, officials will be 
mindful of the risk of political embarrassment – and 
hence possible electoral damage – if information 
is released highlighting significant disagreements 
between ministers and their advisers on important 
policy matters. Any such embarrassment will depend, 
of course, on the extent to which the politicians 
involved have confidence in, and a sound basis for, 
their own judgment. A related risk is that controversial 
policy options may be rendered ‘dead in the water’ if it 
becomes known early in the process that they are under 
active consideration. 
In short, ‘speaking truth to power’, while 
critically important, entails risks. Hence, a degree 
of confidentiality is essential if officials are to have 
the freedom and confidence to tender potentially 
contentious advice – and if ministers are to be willing to 
receive such advice and take it seriously.
Has New Zealand struck an optimal balance 
between openness and confidentiality? And are officials 
providing advice that is sufficiently free and frank? 
Such questions are not easy to answer. The 
available evidence is patchy and some of it conflicts. On 
the one hand, there have been ongoing concerns over 
multiple governments that ministers too often thwart 
the intentions of the OIA by withholding departmental 
advice with which they disagree or which might prove 
politically embarrassing if publicly released. On the 
other hand, the case is often advanced that the OIA 
has had a ‘chilling effect’ on the provision of free and 
frank advice. Officials, it is argued, have become too 
compliant and exercise undue self-censorship; they 
often lack the resolve to ‘speak truth to power’.
Andrew Kibblewhite, while acknowledging these 
concerns, maintains that ‘much free and frank 
advice is still given by officials – the art is far from 
dead’. The problem, he contends, lies in a failure of 
officials to document their advice. But any such lack 
of documentation is, presumably, related to a desire 
to minimize political risk: after all, oral advice, while 
covered by the OIA, is easier to conceal and more 
difficult to ‘release’. Interestingly, the results of a survey 
conducted in 2017 by my colleague at Victoria University 
Chris Eichbaum, together with Richard Shaw of Massey 
University, indicate that a substantial number of public 
servants believe that the appetite for providing free and 
frank advice is not what it should be. Such results are 
of concern.
What, then, is the way forward? Hopefully, the 
recent amendments to the Cabinet Manual and the 
State Sector Act will help strengthen the incentives 
for officials to provide free and frank advice – and 
for ministers to receive such advice. Likewise, the 
new principles-based guidance offered by the Chief 
Ombudsman – and summarized in his contribution to 
Policy Quarterly – will reduce the uncertainties over 
how the principles embodied in the OIA should be 
interpreted. 
Ultimately, however, much depends on the ethical 
norms that guide our political leaders and those who 
serve them. While managing political risk is important, 
the paramount duty of government officials is to protect 
the public interest and safeguard our democratic 
institutions. Accordingly, as Dr Ken Henry, the former 
Secretary to the Treasury in Australia, once observed, 
officials must provide the government with advice that 
is both responsive (i.e. advice that ministers need and 
want to hear) and responsible (i.e. advice that is needed 
but may not be welcomed or encouraged, and indeed 
at times actively discouraged). Responsible advice 
requires a strong moral compass – all the more so in an 
era of ‘fake news’, disinformation and the ‘war on truth’.
Jonathan Boston
Editorial – Free and Frank Advice  
and the Official Information Act
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Andrew Kibblewhite and Peter Boshier
Free and  
Frank Advice 
and the Official Information Act: 
balancing competing principles  
of good government 
Andrew Kibblewhite is the Chief Executive of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the 
Head of the Policy Profession for the public service. Judge Peter Boshier is the Chief Ombudsman.
It may seem novel that the chief ombudsman and the chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet are writing an article together; 
however, this demonstrates our shared 
commitment to good government. For 
some time we have been discussing how to 
balance two principles that contribute to 
good government. The first is that public 
servants should provide free and frank 
advice to ministers. The second is that 
the public should have timely access to 
official information that enables them to 
participate in government decision making 
and hold the government accountable.
We both recognise the potential for 
tension between these two principles. If 
public servants give advice that is less than 
free and frank because of concerns about 
its public release, there is a risk to good 
government. This has led us to ask: to what 
extent can and should New Zealand’s 
public servants expect their advice to 
ministers to remain confidential? In this 
Asbtract
Concern exists that New Zealand hasn’t struck the right balance 
between two potentially competing principles of good government: 
officials should provide free and frank advice to ministers, and the 
public should have opportunities to participate in decision making 
and hold the government to account. Steps we have taken to address 
this include: strengthening constitutional underpinnings for free 
and frank advice (Cabinet Manual changes and issuing expectations 
for officials); a work programme to improve government agency 
practice in relation to the Official Information Act; and the Office 
of the Ombudsman reducing uncertainty about when advice can be 
withheld by issuing new principles-based guidance and providing 
more advisory services. 
Keywords  free and frank advice, stewardship, official information, 
Official Information Act, expectations
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article we explore this and related questions 
from the different perspectives of our 
respective offices. 
From the Prime Minister’s Department 
perspective (and that of head of the policy 
profession), free and frank advice is 
crucial to government making good 
decisions, and achieving good outcomes 
for those who live in New Zealand. If 
concern about release of advice under the 
Official Information Act (OIA) 
discourages officials from providing free 
and frank advice – or ministers from 
seeking it – we need to address that. But 
we also need to use all the other means 
available to us to foster free and frank 
advice and open government.
From the chief ombudsman’s per-
spective, the Official Information Act needs 
to operate with as much certainty as 
possible. The subject of ‘free and frank 
advice’ and when it might be protected or 
not is a difficult and uncertain matter for 
chief executives and ministers. Creating as 
much certainty as possible is desirable, 
because that promotes good government. 
Providing ministers with free and frank 
advice – Andrew Kibblewhite
Advising ministers has long been a crucial 
public service role in countries with 
Westminster-style systems of government. 
Our own State Sector Act 1988, as 
revised in 2013, legally defines the role 
of public servants as ministerial advisors. 
The act refers to the advisor role in two 
clauses. Chief executives continue to be 
responsible to the appropriate minister 
for ‘the tendering of free and frank 
advice to ministers’ (section 32(1)(f)). In 
addition, chief executives are responsible 
for ‘the stewardship of the department 
or departmental agency, including of its 
medium- and long-term … capability, and 
capacity to offer free and frank advice to 
successive governments’ (section 32(1)(c)).
In my role as head of the policy 
profession, I am working to build a 
common understanding of what this 
advisor role means for public servants. 
Some of the points I made in a series of 
speeches about free and frank advice 
between 2015 and 2017 (Kibblewhite, 2015, 
2016) bear repeating:
For the record, I’m not suggesting that 
officials are the only experts who advise 
ministers, or that we are the only voices 
they should listen to – far from it. But 
our advice is important for a number 
of reasons. First, we are trained in how 
to offer analytically robust, practical, 
apolitical advice to ministers on 
achieving their goals. Our responsibility 
is to seek the best outcomes, not the 
political advantage of a party, faction, 
or particular sector of society. 
Added to that, the best advisors 
build relationships with stakeholders 
inside and outside of decision-making 
circles so we are well informed about 
how different choices will play out in 
the real world. And we are a professional, 
permanent cadre of advisors. We’ve 
seen many policies implemented before, 
sometimes successfully, sometimes less 
so. We’ve learned lessons when policies 
implemented against our advice have 
succeeded and policies we’ve backed 
have failed.
And finally, we have the unique 
advantage of providing advice from the 
privileged position of being on the 
inside. We see the shifting sands that 
governments are navigating, how much 
room they have to manoeuvre, how 
stakeholders are reacting, what impacts 
the media narrative is having on their 
choices, and we have the chance to 
position our advice so it can be most 
effective.
For these reasons, an impartial and 
politically-neutral public service is one 
of the strengths of our system of 
parliamentary democracy: it combines 
deep expert advice with democratic 
responsiveness. 
In the policy context I believe the State 
Sector Act stewardship provisions also give 
public servants a duty to look ahead and 
provide advice about the future challenges 
and opportunities New Zealand faces. This 
includes at times offering hard-hitting 
advice to the government of the day that 
the current policy mix might not be 
working, or drawing attention to emerging 
factors that may require existing goals to 
be refocused or replaced.1
Providing advice that is free and frank 
about immediate and longer-term issues is 
a demanding ask – and it is an art as much 
as a science. So it is important that we 
understand what it means to be both free 
and frank as a policy advisor.
The ‘free’ in free and frank isn’t the same 
thing as free speech. Public servants are 
entitled to their opinions, but it’s not 
part of their day job to share that with 
anyone, anywhere. The free part of free 
and frank means that public servants 
offer their best advice freely to decision 
makers, without withholding any key 
evidence or information. Free also 
means we shouldn’t second guess what 
ministers will want to do – it’s about 
telling ministers what they need to hear, 
not what we think they want to hear.
Frank means we don’t pull our 
punches with ministers. We are honest 
about where we think the pitfalls and 
risks are. However frank doesn’t mean 
foolish. As in any relationship there are 
smarter ways of saying things – we need 
to give the hard truths in the most 
‘Free and frank advice’ and the Official Information Act: balancing competing principles of good government 
The Cabinet Office revised the Cabinet 
Manual in 2017 ... [making] specific 
reference to the duty that ministers 
have, as the recipients of free and frank 
advice, ‘to give fair consideration and 
due weight to free and frank advice 
provided by the public service’ ...
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constructive and palatable way possible. 
(Kibblewhite, 2016, p.4)
Fostering free and frank advice and better 
public access to official information – 
Andrew Kibblewhite
We have taken a number of steps, over the last 
few years, to bolster officials’ understanding 
of their obligation to provide free and frank 
advice and ministers’ understanding of their 
obligation to receive it. The Cabinet Office 
revised the Cabinet Manual in 2017 so that 
it now, for the first time, makes specific 
reference to the duty that ministers have, 
as the recipients of free and frank advice, 
‘to give fair consideration and due weight to 
free and frank advice provided by the public 
service’ (section 3.8).
The state services commissioner, Peter 
Hughes, and I also took steps last year to 
strengthen public service and ministerial 
expectations regarding the supply of free 
and frank advice and policy stewardship. A 
working group led by the policy project 
team developed an expectations document 
which was formally issued by the state 
services commissioner in December 2017, 
along with a ‘frequently asked questions’ 
supporting document (State Services 
Commissioner, 2017a, 2017b). We engaged 
with ministers before finalising the 
expectations, and the prime minister has 
expressed her strong support for them. 
The new expectations document makes 
it clear that public servants are expected to 
provide advice that:
· identifies the nature, scale and 
significance of the policy issue or 
opportunity (with supporting 
evidence);
· is politically neutral while also being 
aware of relevant political contexts;
· recognises the historic, contemporary 
and potential longer-term 
dimensions or conditions;
· is comprehensive, objective and 
balanced to cover the range of 
options that address the issue(s);
· is honest about where the 
opportunities, benefits, costs and 
risks of all options are, and about the 
limitations, assumptions and 
information gaps in analysis;
· is clear about any trade-offs involved 
and which option(s) on balance are 
recommended;
· delivers any hard truths in the most 
palatable way possible; and
· covers implementation issues. (State 
Services Commissioner, 2017a)
We have an active programme 
underway to inform public service advisors 
at all levels about the expectations about 
free and frank advice and policy 
stewardship, with the policy project team 
most recently holding forums for policy 
managers across the public service on the 
subject. I will continue to do all I can to 
ensure that officials understand what is 
expected of them, and are supported to 
deliver on those expectations.
I am also conscious of the need to 
strike the right balance between enabling 
confidential consideration of free and 
frank advice, and enabling the public to 
access official information to support 
open government. The commitment 
made in the government’s Open 
Government Partnership National Action 
Plan 2016–18 to improve government 
agency practices around requests for 
official information under the Official 
Information Act is another important 
development. The State Services 
Commission and the Ministry of Justice 
are leading the actions being taken to 
deliver on that commitment by: 
· ensuring that information about the 
OIA (how to make requests, etc) and 
responses to requests are easy to 
access on agency websites;
· publishing OIA statistics (how many 
requests, time taken to respond, etc);
· developing a clear statement of 
government policy on proactive 
release of Cabinet papers and related 
material; 
· developing a suite of consistent 
measures about OIA performance;
· improving access to official 
information by publishing responses 
to requests on government websites 
and developing principles for more 
proactive release; and 
· supporting agencies to deliver by 
developing appropriate guidance and 
training. (Open Government 
Partnership New Zealand, 2016, p.11)
The steps outlined above underscore 
the commitment of the public service to 
lift our game on the transparency of 
government and in particular the OIA. We 
are working to put our house in order. To 
genuinely improve the environment for 
providing robust free and frank advice 
these steps need to be coupled with greater 
certainty about the circumstances under 
which free and frank advice can be held in 
confidence. Advice does not occur in a 
vacuum, and at times public servants can 
be affected by the extent to which they can 
rely on their candid advice remaining 
confidential, particularly where they are 
expressing different views from those of 
the government. This is a subject the chief 
ombudsman and I have discussed at length 
over the last year.
The policy settings that govern official 
information – Peter Boshier 
In the original design of Westminster-style 
government, public servants held a unique 
position as trusted and privileged insiders. 
The advice they provided was confidential: 
intended only for the eyes and ears of the 
politicians they served. In New Zealand, 
the Official Secrets Act 1951 sustained that 
position for over 30 years. The general rule 
was that official information should remain 
secret unless there was a good reason for 
releasing it. This meant that public servants 
could provide advice that challenged the 
The guiding principle [of the Official 
Information Act 1982] became 
availability: official information shall be 
made publicly available unless there is 
good reason to withhold it.
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views of ministers, secure in the knowledge 
that it was unlikely to end up on the front 
page of the newspaper. A connection between 
the Official Secrets Act and the Crimes Act 
made it a criminal offence to release official 
information without approval.
The principle underpinning the Official 
Secrets Act was turned on its head with the 
passage of the Official Information Act 
1982. The guiding principle became 
availability: official information shall be 
made publicly available unless there is good 
reason to withhold it.
The OIA identifies two good reasons 
for withholding official information that 
constitutes free and frank advice 
(colloquially known as the ‘good 
government’ provisions), in sections 9(2)
(f)(iv) and 9(2)(g)(i). These provisions 
reflect the view of the Danks committee 
(whose recommendations led to the OIA) 
that ‘to run the country effectively the 
Government of the day needs nevertheless 
to be able to take advice and deliberate on 
it, in private, and without fear of 
premature disclosure’ (Committee on 
Official Information, 1980, p.19).
The first of these ‘good government’ 
reasons for withholding official information 
is to maintain the constitutional convention 
protecting the confidentiality of advice 
tendered by ministers and officials – section 
9(2)(f)(iv) of the OIA. This section usually 
applies where the release of confidential 
advice given to ministers or Cabinet would 
hinder the orderly and effective conduct of 
government decision-making processes. 
Generally this section of the OIA only 
provides grounds for temporarily 
withholding the release of free and frank 
advice.
The second ‘good government’ reason 
for withholding official information is to 
maintain the effective conduct of public 
affairs through the free and frank 
expression of opinions – section 9(2)(g)(i) 
of the OIA. This section applies where 
release of the information would inhibit 
the future exchange of free and frank 
opinions that are necessary for the effective 
conduct of public affairs.
Both of the ‘good government’ reasons 
to withhold free and frank advice are 
subject to a public interest test: namely, that 
the need to withhold information is not 
outweighed by the public interest in its 
release. There are two matters of public 
interest that are particularly relevant here. 
The first is holding public servants to 
account for the advice they provide to the 
government, and holding ministers to 
account for the decisions made on that 
advice. The second is enabling public 
participation in the development and 
administration of laws and policies. The 
OIA balances the public’s right to know 
with the government’s need to receive the 
free and frank advice required to make 
good decisions.
Concerns about the practice of free and 
frank advice – Andrew Kibblewhite
In the last decade, a number of com-
mentators have expressed concern that 
despite the ‘good government’ provisions 
of the OIA, the presumption in favour 
of releasing official information has 
had unintended consequences for the 
provision of free and frank advice.
In 2013, Matthew Palmer gave an 
address to the Public Service Association 
and Fabian Society in which he pointed to 
a shortage of free and frank advice: ‘There 
is now, in my view, far too much second 
guessing by public servants of the political 
incentives on ministers – and too much 
pulling of punches in the provision of 
advice’ (Palmer, 2013, p.2). He pointed to 
evidence supporting this from the research 
of Nicola White at the Institute of Policy 
Studies, published in the book Free and 
Frank in 2007. Nicola White concluded 
from her research that:
there is now reasonable evidence that:
· blunt advice is offered less easily, 
and obfuscation and softer language 
are widely preferred;
· wide-ranging advice is restricted, 
with written documentation 
tending to stick to the safe middle 
ground and more adventurous 
thoughts being tested in discussion;
· if issues are delicate or difficult, they 
are dealt with orally;
· many people working at the centre 
or at sensitive levels of government 
work largely without creating 
records and, for example, will avoid 
email completely because of a lack 
of any assurance that their 
comments could be protected;
· documents that are clearly going to 
become publicly accessible tend to 
be written with that fate in mind, so 
they do not contain anything that 
could attract a headline or create a 
story in itself – the ‘front page of the 
Dominion test’ is becoming a public 
service norm equal in status to ‘no 
surprises for the minister’; the 
public record suffers from 
incomplete documentation and 
from papers that are written for the 
record rather than for the moment;
· relationships can be damaged when 
people, particularly ministers, 
perceive a group of officials to be 
‘writing for the record’ or ‘setting 
them up’ by creating paper trails;
· dissection of the exact role of 
officials and ministers in any overall 
piece of government policy work or 
decision-making can destabilise 
relationships, and create intrigue 
out of the ordinary business of 
supporting a politically responsible 
executive; and
‘Free and frank advice’ and the Official Information Act: balancing competing principles of good government 
I am also conscious of the need to strike 
the right balance between enabling 
confidential consideration of free and 
frank advice, and enabling the public 
to access official information to support 
open government. 
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· the fishbowl nature of working at 
senior levels in the public service 
appears to have made it more 
difficult to attract and retain staff. 
(Wright, 2007, p.271, quoted in 
Palmer, 2013, pp.2–3)
More recently there have been media 
reports about the preliminary results 
from a questionnaire that Chris Eichbaum 
of Victoria University and Richard 
Shaw of Massey University distributed 
through the New Zealand Institute of 
Public Administration. They received 
640 responses, with more than 80% 
from individuals employed in the state 
sector. More than half of the respondents 
(53%) indicated some agreement with 
the statement: ‘Public servants in 2017 
are less likely to provide a minister with 
comprehensive and free and frank advice’ 
(Eichbaum, 2017).
In regard to reversing this trend, 
Matthew Palmer has expressed the view 
that we should ‘insist that Ministers, and 
public servants, harden up. If the job is to 
give free and frank advice then that is what 
public servants have to do and Ministers 
have to like it.’ He envisaged this attitudinal 
change being achieved through leadership. 
‘Both at senior political and senior 
bureaucratic levels, there would need to be 
a formal acknowledgement that our system 
of government and constitution values free 
and frank advice as an objective and that a 
paucity of it is a problem’ (Palmer, 2013, 
p.6).
My own experience is that much free 
and frank advice is still given by officials – 
the art is far from dead. But I do concede 
that we have become less diligent about 
documenting that advice, and 
documentation matters. Without it the 
rigour of analysis is weakened through less 
exposure to subsequent scrutiny. The basis 
of decisions can also become lost with the 
passage of time and the Crown’s ability to 
defend its decisions, if challenged by way 
of judicial review, is weakened.
So what to do? I agree that Matthew 
Palmer’s prescription – that officials and 
ministers need to ‘harden up’ – is part of 
the remedy. Robust advice provided to 
ministers on the merits of a proposal 
should first be given, then appropriately 
released – ideally proactively, at a time that 
will most usefully support the public’s 
understanding of the policy decision. As 
discussed above, we have taken a number 
of steps to make sure officials understand 
what is expected of them in this regard.
I am, however, firmly of the view that 
‘hardening up’ is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. Ministers and senior 
officials also need to have confidence that 
some advice – particularly early stage 
(often discretionary) advice that might 
directly challenge policy settings or the 
ideological priors of the minister – can be 
given and received in confidence. While the 
free and frank grounds for withholding 
advice offer some protection for this sort 
of discourse, neither ministers nor officials 
have felt confident in how those grounds 
will be applied. This uncertainty is 
damaging for good decision making 
because over time it has a chilling effect on 
the provision of free and frank advice. It is 
to the great credit of the chief ombudsman 
that he has acknowledged the important 
role his office plays in creating certainty for 
policy practitioners, and has taken steps as 
set out below. 
Clarifying the application of the OIA’s ‘good 
government’ provisions – Peter Boshier
The OIA has lately attracted attention 
related to whether or not the act is effective, 
whether it is applied efficiently, and whether 
reform is required. For the most part, the 
provisions of the act are clear. However, 
commentators have long recognised the 
elusive nature of clarity in relation to this 
area of law (in sections 9(2)(f)(iv) and 
9(2)(g)(i) of the OIA). For example, the 
Law Commission considered the ‘good 
government’ grounds in its 2012 review 
of the OIA, and recognised that they are 
among the grounds that cause the most 
difficulty for those who request and hold 
official information (Law Commission, 
2012, p.50).
There are two major contributions I 
can make in this area:
1. clearly stating my view – and therefore 
the lead I give to my office – on how the 
OIA provisions relating to free and 
frank advice should be applied. To 
achieve this, I have recently published 
detailed guides on the grounds for 
withholding free and frank and 
confidential advice to the government, 
and how they should be applied to 
information generated in the public 
policymaking process (Office of the 
Ombudsman, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c); 
2. making my office more available to 
officials faced with an official 
information request who are unsure 
whether the withholding of information 
is justifiable. I want my office to be 
known not just for investigation and 
recommendation, but also as a first 
stop for advice and guidance before a 
decision is made.
I am keen to achieve greater certainty, 
and I think it can be reached on a principled 
basis. Of course, one should never prejudge 
the outcome of any complaint. But just as 
with court work and litigation, it makes sense 
for officials planning to adopt a particular 
response to an OIA request to know what 
they are heading into and what the outcome 
might be. I have therefore instructed my 
office that we must be bold in giving that 
clarity, while still preserving our ability to 
investigate fully if required, and deliver an 
opinion and make recommendations if we 
think that an error has occurred. Over time, 
this initiative should result in a reduced 
need to make recommendations, as officials 
better understand the circumstances in 
The [Official Information Act] has lately 
attracted attention related to whether 
or not the act is effective, whether it is 
applied efficiently, and whether reform  
is required. 
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which withholding free and frank advice is 
permissible. 
A crucial element of good government 
is the ability of a chief executive or their 
staff to be able to give honest and fearless 
policy advice on an issue to ministers at an 
early stage. Ultimately, the soundness of 
the decision made (and converted into 
policy and statute) may depend on an 
initial robust analysis of what a problem is 
thought to be and what the best solutions 
seem to be. This is a fundamental aspect of 
democracy and must not be lost.  
For this reason, where discussion and 
advice is at a very early stage – it is 
exploratory, or ‘blue skies thinking’, or 
deliberately provocative – it ought to be 
protected. If that is not the case, the chilling 
effect of the release of early stage free and 
frank advice on the provision of such 
advice may undermine the integrity of this 
decision process. 
If I liken this approach to a potential 
journey with four phases, the first phase is 
alerting the minister that a journey may be 
needed, and indicating some possible 
routes. It is impossible to say at this early 
stage whether the journey will actually take 
place, or if it does what route the journey 
will take. If the minister indicates potential 
interest in embarking on this journey, the 
second phase is becoming clearer as to what 
the destination might be.
During these early stages, advice is 
more likely to require protection on the 
basis that disclosure would prejudice the 
future free and frank exchange of opinions 
necessary for the effective conduct of 
public affairs. However, general 
information could be released at this time 
about the policy’s scope or terms of 
reference, and the development plan or 
stages of policy development ahead 
(including timeframes for any public 
consultations and final decisions).
The third phase of the journey will 
involve reasonable certainty of the route 
and likely destination. By this time I 
think the principles of participation in 
democracy should weigh heavily. This is 
the chance for the public to know about 
policy and contribute to its development. 
Disclosure of any firm options being 
considered would usually fall within this 
phase. Detailed advice on the options 
may require protection to enable the free 
and frank exchange of opinions and 
orderly conduct of the decision-making 
process. However, a brief outline of 
options can usually be disclosed without 
undermining those interests. This allows 
the public to participate in the decision-
making process by offering a contestable 
stream of advice.
Finally, at phase four, where the 
journey is all but complete, there should 
be certainty that information will be 
released unless some wholly different 
withholding ground can be established. 
The strong public interest considerations 
that favour disclosure would be 
accountability and transparency of the 
decision on which option was chosen, the 
advice provided and reasons why that 
decision was made.
So, when officials are considering how 
to apply the ‘good government’ withholding 
provisions of the OIA to their free and 
frank advice, they must always be able to 
illustrate where in a governmental decision 
process information is being generated and 
for what purpose.
I hope that my explanation of what is 
appropriate at each stage in the process and 
my reflections on the importance of the 
beginning phase help to create the certainty 
that I am looking for. If it is less clear where 
in the continuum policy advice is at, 
reasonable certainty can be instilled through 
a candid discussion with my office to obtain 
an objective view on whether information 
can be protected at that time or not.
Conclusions – Andrew Kibblewhite and Peter 
Boshier
Good government requires officials to be 
able to provide free and frank advice to 
ministers in confidence. And it requires the 
public to have opportunities to participate 
in decision making and hold the 
government accountable for its decisions. 
Getting the balance right between these 
two principles matters, as too much of 
the latter may result in less of the former, 
and vice versa. Between us, we have been 
actively using any means in our power to 
foster free and frank advice, while also 
encouraging open government. 
From inside executive government it 
has been necessary to strengthen the 
constitutional underpinnings that 
influence how free and frank advice is 
delivered and received. We have done this 
through recent changes to the Cabinet 
Manual and by issuing formal expectations 
for chief executives. Government agencies 
also need to get better at dealing with 
public requests for information in a timely 
fashion. We both support the programme 
of work underway to achieve that.
We agree that the path to fostering free 
and frank advice involves the chief 
ombudsman and his office creating as 
much certainty as possible on how the 
‘good government’ provisions of the OIA 
are applied. This greater clarity will be 
provided by the new guides on those 
provisions and the office’s better availability 
to give advice at the start – in both cases, 
being as thorough as possible about the 
relevant factors relating to this area of 
official information. 
We hope our collective efforts to clarify 
expectations of officials and to improve 
certainty and confidence in the application 
of the OIA can enhance the appetites of 
both ministers and officials to receive and 
offer challenging stewardship advice – ‘blue 
‘Free and frank advice’ and the Official Information Act: balancing competing principles of good government 
We agree that the path to fostering  
free and frank advice involves the chief 
ombudsman and his office creating as 
much certainty as possible on how the 
‘good government’ provisions of the OIA 
are applied. 
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skies thinking’ – that comes early in the 
policy process. Our aspiration is that both 
requesters and the agencies and ministers 
who receive the requests can operate with 
increasing confidence. This will enable them 
to increase their speed in handling requests 
and disclosing information, or to know 
when withholding is more clearly justified.
We now wait with interest to see what 
impact these initiatives have on both the 
provision of free and frank advice and the 
release of official information to the public. 
We anticipate that the balance between the 
two will continue to evolve, as citizens 
expect to be more involved in the design 
of policies and services, and as enabling 
digital and other technologies emerge.
1 The guidance on policy stewardship issued by the State 
Services Commissioner in December 2017 explicates 
this understanding (State Services Commissioner, 2017a, 
2017b).
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Grease or Sand  
in the Wheels  
of Democracy? The market 
for lobbying in New Zealand
What is the nature of the market for political lobbying in New Zealand? Is our lobbying 
grease in the wheels of a well-functioning 
democracy – adding to overall societal 
efficiency – as its supporters suggest? Or 
is lobbying sand in the wheels, by wasting 
resources in buying redistribution from 
one social group to another and damaging 
the social fabric essential for a well-
functioning democratic mixed economy, 
as opponents of lobbying believe? And, 
should we regulate lobbying in New 
Zealand, and why?
Broadly, lobbying is any effort by 
individuals or collectives to directly 
influence decisions of legislators and public 
officials outside elections. So defined, 
lobbying is an important element of 
political participation outside the voting 
booth. This article focuses more narrowly 
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on the local market for lobbying. Market 
lobbying occurs via the purchase of the 
services of a profit-making lobbying 
intermediary lobbying for a third party. 
Market lobbying also arises where a body, 
such as a corporation, a trade federation 
or peak business organisation, a trade 
union federation or a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), hires a person and 
allocates their time to lobbying activity.
When analysing a market, the usual first 
port of call for developing an understanding 
is industry statistics. However, such data 
does not exist for lobbying. Statistics New 
Zealand industry data does not contain an 
exclusive industry category for political 
lobbying intermediaries; the industry is too 
small. Most intermediary lobbyists are 
probably included as management advice 
and related consulting services. The market 
is also too diffuse. For those corporates that 
directly lobby government, their lobbying 
activity will be included as measured 
output in their disparate industries. 
Additionally, data on NGO, trade union 
and business organisation lobbying activity 
is not available as such.
In many countries, the regulation of 
lobbyists provides considerable informa-
tion with which to examine the lobbying 
market. While this has not resulted in a 
definitive overseas answer to the grease 
versus sand question, it provides 
information pertinent to addressing the 
issue to the public, and, via a more trans-
parent system, automatically reduces the 
amount of sand in the system. By contrast, 
lobbying is unregulated in New Zealand. A 
Lobbying Disclosure Bill was introduced 
in Parliament in 2012 by the Green Party, 
but it was unsuccessful, with the general 
view being that it was an ill-considered and 
poorly crafted legislative response 
(Edwards, 2018b). The downstream 
consequence of an absence of regulation is 
an ongoing lack of public information on 
the local market.
However, various sources of 
information can be utilised to cast light on 
the local lobbying market, allowing a 
structured discussion of whether it 
provides grease for or is sand in the wheels 
of New Zealand democracy, if not anything 
approaching a definitive conclusion. There 
are a number of media articles on aspects 
of the lobbying industry (e.g. Dudding, 
2011; Walters, 2017; Edwards, 2017, 2018a, 
2018b; Barton Deakin, 2016; Secombe, 
2015). There are commentaries by 
politicians (e.g. Mallard, 2003). There are 
several pieces of postgraduate student or 
academic research (Williams, 2014; Tyler, 
2015; Strong and Tyler, 2017), as well as a 
useful broader consideration of vested 
interests, including lobbying, by Ellie 
Argyle and political commentator Colin 
James (Argyle and James, 2014). There are 
several investigative works alleging 
egregious behaviour by lobbyists (Hager 
and Burton, 1999; Hager, 2002, 2012). 
There is one policy article by a professional 
lobbyist (Unsworth, 2014). Information on 
some lobbyists is available from a list of 
access cards to Parliament issued by the 
speaker of the House. There is online 
information provided by lobbying 
companies to promote themselves to 
potential clients. Finally, there is a body of 
theory and empirical evidence on lobbying 
markets from overseas. It is to this 
international literature to which we first 
turn.
International literature on lobbying
There is a vast international literature on 
lobbying from a wide variety of disciplinary 
perspectives. The surface of this literature 
can be scratched here only, and our focus 
is on the economic literature, which is 
based on a rational choice paradigm which, 
while delivering insights (e.g. Grossman 
and Helpman, 2001), may not be the most 
appropriate lens through which to consider 
lobbying. As overseas information comes 
from different political and economic 
environments, their conclusions must be 
applied with care to New Zealand. Yet that 
information is far from irrelevant. 
There are several core theories in the 
international literature on the market for 
lobbying. The first theory is that vested 
interests directly lobby policymakers with 
money to generate political change which 
rewards their bottom lines (Olson, 1965; 
Tollison, 2014). Such ‘rent seeking’ lobbying 
is entirely social sand: it wastes society’s 
resources. A second theory suggests that 
vested interests lobby policymakers with a 
mix of private information and money (De 
Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). Money 
either signals the credibility of their 
information or buys access to policymakers. 
This form of lobbying may be a mixture of 
grease and sand, if the private information 
is of social value. A third theory suggests 
that vested interests with similar objectives 
to policymakers support policymakers to 
allow them to fulfil more of their shared 
objectives (Groll and McKinley, 2015). 
Again, this form of lobbying may be a mix 
of grease and sand.
While the empirical work arising out of 
the rational choice paradigm has been 
unable to determine the extent to which 
lobbying generates social value, or has 
chosen not to address these questions 
(Grossman and Helpman, 2001, p.4), it has 
established a number of important 
empirical regularities about lobbying. 
While many of these stylised facts are 
unsurprising, it is valuable to have them 
confirmed by systematic study. These 
empirical regularities, for the United States, 
are as follows (all from De Figueiredo and 
Richter, 2014). First, lobbying spending is 
significantly more sizeable – five times 
larger – than private funding of political 
parties. Second, businesses account for the 
vast majority – 84-86% – of lobbying 
spending. In contrast, issue–ideology 
groups, such as environmental groups, 
comprise a small share: between 2% and 
7% of spending. Corporate lobbying is not 
cancelled out by the countervailing power 
Empirical researchers have had limited 
success in identifying whether lobbyists 
are successful because of what they 
know – their knowledge base – or who 
they know – their connections.
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of issue–ideology groups. Third, large 
corporations are more likely to lobby 
independently than smaller corporations, 
and they tend to continue lobbying over 
time. Fourth, lobbying increases when 
there is a larger financial stake for the 
organised interest. A fifth fact is that 
lobbyists target two sorts of politicians: the 
powerful agenda setters, and those 
wavering at the margins who can most 
easily be swayed.
Empirical researchers have had limited 
success in identifying whether lobbyists are 
successful because of what they know – 
their knowledge base – or who they know 
– their connections. The evidence suggests 
both factors are operating (De Figueiredo 
and Richter, 2014). Lastly, a large body of 
empirical research shows that lobbying 
generally generates positive returns to the 
lobbyer (Borisov, Goldman and Gupta, 
2015; Hadani, Bonardi and Dahan, 2017). 
Lobbyists and parliamentary access
Who has swipe card access to Parliament, 
other than staff and MPs, also allows 
some insights into lobbying, providing 
some, albeit imperfect, information 
on some market participants and their 
sectoral distribution. Here we consider 
this data and the qualitative implications 
of its limitations. The numbers with card 
access are small and those who appear 
to be lobbyists is smaller. However, the 
number of lobbyists grew rapidly from 
12 in 2012, to 41 people in July 2017 
(see Figure 1). Whether this represented 
industry growth, or simply higher rates 
of acquisition of cards, is unclear. In 2003 
MP Trevor Mallard claimed that ‘[i]n the 
many years I have spent in Parliament, I 
have noticed a growth in lobbying. This 
growth is likely to continue. Lobbying as 
a practice and a discipline is going to get 
more sophisticated and more common’, 
and he repeated this view in 2015 (Tyler, 
2015, p.18). In 2015 another long-
serving MP, Peter Dunne, reported that 
lobbying activity had shrunk, but agreed 
with Mallard that it had become more 
sophisticated in its methods (ibid., p.19). 
After the 2017 election, the new speaker 
of the House reduced numbers with card 
access. Lobbyists currently make up fewer 
than half of those with cards; 22 of those 
with cards appear to act as lobbyists. In 
terms of the organisations they represent, 
their current number and distribution are 
as follows:
· seven holders (32%) represent 
corporations;
· seven (32%) are intermediary 
lobbyists;
· two (9%) represent industry bodies 
(businesses);
· five (23%) represent trade unions 
– either the NZCTU or the PSA;
· one (5%) is an incorporated society 
(the New Zealand Taxpayers’ Union).
By way of comparison with the card 
data, Table 1 shows lobbyist Mark 
Unsworth’s impressionistic estimates of 
market share of lobbying by sector, next to 
his European Union figures. In terms of 
the broad dominance by corporations and 
their proxies, the access card data looks 
similar to Table 1, and the local dominance 
of market lobbying by business interests is 
also similar to the international empirical 
facts considered above. However, 
Unsworth’s data suggests a stronger 
representation of NGO lobbying in New 
Zealand compared to overseas.
A key characteristic common to all 
corporations with cards is their size, again 
consistent with the international literature. 
Large companies whose bottom line can 
be significantly influenced by central 
government regulations and policies have 
a strong incentive to lobby. If they do a 
considerable amount, it is rational to 
employ a person who specialises in this task, 
rather than purchasing lobbying services 
from an intermediary (although 
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Figure 1: Number and distribution of lobbyists and non-lobbyists with swipe card 
access to Parliament, 2012 - 2017 
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Table 1: Market shares of lobbying
New Zealand (estimated guess) European Union
Corporates 26% 13%
Business Associations and Unions 20% 10%
Consultants (intermediaries) 18% 15%
NGOs 18% 13%
Local government 7% N/A
Iwi 5% N/A
Government funded advocacy 5% N/A
Trade Federations N/A 35%
Regional representation N/A 8%
International Organisations N/A 5%
Think Tanks N/A 1%
Source: Unsworth, 2014
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corporations may also do this). 
Corporations with an employee with an 
access card currently include Air New 
Zealand, Fonterra, Chorus and Westpac. 
These people have roles as directors or 
managers of ‘external relations’, ‘com-
munications’ or ‘public affairs’; many of 
them have previous political experience in 
different guises.1
Specialist lobbying firms – inter-
mediaries – also appear to be an important 
part of the market. These firms provide 
lobbying services for multiple clients. Who 
these clients are is unclear, and it is 
unknown how much the firms are paid and 
to what extent clientele engage in one-off 
transactions or repeat business. However, 
c l ients  are  a lmost  cer ta inly 
disproportionately weighted towards the 
business sector. Well-known firms such as 
Saunders Unsworth, Busby Ramshaw Grice 
Ltd and Boag Allen SvG all have employees 
with cards. Many of these specialist 
lobbyists also have extensive experience 
within the political system.
The organisations representing 
industries with representatives on the list 
are peak organisations whose activity is 
affected regularly by regulations and 
legislation. A significant number of trade 
unionists are also on the list. It is unclear 
whether union representatives on the list 
are full-time lobbyists.
The card list suggests that a relatively 
small lobbying market exists in New 
Zealand. Indeed, the established wisdom is 
that the market is both relatively small and 
unimportant (see, for example, Walters, 
2017). In order to contextualise this 
conjecture, the per capita number of 
lobbyists in the United States and Australia 
is of relevance. In 2016 the United States 
had 11,143 active lobbyists for a population 
of 323 million.2 If New Zealand had a 
similar per capita proportion, there would 
be about 164 local lobbyists. Australia has 
554 registered lobbyists currently and a 
population of about 24 million.3 Having 
an Australian per capita figure here would 
mean about 108 lobbyists. 
The card data suggests that the New 
Zealand lobbying market is roughly 13% 
the size of the United States’ and 20% the 
size of Australia’s. However, the access card 
list, while giving an approximation of the 
distribution of institutions engaging in 
lobbying, has several important deficiencies 
as a data source for the number of lobbyists 
employed. What does it miss? First, not all 
professional employees of a lobbying 
company have swipe card access. For 
example, according to their website 
Saunders Unsworth has five professional 
staff, but only two have cards. A further 
major deficiency is that it does not include 
some firms known to be part of the 
lobbying market. Lobbying firms that do 
not have staff currently on the list but have 
had previously include Silvereye 
Communications (employing eight 
people), Dart Government Relations (two 
people) and Acumen Republic (12). Taking 
into account firms previously with card 
access and still operating increases the 
market by around ten firms and by a much 
larger number of lobbyists.
The true size of the market is even 
larger. There are many lobbying firms and 
communications agencies which have 
never had access cards. An internet search 
for ‘government relations firms nz’ shows 
many such firms, including Exceltium, 
Boyd Public Relations and Adroite. And 
there are a number of recent new entrants 
to the market, including Barton Deakin 
and Hawker Britton.
Other significant sectors of the lobbying 
market are not represented. Many major 
law firms provide lobbying services (such 
as Buddle Findlay, Simpson Grierson and 
Johnston Lawrence). Chen Palmer, a 
leading specialist public law firm, has never 
had card access to Parliament but provides 
clients with services which most likely 
include lobbying (Chen Palmer, 2018).
Another sector absent from the list is 
NGOs. These organisations are often a 
significant lobbying presence during the 
legislative process. One explanation for this 
absence is that NGOs gain political 
influence through methods other than 
parliamentary meetings. How relatively 
important NGOs are is unclear, and it may 
be that Unsworth has overestimated the 
extent of NGO lobbying.
The card list is also not fully 
representative of the market because MPs 
can be lobbied outside Parliament. 
Lobbyists can use their contacts to instigate 
meetings or conversations with politicians 
without needing to regularly enter 
Parliament. Paid people can lobby 
government through phone calls, email, 
letters, and oral or written submissions. 
Thus, the number of paid lobbyists is likely 
to be by an order of magnitude larger than 
the parliamentary access card data suggests. 
Overall, the New Zealand lobbying market 
may more closely resemble that of Australia, 
for example, than New Zealanders probably 
like to believe.
Additionally, the trend suggested by the 
size of the list of people with cards creates 
the impression that local lobbying has been 
through a boom–bust cycle. However, this 
perception is probably inaccurate. It is 
difficult to effectively gauge growth in the 
lobbying industry, but it is unlikely to be 
decreasing in size (as discussed above). 
Indeed, an experienced observer suggests 
that it is growing (Edwards, 2017, 2018b), 
a view supported by evidence of recent new 
entrants to the industry. 
How do specialist lobbyists operate?
Based on their websites, firms offering 
lobbying services appear to be fairly 
uniform in how their services are structured 
and presented to customers. All lobbying 
firms that have previously had card access 
All lobbying firms that have previously 
had card access to Parliament consist 
of small teams of between one and a 
dozen or so employees, with one or two 
support staff and the bulk of staff being 
professionals. 
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to Parliament consist of small teams of 
between one and a dozen or so employees, 
with one or two support staff and the bulk 
of staff being professionals. As already 
noted, many lobbyists have previous work 
experience within government (Tyler, 2015, 
pp.13–14). The Frank Bold Foundation 
suggests that ‘the single most valuable tool 
any lobbyist has is their contacts with and 
links to politicians and decision-makers’ 
(Kwiatkowski, 2016). This experience 
is a selling point across all lobbying 
firms. Evidently, these ex-government 
employees maintain their contacts inside 
government once they leave, and cultivate 
their relationships to deliver policy results 
for clients. For some, this maintenance is 
aided by refreshing of their connections 
via revolving door appointments, from 
lobby organisations to political staff and 
back (Edwards, 2018a). Some lobbyists 
make their way in from the other direction: 
current National Party MP Chris Bishop 
and former National Party MP Todd 
Barclay were both lobbyists before entering 
Parliament (Emanuel, 2018).
Another notable characteristic of the 
market is that not all firms solely offer 
lobbying services. Many firms also offer 
public relations, public law, strategic 
communications or crisis management as 
services. Indeed, perhaps to avoid the 
public stigma of ‘lobbying’, firms tend to 
avoid describing their work as such. Instead 
they tactfully choose to describe their work 
using terms such as ‘government relations’, 
‘influencing policy’ or ‘advocacy’. 
Most firms operate across the political 
spectrum. However, if one takes Adam 
Smith’s famous dictum ‘the division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market’ 
seriously, the recent market entry of 
partisan lobby firms Barton Deakin and 
Hawker Britton may be a further indication 
of the growth of the local lobbying industry, 
as it is now large enough to sustain left–
right specialisation. Although their 
entrance into the market may signal a 
swing towards a partisan lobbying model 
more closely resembling the American or 
Australian markets, only time will tell if it 
is successful. 
Current charge-out rates for lobbyists 
are unclear, but casual charge-out rates 
were reported as being in the vicinity of 
$400 per hour or $3200 per day in 2011, 
which suggests that comparatively high 
levels of remuneration are common 
(Dudding, 2011). Pay rates, billable hours, 
overheads and hence profitability are 
unclear. 
What lobbyists actually do on a day-to-
day basis to earn their coin and who they 
do it for is not transparent (see Tyler, 2015, 
pp.33–4 for a discussion of the possible 
range of activities which may be part of 
lobbying). Indications are that most 
clientele are businesses (Dudding, 2011). 
Mai Chen, a public lawyer who prefers not 
to identify as a lobbyist, says that lobbyists 
offer translation services between two 
groups, public policymakers and businesses, 
which speak different languages (Dudding, 
2011; see also Emanuel, 2018). From this 
perspective, a large proportion of the work 
lobbyists do is grease, improving 
information provided to public officials. 
The translator metaphor raises a question 
of justice: who can and can’t afford to pay 
for ‘translation services’? And why, if 
translation is so important, do public 
servants, on the other side of the divide, 
not hire such translators for all citizens, 
rather than only those who can afford 
them?
Due to the lack of regulation, it is 
difficult to know both who lobbyists act for, 
and whether lobbyists behave ethically. 
Investigative journalist Nicky Hager has 
shed light on the inner workings of 
government by detailing cases where 
lobbyists, public officials and organisations 
have worked together to coordinate 
misleading public relations campaigns: this 
is pure sand (see also Tyler, 2015, p.17). 
Hence, the claim that lobbyists always act 
in the public interest is demonstrably 
incorrect. The issue is how much of such 
behaviour occurs relative to socially useful 
‘translation’ services, and how damaging 
the former is relative to the latter.
Should New Zealand regulate lobbying?
The OECD has advocated developing 
non-reactive and coherent regulatory 
approaches to lobbying in order to 
maintain and enhance public trust in 
the democratic process (OECD, 2009). 
The above discussion has examined the 
limited information on local lobbying. 
Acknowledging its limitations, it does 
not support the notion that the lobbying 
market in New Zealand is sui generis. 
Given what we know about local lobbying, 
is there then any strong reason why 
New Zealand should not follow OECD 
recommendations and implement well-
considered, transparency-enhancing 
reforms? 
Market-based lobbying is an area of 
human engagement where two opposing 
values come into contact and thus into 
conflict. The first value is that of the market, 
where one dollar equals one vote, and 
where dollars are unequally distributed 
across the population, local and 
international. The second is that of 
democratic citizenship, where, ideally, one 
adult citizen of a nation state has one vote 
and votes are equally distributed across the 
voting population (or, more broadly, hours 
available for non-market lobbying activities 
are roughly equally distributed across 
citizens).
There are further contextual factors in 
this conflict that are important. There has 
Investigative journalist Nicky Hager 
has shed light on the inner workings 
of government by detailing cases 
where lobbyists, public officials and 
organisations have worked together to 
coordinate misleading public relations 
campaigns: this is pure sand ...
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been a worldwide rise in wealth inequality 
and shift in the functional distribution of 
income towards corporate profits in recent 
times (Piketty, 2015). This shift has also 
been taking place locally (Rosenberg, 2018). 
At the same time, an increasingly 
authoritarian and kleptocratic China is 
flexing its growing economic muscle in 
sophisticated efforts to influence domestic 
political processes, including in New 
Zealand (Brady, 2017).4 Hence, lobbying 
activities – by increasingly wealthy 
individuals, by increasingly profitable local 
and multinational corporate entities and 
by increasingly anti-democratic nation 
states – are coming into growing conflict 
with notions of democratic citizenship. At 
the same time, with union membership in 
New Zealand declining from 42.9% of the 
workforce in 1991 to 17.7% in 2016, 
organised labour’s countervailing lobbying 
power has been significantly eroded relative 
to the corporate sector (Ryall and 
Blumenfeld, 2017). These shifts in power 
have intensified, and likely will continue to 
exacerbate the ongoing conflict between 
market values and democratic citizenship. 
There are good reasons to believe that 
lobbying may directly throw sand into the 
wheels of society, as well as indirectly 
undermining values underpinning 
democratic citizenship, and these problems 
are going to be larger in the absence of 
transparency. There are also reasons for 
believing that these problems are likely to 
become worse over time. Hence, action on 
these matters today is likely to be easier 
than action tomorrow, as growing vested 
interests will make stronger efforts to hide 
lobbying activities that are privately 
beneficial but socially damaging. 
Low compliance cost approaches which 
provide the raw material for a better 
informed democratic citizenship and do 
not impose high costs on legitimate 
lobbying are likely to be the most 
appropriate policy responses. The OECD 
has recommended significant change in 
this area, change which occurs in a 
considered manner, unprompted by the 
heat of major scandal (OECD, 2009). 
Recent Green Party commitments to 
publish details of ministerial diaries and 
receipt of perks are to be applauded (Cook, 
2018). There is no reason why such public 
disclosures should not be enforced by law 
for all elected members of Parliament, as 
representatives of the people. Extension of 
this form of transparency to elected local 
government officials is also desirable.
In addition, it is time to again consider 
a register of lobbyists and their clients, 
adoption of a formal code of conduct along 
the lines of that in Australia, and regular 
collection and publication of data on who 
spends what on market lobbying. Again, 
this form of policy response is a relatively 
low compliance cost measure which makes 
the process more transparent, and thus 
more consistent with principles of 
democratic citizenship. 
The publication of ministerial diaries, 
and the creation of a register of lobbyists 
and their clients and publication of the 
value of their spending would provide the 
public with a body of pertinent information 
to enable them to better understand the 
decisions made by their elected 
representatives. Transparency will help 
citizens to better judge for themselves 
whether lobbying is socially valuable grease 
or anti-social sand in the democratic 
wheels.
Some level of regulation of the lobbying 
industry would also discourage unethical 
behaviour. Given New Zealand’s high levels 
of transparency and relative lack of 
corruption (Transparency International, 
2016), some might question whether even 
light-handed regulation of the lobbying 
market is necessary. One view is that 
regulation is unnecessary, because lobbyists 
are self-regulating and ethical (Dudding, 
2011; Emanuel, 2018). Neale Jones, lobbyist 
for Hawker Britton, believes that because 
Wellington is a ‘small town’, lobbyists can’t 
get away with what he calls a ‘breach of 
faith’. Barry Saunders of Saunders 
Unsworth agrees, again seeing the small 
industry as self-policing. Jones insists that 
he has rejected clients in the past on ethical 
grounds (Emanuel, 2018). Barton Deakin’s 
website includes an ‘Ethics’ page, which 
states that the firm ‘acts in the broader 
public interest in all its dealings with clients 
and governments’ (Barton Deakin, 2017). 
Ethics statements are uncommon on other 
lobbyist websites. The insistence by 
lobbyists that they act ethically and that 
their industry is effectively self-regulating 
can be seen, not mutually exclusively, as 
honest, unbiased observation, self-
interested business protection or cognitive 
dissonance about what they are doing. The 
lack of industry transparency means that 
separating the signal from the noise in 
these claims is impossible.
However, the creation of low 
compliance cost regulation, with a strong 
transparency focus, would likely not be 
strongly objected to by those within the 
industry. In the report of the government 
administration select committee regarding 
the 2012 Lobbying Disclosure Bill, it was 
noted that most of the 103 submissions 
received ‘supported [the bill’s] intent of 
enhancing trust in the integrity and 
impartiality of democracy and political 
decision-making by bringing more 
transparency to political lobbying’ 
(Government Administration Committee, 
2013). Furthermore, lobbyists Jenna 
Raeburn and Neale Jones are not opposed 
to a register similar to those in Australia 
and Canada, since their firms’ Australian 
operations have not been negatively 
affected by the mandatory register of 
lobbyists and their clients (Emanuel, 2018). 
Lobbying may be grease in the wheel of 
politics, or it may be sand, or – perhaps 
inevitably – it may be a complex mixture 
of both. Although this study has produced 
some idea of the nature of the lobbying 
market, it is still unclear who lobbyists 
Given New Zealand’s high levels 
of transparency and relative lack of 
corruption ... some might question 
whether even light-handed regulation of 
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work for and how they act, with little hard 
evidence available to illuminate the true 
nature of the industry. The key point 
uncovered is that citizens lack convincing 
evidence for sand or grease. This is why 
regulation is needed – to shine a brighter 
light on a currently shadowy industry 
which has significant long-term potential 
to corrode the integrity of the democratic 
process. The aim of regulation would also 
be to contribute positively to making the 
industry more about grease and less about 
sand. With multiple stakeholders, as well 
as the OECD, in agreement that well-
designed regulation is necessary, the 
question must surely be: why not? 
1 Information was obtained by viewing the LinkedIn pages of 
lobbyists who have been, or currently are, on the swipe card 
access list. Pages accessed 15 February 2018. 
2  From https://www.statista.com/statistics/257340/number-
of-lobbyists-in-the-us/, downloaded 20 March 2018.
3  From http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/who_register_lobbyists.cfm, 
downloaded 20 March 2018.
4  In this context, note that Saunders Unsworth advertise 
their services in a Chinese language section: see http://www.
sul.co.nz/page/chinese-section.aspx. Whether they have 
clientele from China, as opposed to Chinese New Zealanders, 
and if so who they are and what they may be lobbying about 
is unknown. Silvereye also appear to have an advertised 
presence directed at China: see http://www.silvereye.co.nz/
about-us/ (accessed 20 March 2018).
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Abstract 
With pressures growing on international rules, Jacinda Ardern’s 
new government faces extra challenges in shaping a principled 
New Zealand foreign policy based on the consistent assertion of 
values. Many of these external challenges are being felt in Asia. Even 
if force can be avoided on the Korean peninsula, escalating tariff 
competition between the United States and China may signal deep 
challenges for the rules of the road that suit New Zealand. As the 
wider storm clouds grow, the Ardern government’s focus on the 
South Pacific in cooperation with Australia offers some respite. But 
the Labour–New Zealand First coalition may complicate the delivery 
of predictable and creditable foreign policy stances.
Keywords foreign policy, security, trade, Asia, Pacific
In its briefing document for Winston 
Peters, the incoming minister of foreign 
affairs, the country’s diplomats made 
no bones about the challenges ahead: 
‘New Zealand is pursuing its interests in 
a turbulent environment where the risks 
for small countries are acute’ (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p.6). 
This article provides a snapshot of 
some of New Zealand’s leading 
international policy challenges and what 
these mean for Wellington’s international 
policy preferences. As the reader will note, 
many of these external challenges are 
occurring in the Asia–Pacific region. This 
is not only the location for many of New 
Zealand’s most significant interests. It is 
also the region where the Ardern 
government will need to work doubly hard 
to find partners sharing at least some of 
Wellington’s international priorities.
Regional peace
The first of New Zealand’s regional interests 
is the preservation of interstate peace in 
Asia. To this positive condition is closely 
linked the regional prosperity which has 
allowed New Zealand companies to pursue 
Robert Ayson
The Ardern Government’s 
Foreign Policy 
Challenges
Robert Ayson is Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, where he works in 
close association with the Centre for Strategic Studies.
New Zealand general election outcomes are seldom shaped by foreign policy debates. No 
exception to this rule is the changed 
political landscape which has produced 
Jacinda Ardern’s Labour-led coalition 
government. The new prime minister’s 
rise was propelled by domestic political 
concerns about housing, child poverty and 
income inequality. But the new coalition 
has also taken office at a time of serious 
doubt and fluidity in international politics. 
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trade and investment opportunities in a 
favourable regional environment. But at 
the time of New Zealand’s general election 
in September 2017, concern was growing 
about a possible war over North Korea’s 
accelerating nuclear weapons programme. 
The United States intelligence community 
was on the cusp of judging that Kim Jong-
Un’s regime could bring a nuclear-armed 
intercontinental ballistic missile back 
into the earth’s atmosphere and deliver 
a nuclear weapon onto a continental 
American target. Newly inaugurated 
president Donald Trump had asserted that 
this North Korean breakthrough would 
not happen on his watch. And he seemed 
intent on doing more than matching 
Kim’s outlandish rhetoric. Trump gave the 
appearance of being willing to use force to 
roll back North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
ambitions. 
Such a violent development could have 
grave implications for New Zealand and its 
regional partners. Even an initially limited 
use of force by the United States designed 
to destroy some of North Korea’s missiles 
and warheads could lead to a quickly 
escalating armed conflict. Many expect that 
North Korea would respond with a barrage 
of artillery attacks on nearby South Korea 
at the very least. But if it believed that an 
American attack was imminent, North 
Korea might act first. And even if it waited 
for the US to initiate a conflict, North Korea 
might decide that it needed to use its 
nuclear weapons early before it loses the 
chance to do so.
As North Korea’s ally, China would face 
some very difficult choices in any of these 
scenarios. If Beijing did enter a growing 
war, this would mean New Zealand’s largest 
trading partner was involved in a violent 
conflict with the most powerful of New 
Zealand’s traditional security partners. In 
the event that Australia came good on 
indications that it would support the 
United States should war break out 
(Dziedzic, 2017), New Zealand would have 
even less scope for staying on the sidelines, 
militarily as well as diplomatically.
It is a statement of the glaringly obvious 
that New Zealand’s preference is for a 
negotiated settlement which avoids 
violence on the peninsula. Ardern’s 
immediate predecessor as prime minister, 
Bill English, observed that an especially 
volatile example of Trump’s rhetorical 
pressure on North Korea was ‘not helpful’. 
This sentiment was noticed internationally 
(Nelson, 2017). As a middle ground 
between proper disarmament negotiations, 
which have often seemed unlikely, and the 
use of violent force, which seems potentially 
catastrophic, New Zealand has supported 
the use of economic sanctions to place 
pressure on Pyongyang. That also means 
welcoming any sign of US–China 
cooperation to facilitate that sanctions 
pressure, including in Trump’s early 
interactions with China’s leader Xi Jinping. 
In her first speech on foreign policy 
since becoming prime minister, Ardern 
returned to a familiar Labour theme in 
relation to the North Korea–US stand-off: 
New Zealand’s commitment to multilateral 
nuclear disarmament (Ardern, 2018a). This 
approach, she has suggested, gives 
Wellington a particular angle on this vexing 
example of nuclear proliferation. Her 
government can be expected to give even 
stronger attention to the nuclear 
disarmament treaty that the Key–English 
government supported at the United 
Nations General Assembly. But there is a 
long distance between this universalistic 
(and hopeful) approach and the particular 
kind of diplomacy Trump and Kim may 
have in mind if a meeting between them 
goes ahead. 
Any such discussion is unlikely to 
resolve the conundrum of North Korea’s 
desire to retain nuclear weapons as the best 
chance of regime survival and international 
leverage. Unless Trump pulls off a miracle 
(even less likely it would seem than Ronald 
Reagan’s arms reduction progress with 
Gorbachev), we may be back to a more 
hazardous drawing board. With Trump’s 
Cabinet becoming more hawkish since the 
departure of Gary Cohn, Rex Tillerson and 
H.R. McMaster, possibly only defense 
secretary Mattis would stand in the way of 
a risky use of force by the United States, 
which would likely end several decades of 
interstate peace in north Asia. 
Regional prosperity
Armed conflict on the Korean peninsula 
would be a severe test for US–China 
relations. New Zealand’s continuing 
hopes for regional stability have assumed 
significant common interests between these 
two great powers. This has been a plausible 
hope: Beijing and Washington have long 
had shared interests in Asia’s remarkable 
economic expansion. New Zealand has 
also benefited from the choices made by 
the vast majority of Asian economies to 
embrace global trade and investment. 
Some of the most recent and largest of these 
benefits have come from China’s increasing 
participation in global markets. But it has 
also been in New Zealand’s interests for 
established Western economies, including 
the United States, to remain active in the 
region and remain committed to an open 
and rules-based international trading and 
investment system. 
That both China and the United States 
have supported pathways to closer regional 
economic integration need not produce an 
economically competitive environment, 
forcing New Zealand to make all-or-
nothing choices. Wellington’s approach has 
been to embrace as many of these options 
as possible. Fears of overdependence on 
one large partner have been balanced by 
the commitment of the other: Wellington 
... both China and the United States 
have supported pathways to closer 
regional economic integration need not 
produce an economically competitive 
environment, forcing New Zealand to 
make all-or-nothing choices.
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would have found it more challenging to 
endorse China’s Belt and Road initiative, 
for example, had it not been for America’s 
active participation in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). 
This favourable equilibrium was tested 
by the Trump administration’s decision to 
withdraw the United States from the TPP 
process. In this new situation, Bill English’s 
government was happy to accept the 
prospect of Japan, the largest remaining 
economy in the group of 11, becoming the 
TPP’s unofficial leader. But National-led 
governments were unencumbered by 
serious doubts about the virtues of this 
high-profile trade agreement. This was not 
Ardern’s situation. Labour was unhappy 
with some of the TPP’s more contentious 
clauses, and its two political partners, New 
Zealand First and the Greens, held even 
greater reservations. 
In the final negotiations, which 
produced the more inclusively named CP 
(Comprehensive and Progressive) TPP, the 
Ardern government got some, but not all, 
of the changes it was seeking. This was a 
typical bargain where nobody emerged 
completely satisfied with the outcome. 
Even though the coalition has been 
engaging in a little bit of protectionism of 
its own, it was able to say that in supporting 
the revised agreement New Zealand 
remained a friend of economic openness. 
The risk had been averted that in her first 
major regional visit, to Vietnam for the 
APEC summit, the new prime minister 
would signal a significant reduction in New 
Zealand’s role in regional economic 
diplomacy.
Yet some bigger clouds on the trade 
policy horizon may present New Zealand 
with a regional picture unknown to any of 
Ardern’s recent prime ministerial 
predecessors. Donald Trump is now 
threatening to impose tariffs on major 
trading partners with whom the United 
States has a deficit. Many of Washington’s 
security allies – Canada, many other NATO 
partners in Europe, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and Australia – have been on the 
receiving end of these threats, although 
some of them have sought exclusions for 
themselves. But all along Trump’s big target 
was China, and as this article was being 
finalised the president was engaged in the 
early stages of what many fearful onlookers 
have depicted as an embryonic trade war. 
Even if that more extreme situation is 
avoided, almost any level of tariff escalation 
between the United States and China is bad 
news for New Zealand’s prospects. If these 
two leading economies define their 
economic relationship through a 
mercantilist lens, disregarding the mutual 
benefits of economic interdependence, the 
signals for the world economy in which 
New Zealand makes its living will be 
unmistakably negative. When Trump was 
taking a protectionist line on the campaign 
trail, Xi claimed that China was the new 
champion of economic globalism. But the 
more that Trump tries to push China 
around, the more that Xi will be inclined 
to focus on China’s prestige as a great 
power which can respond in kind.
In that sort of tussle, smaller, trade-
dependent countries like New Zealand will 
worry about the future of a trading order 
based on restraint around common rules 
and understandings. And if Mr Trump 
decides that Washington can live without 
the World Trade Organization – the central 
pillar of that system of rules – one of the 
foundations of New Zealand’s global 
connections will have been put at risk. It is 
hard to imagine a shift by Washington away 
from the fabric of global governance, aside 
from withdrawing from the United Nations 
itself, which could attract graver concerns 
from Wellington. 
Who is stepping up and stepping in? 
As the United States steps back from 
international economic leadership, some 
of New Zealand’s other leading partners 
have been trying to fill some of the 
vacuum. These include the European 
Union (EU) and Japan, who have agreed 
between themselves to a major free trade 
agreement. As well as the prospect of 
New Zealand–Japan free trade relations 
in a completed CPTPP, making progress 
towards a free trade agreement between 
New Zealand and Europe is part of the 
Ardern government’s negotiating agenda. 
But this will take time and it will not be 
easy to extract the agricultural concessions 
that New Zealand will be seeking. Unlike 
the prospects for a bilateral free trade 
agreement with the United Kingdom, the 
EU trading relationship was not mentioned 
in the prime minister’s big speech (Ardern, 
2018a). 
As America’s commitment falters and 
the United Kingdom is consumed by Brexit, 
New Zealand will welcome signs that other 
liberal democracies are keen to sustain an 
open trading order. Wellington will not 
want its Western partners to leave the stage 
to China. Many of New Zealand’s regional 
trading partners will remember China’s 
important contribution to their economic 
futures 20 years ago during the Asian 
financial crisis. They would have suffered 
even more from the more recent global 
financial crisis, which began with a 
meltdown in US housing securities, had it 
not been for the engine of growth that 
China’s economy has become. Like New 
Zealand, many Asia–Pacific countries are 
participating in China’s Belt and Road 
initiative and Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. These are further signs 
of China’s growing clout.
Like its predecessors, the Ardern 
government will be attracted to the benefits 
that a growing China provides to New 
Zealand’s region. But the era of American 
indifference to its international com-
mitments poses additional challenges for 
this approach. If New Zealand’s default 
strategy has been to say yes to initiatives 
from both China and the United States so 
as to encourage an equilibrium between 
As America’s commitment falters and 
the United Kingdom is consumed by 
Brexit, New Zealand will welcome signs 
that other liberal democracies are keen 
to sustain an open trading order.
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them, that strategy will now need to be 
revisited. There are now increased risks to 
New Zealand of being seen as beholden to 
China – and impressions count for a lot in 
these matters. But simply cutting back on 
connections with China is hardly an option. 
One can hardly imagine a New Zealand 
government that would decide, for 
example, not to seek an upgraded free trade 
agreement with Beijing. 
Yet New Zealand cannot ignore the 
obvious signs that a more powerful China 
is producing complex and unsettling effects 
whose impact will increasingly be felt. The 
Communist Party of China, which now 
appears to have Xi Jinping as its permanent 
head, wants to silence alternative political 
voices. Its approach to freedom of 
expression and to the openness of the 
internet run contrary to the views of New 
Zealand and other democracies. The more 
that Beijing, sometimes in conjunction 
with Moscow, encourages other 
governments to celebrate non-liberal 
political norms, the less this will work for 
New Zealand’s interests and values. 
New Zealand has been somewhat 
cautious in taking public stands against 
non-democratic politics, at least when this 
means criticising great powers on their 
human rights records. The new prime 
minister’s speech to the New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs gave the 
impression of breaking new ground by 
indicating that under her government New 
Zealand would not hesitate to raise with 
China its different views on ‘human rights, 
pursuing our trade interests, or the security 
and stability of our region’ (Ardern, 2018a). 
But any notion that this represents a 
significant pushback on China is likely to 
be premature. There is no sign, moreover, 
that New Zealand is willing to join a US-led 
chorus identifying China as lying outside 
the international order. 
Upholding international rules
This brings to mind the third main area 
of foreign policy challenge for the new 
government: how Ardern’s team will 
approach the promotion and protection 
of the systems and groups of rules of 
international conduct which have served 
New Zealand’s interests so well. This sits 
right in the middle of Labour’s traditional 
foreign policy agenda. Support for 
international law, negotiated settlements 
of international crises, a strong United 
Nations, and multilateral approaches to 
complex issues are all part of the foreign 
policy DNA that Ardern has inherited as 
the party’s (and the country’s) new leader. 
But the international rules, formally 
instituted as well as informally observed, 
that have worked so well for New Zealand 
are being challenged in multiple directions. 
Many of these problems were doc-
umented by National-led governments of 
the Key–English era. For example, New 
Zealand’s 2016 Defence White Paper drew 
attention to Russia’s violation of the rules 
of sovereignty in its annexation of Crimea 
and intervention in Ukraine (New Zealand 
Government, 2016, p.32). At this time New 
Zealand held one of the temporary seats 
on the UN Security Council, where it was 
an enormous struggle to get great power 
consensus on which restraints, rules and 
sanctions should apply to the various 
parties causing humanitarian distress in 
Syria. And the battlefield defeat of ISIS does 
not mean that transnational terrorism, and 
the damage it does to basic rules of justice 
and civility, has departed from the 
international scene. 
Other challenges abound. The 
willingness and capacity of many states to 
accord refugees and asylum seekers their 
full rights under international law has been 
reduced as populist nationalism rises in 
many places, often in tandem with national 
security concerns. The fabric of arms 
control, which has helped regulate strategic 
relations between the United States and 
Russia, is under severe strain. Finding new 
rules for emerging areas of potential 
cooperation and competition is not being 
made any easier in this divisive climate of 
international opinion. That includes, of 
course, climate change itself – although, in 
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, the 
Trump administration has turned the 
United States into a solitary dissenter rather 
than a leader of a strong pack of holdouts. 
The emerging areas also include cyber 
security, where very different notions of 
government–civil society relations and 
rights are competing for influence.
Interstate relations in the Asia–Pacific 
region seldom emphasise formal rules and 
deeply institutionalised processes of 
negotiation. One might wonder if 
Wellington can therefore relax in the face 
of arguments that the rule-making and 
keeping part of the international order is 
being undermined. But a quick survey of 
regional developments suggests otherwise. 
For example, South East Asian 
multilateralism, to which New Zealand 
attaches great importance in its regional 
engagement (McKinnon, 2016, pp.31–3), 
prescribes the avoidance of force in 
international disputes along the lines of the 
UN Charter. And while China has preferred 
generally non-violent forms of pressure to 
pursue its aims in the South China Sea, its 
approach still clashes with widely 
understood views of Beijing’s obligations 
under international law. Washington’s 
criticism of China’s approach, which has 
been stepped up in 2018, would be more 
convincing if the Senate had ratified 
America’s signature to the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, whose importance 
will only grow as competition for maritime 
influence and resources expands. While 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing 
is in violation of obligations to the Security 
The willingness and capacity of 
many states to accord refugees and 
asylum seekers their full rights under 
international law has been reduced 
as populist nationalism rises in many 
places, often in tandem with national 
security concerns.
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Council, an American decision to use 
preventive force against North Korea would 
still be widely seen as contrary to 
international law.
Encouraging rules-based behaviour is 
also important closer to home. New 
Zealand’s hopes for order in the South 
Pacific rest in part on regional consensus 
at the Pacific Islands Forum. This has made 
Fiji’s challenge to that institution’s 
prominence an issue of some concern. That 
consensus may be an important issue if the 
region is soon faced with unsettling 
political developments in New Caledonia 
and Bougainville. In terms of regulating the 
role of powerful external actors, establishing 
rules of the road for the responsible 
distribution of overseas aid monies by the 
major powers (including China) in the 
Pacific is a continuing priority for 
Wellington. This was hinted at, rather than 
directly addressed, in Winston Peters’ 
speech in Sydney at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy with the argument that 
New Zealand, Australia, the US and the EU 
(i.e. traditional Western donors) ‘need to 
better pool our energies and resources to 
maintain our relative influence’ (Peters, 
2018).
Further south, New Zealand’s interests 
are bound up inextricably with the 
Antarctic Treaty system, whose regulatory 
capacity is being challenged as several large 
states seek greater presence and possibilities 
for resource exploitation. An echo can 
sometimes be heard of Arctic developments, 
where climate change is opening up new 
navigation possibilities before there is 
consensus on how the new possibilities for 
competition can be managed.
In many of these issue areas New 
Zealand is a stakeholder in systems of rules 
that have often reflected Western influence 
on international relations since the Second 
World War. This doesn’t mean Wellington 
has been unable or unwilling to 
accommodate new sources and types of 
rules and institutions. Even more 
importantly, it does not mean that as rising 
powers come onto the scene they have 
necessarily sought to replace existing 
systems of rules with brand-new approaches 
reflecting completely contradictory 
interests. Some of the apparent challengers 
to the status quo have done very well out 
of the existing rules: China’s profitable 
embrace of economic globalisation is one 
such example. Another example is the 
liking that so many newer nation states 
have for old-fashioned ideas about national 
sovereignty, a quintessential foundation of 
the system of states. And even when rising 
powers use the United Nations to pursue 
divisive objectives, they are still using a set 
of institutions that were part of the post-
war consensus on the greater need for 
global governance.
This external environment poses some 
important questions for the values-based 
foreign policy that Prime Minister Ardern 
has been seen to emphasise (Sachdeva, 
2018). On one hand, there is the question 
of which areas are most likely to be 
responsive to a degree of extra engagement 
by New Zealand, so that there is some 
effective action to go alongside the lofty 
rhetoric. On the other hand, there is the 
issue of who New Zealand’s values-based 
partners are likely to be on any issue. At 
least on security issues, the Key–English 
years were marked by a growing emphasis 
on cooperation with New Zealand’s Five 
Eyes partners. A Labour-led coalition 
government supported by the Greens 
would seem less likely to hold to that 
conservative assumption. By the same 
token, the make-up of the Ardern–Peters 
coalition may complicate New Zealand’s 
ability to show solidarity with its Western 
partners on the challenges posed by 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia to the rules of 
international conduct (Radio New Zealand, 
2018). 
Regional partners? 
Quite who the Ardern government’s main 
international partners will be is a particular 
challenge in Asia, where so many polities 
are becoming distinctly less progressive. 
The default answer, resorted to regularly by 
Wellington in the past, is to emphasise New 
Zealand’s engagement with the multilateral 
forums which have grown up around the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
But in practice these forums have had 
a limited purchase on the region’s most 
contentious and difficult issues, including 
maritime territorial disputes. Too many of 
the hard issues continue to be deflected in 
the search for consensus. 
For some time New Zealand has needed 
to boost and broaden its Asia–Pacific 
bilateral connections in Asia (beyond its 
strong relationships with China and the 
United States). Some of this was beginning 
to take shape in the later years of the Key–
English era, but hardly in a revolutionary 
or surprising fashion. Enhancing New 
Zealand’s already close relationship with 
Singapore, a leading interlocutor, has been 
one such priority. This will likely appeal to 
the new government, with the possible 
exception of the idea of basing Singaporean 
fighter aircraft in New Zealand.
The second priority has been Japan, 
touted in the last white paper as a fellow 
supporter of the rules-based order (New 
Zealand Government, 2016, p.34). This is 
an important country with which New 
Zealand’s security relationship is relatively 
undeveloped. The prime minister has given 
little indication that Japan features 
prominently in her view of the world 
(Capie, 2018; McLachlan, 2018). How 
much her government will focus on Tokyo 
will depend partly on its appetite for risk, 
given the competition between Japan and 
China. It will probably make sense for New 
Zealand to be cautious about one of Shinzo 
Abe’s signature foreign policy ideas: an 
Indo-Pacific strategic partnership between 
Asia’s maritime democracies involving 
For some time New Zealand has needed 
to boost and broaden its Asia–Pacific 
bilateral connections in Asia (beyond its 
strong relationships with China and the 
United States). 
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Australia, India and the United States 
alongside Japan. The division of the region 
by regime type does not suit New Zealand’s 
inclinations or interests; nor does the 
prospect of encouraging the perception 
that Wellington seeks China’s containment.
Aside from these two partners, there 
aren’t too many other obvious choices in 
Asia. South Korea has moved in a more 
progressive direction under President 
Moon, but is very focused on problems on 
the peninsula. In April 2018, New Zealand 
received a rare visit from an Indonesia 
president. The shortage of attention given 
to this important event (Rabel, 2018) 
indicates that we should not get carried 
away in any expectations for growth in New 
Zealand’s relations with South East Asia’s 
largest and most important country. 
Elsewhere the prospects do not seem 
especially bright. Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines are beset by various 
domestic concerns. By comparison, 
Vietnam is remarkably stable, and has 
precious insights into the art of pursuing 
national interests during times of increasing 
geopolitical competition. But, despite the 
recent visit of Prime Minister Nguyen, 
there will be limits as to how much New 
Zealand would rely on a partnership with 
a one-party state in mainland South East 
Asia.
Australia’s importance
All of this has one obvious conclusion. 
New Zealand’s reliance on its bilateral 
partnership and alliance with Australia, 
still the most important relationship in 
Wellington’s approach to the region and 
to the world, is unlikely to diminish. 
For the Ardern government, facilitating 
trans-Tasman cooperation in many areas 
of common interest remains the first 
priority for New Zealand foreign policy. 
This suggests that it will be necessary to 
ensure that policy differences between New 
Zealand and Australia do not get in the way 
of a broader desire for collaboration. 
It is nothing new for Australia and 
New Zealand to adopt different approaches 
to the same foreign policy issue. If in the 
lead-up to last year’s general election in 
New Zealand, Wellington and Canberra 
had been taking different views on the 
treatment by other countries of asylum 
seekers and migrants, this would hardly 
be a significant issue for the trans-Tasman 
relationship. But New Zealand’s insistence 
that Australia agree to its offer to take 
some of the migrants which Australia had 
located on Manus Island in Papua New 
Guinea was too easily seen as an attempt 
by Wellington to influence Canberra’s 
domestic policy in a very sensitive area. 
This was compounded by concern within 
Malcolm Turnbull’s government that the 
New Zealand Labour Party and the 
Australian Labor Party (both still in 
opposition) were in some sort of collusion 
at a time when the Liberal–National 
coalition had a very delicate hold on 
power in the federal Parliament. 
Jacinda Ardern came into office with an 
even stronger commitment to raise this 
issue than had been seen under Bill English. 
The passions some New Zealanders feel 
about Australia’s treatment of asylum 
seekers had been compounded by concerns 
that New Zealand expatriates have been 
treated unfairly in their access to Australian 
government assistance. Australia’s policies 
had become a larger factor within New 
Zealand domestic politics, and vice versa. 
An early test of this problem came with 
Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop’s 
visit to meet with her trans-Tasman 
counterpart, Winston Peters. Bishop was 
on record for suggesting before New 
Zealand’s general election that the Turnbull 
government might find it hard to work 
with a New Zealand Labour government. 
But there were no obvious fireworks. Peters 
made possible an informal Auckland 
meeting between Bishop and Ardern, who 
would soon be in Australia to meet Turnbull 
and to reaffirm that Australia was 
‘New Zealand’s indispensable international 
partner’ (Ardern, 2018b). 
The South Pacific: venue for a progressive 
turn?
At that very time, Peters himself was 
speaking in Sydney extolling Australia’s 
role in the South Pacific as New Zealand’s 
preferred partner there (Peters, 2018). 
This is one part of the world where New 
Zealand knows Australia depends on its 
involvement. Of course, the reverse is also 
true, and it applies beyond the immediate 
region, including currently in Iraq, where 
New Zealand forces are working with 
their Australian colleagues. But the profile 
of Australia–New Zealand collaboration 
in their nearer neighbourhood depends 
partly on events. It would be churlish to 
suggest that what they both need is a Pacific 
crisis to remind them of their mutual 
dependence. And there are also always 
going to be risks of divergence. This could 
occur if an Ardern government is tempted 
to burnish its progressive credentials as a 
South Pacific leader which understands 
the concerns of small states in a way that a 
security-focused Australia may not. 
One opportunity, which could also be 
a risk in terms of the Australian relationship, 
is to promote New Zealand as a champion 
of Pacific small state concerns about 
climate change. This might play well as a 
component of Ardern’s argument that 
climate change is this generation’s version 
of the anti-nuclear movement (Ewing, 
2017). The part of that movement that 
grew in New Zealand drew on concerns 
about nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 
But as students of New Zealand’s foreign 
policy history also know, New Zealand’s 
nuclear free crescendo also benefited from 
the existence of two major-power testers of 
nuclear weapons, France and the United 
States. There is no comparable focus for 
... as students of New Zealand’s foreign 
policy history also know, New Zealand’s 
nuclear free crescendo also benefited 
from the existence of two major-power 
testers of nuclear weapons, France and 
the United States.
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opposition in the case of climate change 
which can mobilise a corresponding level 
of resistance and energy. The problem is 
more diffuse. Persuading Washington to 
return to the climate change table, for 
example, is absolutely no guarantee of 
sufficient levels of mitigation of this global 
problem.
The recent history of New Zealand 
foreign policy also suggests that 
governments don’t often get to choose in 
advance the crises and challenges around 
which their most important decisions will 
be made. Who in the Clark government 
when it came into office in 1999 would have 
thought that within two years New Zealand 
would be joining an international coalition 
in Afghanistan following a terrorist attack 
on the United States? The resulting 
improvement in relations between 
Wellington and Washington was the most 
important Clark-era diplomatic 
achievement alongside the completion of 
New Zealand’s free trade agreement with 
China. We cannot tell from the state of the 
world in 2018 or from the make-up of the 
new coalition government what the Ardern 
era’s main foreign policy contribution will 
be. It may not be a single thing. And it may 
be hardly noticeable. But to have 
encouraged New Zealand’s Asia–Pacific 
partners to prefer peace to war, trade to 
protectionism, and the rule of law to the 
law of the jungle, even in small ways, might 
just be enough.
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Abstract
This article studies the New Zealand government aid programme 
over the years of Murray McCully’s tenure as New Zealand’s foreign 
minister. The article uses quantitative and qualitative data to detail 
changes in New Zealand aid volume, sectoral and geographic foci, 
and quality. We argue that despite strong rhetoric from Minister 
McCully, change in some areas was surprisingly modest. Yet the 
minister had impacts in other areas, particularly on aid quality, 
foremost in the form of changes to the purpose of New Zealand aid.
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under Minister 
McCully
In the wake of the 2008 general election, Murray McCully became New Zealand’s foreign minister. He 
was to stay in this role until May 2017, 
a term that makes him New Zealand’s 
third longest serving foreign minister. As 
foreign minister McCully took an active 
interest in the New Zealand government’s 
aid programme. In this article we draw 
from publicly available data sources to 
study Minister McCully’s impacts on the 
New Zealand government aid programme. 
We first outline the organisational 
arrangement changes made in rescinding 
the aid programme’s semi-autonomous 
status. Second, we make use of OECD 
and Treasury data to describe quantitative 
changes in New Zealand aid – specifically, 
the extent to which New Zealand’s aid 
volume and effort, and regional and 
thematic foci, changed under McCully. 
We then explore McCully’s impact on New 
Zealand aid quality, using data from the 
New Zealand aid stakeholder survey, the 
OECD and qualitative sources. 
Our key findings are that McCully’s 
impacts were less in some areas than might 
have been anticipated on the basis of either 
the minister’s own rhetoric or the extent 
of controversy at the time. The minister 
did, however, have a significant impact in 
important ways. His organisational 
arrangement changes removed the aid 
programme’s authority and autonomy in 
relation to other foreign policy, but they 
did not completely prevent the aid 
programme from functioning. McCully 
increased the aid budget, but much more 
slowly than promised. He had little impact 
on aid’s concentration in the Pacific and 
aid to multilateral organisations, and, while 
some increase in aid for economic 
development occurred, it was not a radical 
transformation. However, the quality of 
New Zealand aid worsened under 
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McCully’s tenure, driven in part by his 
approach to managing the aid programme 
and in part by his desire to align aid with 
other foreign policy areas. This latter 
change saw the purpose of New Zealand 
aid giving become markedly more oriented 
towards advancing New Zealand’s interests 
rather than helping people in developing 
countries.
This article, it should be noted, focuses 
on the types of high-level change that can 
be tracked with publicly available data. The 
article also draws primarily on quantitative 
data. Because of this, subtler changes – 
such as shifts in the dynamics of the 
relationships that structure New Zealand 
aid work – are not captured in our study. 
Similarly, other areas for which there is no 
public data, such as aid programme staff 
turnover and staff morale, are not covered 
here. To fully investigate changes in New 
Zealand aid more qualitative research 
would be very useful. Nevertheless, the data 
we have compiled enables us to identify 
important areas of continuity and change.1
Background to the changes
While opposition spokesperson on foreign 
policy, McCully signalled early on that he 
planned to do things differently. In a paper 
written with National Party colleagues he 
stated that ‘[f]resh thinking [was] required 
on development assistance strategy’, and 
that ‘[t]he way ahead is not obvious but it 
does not lie in replicating failure’ (McCully 
et al., 2007, p.8). Upon assuming the role 
of foreign minister, he wasted no time in 
making his desired changes, requesting 
Cabinet papers be produced to justify 
change before Christmas 2008 (Spratt, 
2017). NZAID, New Zealand’s semi-
autonomous aid agency, was integrated 
back into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MFAT) (Cabinet Office, 2009a, 
p.2). The minister indicated that he 
planned to take a hands-on approach to 
aid programme management, deriding 
‘so-called development experts’ and 
‘development specialists’ (McCully, 
2009, p.1, 2011, p.1). On the minister’s 
recommendation, Cabinet agreed to 
increasingly concentrate aid in the 
Pacific region, and to make economic 
development the aid programme’s core 
focus (Cabinet Office, 2009b, p.1). McCully 
also pledged to increase the government 
aid budget (McCully, 2009). He also 
indicated that New Zealand’s aid work 
would be changed to ‘be consistent with, 
and support, New Zealand’s foreign policy 
and external relations outcomes’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2009b, p.1).
From the outset these changes were 
controversial, prompting critique from 
NGOs, academics, the private sector and 
political parties (New Zealand Labour 
Party, Green Party of Aotearoa New 
Zealand, Progressive Party and United 
Future, 2009; Coates, 2009; McGregor et 
al., 2013; Banks et al., 2012; Overton, 2009), 
as well as former aid programme staff (for 
example, Adams, 2011) and the media 
(New Zealand Herald, 2009). Yet the extent 
and impacts of the changes varied 
considerably.
Aid’s organisational arrangements
One area where the minister’s desire 
for change had a clear impact was the 
organisational structure of the New 
Zealand government aid programme. In 
2001, following a ministerial review of 
New Zealand’s aid, the Labour–Alliance 
coalition government decided to establish a 
semi-autonomous aid programme. Called 
the New Zealand Agency for International 
Development, or NZAID, this agency 
was still attached to MFAT, but it had 
greater autonomy and authority on aid 
policy. NZAID had an executive director 
who could provide advice directly to the 
minister, and responsibility for its own 
human resources and policy development. 
In 2009 McCully dismantled NZAID and 
the aid programme once again became an 
operational group within MFAT.
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Figure 1 – New Zealand aid volume
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Figure 2 – New Zealand aid effort (government aid/GNI)
Note: data is from the OECD’s OECD.stat database (OECD DAC, 2017).
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As we discuss in a later section, some of 
the negative long-term consequences of 
this change were less than many feared at 
the time. However, there is no evidence that 
these changes improved the quality of New 
Zealand aid. And in the short term the 
transaction costs were significant. Human 
resources and internal systems required 
realigning. Existing aid and development 
policies were also removed, and it took 
until early 2010 for a single international 
development policy statement to emerge 
(Spratt, 2012). 
Aid volume
Figure 1 shows the volume of New Zealand 
government aid over time. 
Initially, McCully pledged to increase 
the government aid budget to NZ$600 
million in 2012–13 (McCully, 2009). He 
subsequently pledged to increase aid to 
$621 million by the 2014–15 financial year 
(McCully, 2011). However, as Figure 1 
shows, the rate of increase was much slower 
than McCully promised, with the non-
inflation-adjusted aid spend only topping 
$600 million for the first time in the 
financial year ending 2017. As the inflation-
adjusted line in Figure 1 shows, with 
inflation accounted for, the increase across 
his tenure was only $36 million – a very 
modest 6% in total over nine years. 
Plausibly, the minister’s failure to deliver 
on promised growth in the aid budget 
might be explained by circumstances 
outside the minister’s control, such as 
overall economic performance and the 
Canterbury earthquakes. However, this 
explanation does not fit with available 
evidence. The New Zealand economy grew 
at a more rapid pace than the New Zealand 
aid budget across the years that McCully 
was foreign minister. The government 
could have at least increased aid in line with 
economic growth, but this did not happen. 
This can be seen in Figure 2, which shows 
New Zealand’s aid spending relative to 
economic performance, as measured by the 
standard international measure of aid 
effort, aid/gross national income (GNI). As 
a share of GNI, New Zealand’s aid spend 
crept downwards during McCully’s tenure.
Regional focus
Early in his time as foreign minister, 
McCully indicated that he wanted to 
increase New Zealand aid’s concentration 
in the Pacific (Cabinet Office, 2009b, 
p.1). As Figure 3 shows, New Zealand 
aid’s Pacific focus did increase under 
McCully’s tenure, yet the increase was 
quite small: four percentage points 
between 2009 and 2015. (2009 was the 
first calendar year in which McCully was 
able to exert an influence on country 
allocations.) Moreover, the increase was 
a continuation of existing trends. The 
particularly low aid share to the Pacific 
in 2003, 2004 and 2005 was a product 
of the Indian Ocean tsunami, and surges 
in aid to Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan 
(2004). Were it not for the tsunami, 
more than 50% of New Zealand country-
allocable aid would have been spent in 
the Pacific in every year since the turn 
of the millennium.
Spending on multilateral organisations
In his final speech as minister to the 
New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs, McCully spoke of his antipathy for 
multilateral organisations: ‘These giant 
process-driven bureaucracies generally 
deliver a below-average quality of service 
to the poorer countries of the world, 
especially those in our region’ (McCully, 
2017, p.1) For some in the New Zealand 
media this comment was indicative of a 
hard line that McCully had supposedly 
taken on multilateral aid organisations 
throughout his tenure (for example, 
Watkins, 2017). Given such reported 
antipathy, it seems reasonable to expect 
that McCully’s tenure as minister might 
have brought with it a decrease in New 
Zealand aid funding going to multilateral 
organisations.
Figure 4 shows New Zealand 
government aid broken down by 
multilateral and bilateral spending.2 In the 
years from 2000 to 2009, on average 23% 
of New Zealand aid was allocated via 
multilateral organisations. In the years 
since, on average 22% was allocated 
through multilateral means. McCully may 
have held strong views about the efficacy 
of multilateral organisations, yet these 
views do not appear to have had an effect 
on spending patterns.
Aid for economic development
One of the most controversial aspects 
of the changes that McCully brought 
to New Zealand aid was the decision to 
make economic development the aid 
programme’s core focus. As Figure 5 
shows, McCully’s time as foreign minister 
did bring an increase in the share of 
New Zealand aid devoted to economic 
development.
Economic development’s share of 
spending doubled from 15% in 2009 to 
30% in 2015. Since 2011 economic 
development has been the largest sector. 
This is a substantial change, yet the change 
hardly counts as a wholesale trans-
formation.3 Change occurred, yet it was 
less than might have been anticipated on 
the basis of either the minister’s statements 
or the public debate at the time.
Interestingly, the increased focus on 
economic development has not come at 
Figure 3 – Percentage of New Zealand aid spent in the Pacific
Note:  data is from the OECD’s OECD.stat database (OECD DAC, 2017). At the time of writing spending by region was only 
available from the OECD up to the end of the 2015 calendar year.
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the expense of humanitarian assistance, 
or education. The share of spending 
devoted to improving governance and, to 
a lesser extent, health in developing 
countries fell, but the real loser was the 
‘other’ category. This category is an 
amalgam of sub-categories. Analysis of 
these sub-categories shows that this fall 
was driven by a relative fall in aid allocated 
to the OECD category of ‘unallocated/
unspecified’. What this means is hard to 
interpret. One possible explanation is that 
previously uncategorised projects were 
recategorised as being related to economic 
development. If this has occurred, the 
extent of change in this area may actually 
be less than Figure 5 suggests.4
Aid quality
The 2015 New Zealand aid stakeholder 
survey (Wood and Burkot, 2016) surveyed 
senior managers in New Zealand aid 
NGOs and private sector contractors who 
worked regularly with the aid programme. 
It asked them a series of detailed questions 
about aid programme performance, both 
overall and with respect to specific aid 
programme attributes. While the sample of 
participants was comparatively small (62), 
all of the participants were well placed to 
assess aid programme performance, owing 
to their regular work with it. Significantly, 
the method affords detailed insights into 
aid programme functioning that are not 
readily able to be inferred through other 
means, such as the analysis of aid flows (for 
a detailed discussion of the method and 
its strengths and weaknesses compared to 
other approaches, see Wood, Burkot and 
Howes, 2017).
By far the most positive finding from 
the 2015 stakeholder survey can be seen in 
Figure 6. A significant majority of 
respondents thought the aid programme 
was effective. Favourable appraisals of the 
aid programme were less common from 
NGOs than from the private sector, and 
when asked in a separate question about 
trends in aid programme performance, 
fewer than a quarter of respondents said 
they thought the aid programme was 
becoming more effective. Nevertheless, 
given the transition the aid programme 
went through with NZAID’s dissolution, 
the effectiveness finding is an encouraging 
one. It also fits broadly with the high-level 
findings of the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee’s peer review of the 
New Zealand government aid programme 
(Development Assistance Committee, 
2015). To be clear, there is no evidence that 
the aid programme has been made more 
effective by the changes it has been through. 
Indeed, it may well be the case that 
effectiveness has deteriorated since 2008. 
Yet the finding remains encouraging in that 
the stakeholder survey data does not 
provide evidence of a catastrophic collapse 
in aid programme effectiveness. 
However, the 2015 stakeholder survey 
also brought more worrisome findings. 
Chief among these was the fact that the 
majority of surveyed stakeholders thought 
that New Zealand aid was primarily 
focused on advancing the commercial and 
geostrategic interests of New Zealand, 
rather than on helping reduce poverty. This 
view was advanced not only by NGO 
stakeholders, but also by private sector 
stakeholders (Wood and Burkot, 2016, 
p.13). 
Although geostrategic interests have 
always played some indirect role in guiding 
aspects of aid policy, in the years 
immediately prior to McCully’s time as 
foreign minister there was no evidence of 
New Zealand giving aid to advance its 
commercial interests, and the purpose of 
New Zealand aid giving was considered a 
strength (Waring, 2005; Development 
Assistance Committee, 2005). The shift 
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Figure 4 – New Zealand aid spending bilateral versus multilateral
Note:  data is from the OECD’s OECD.stat database (OECD DAC, 2017). Spending type is only available up to the end of the 2015 
calendar year.
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Figure 5 – New Zealand aid spending by sector
 
Note: data are from the OECD’s OECD.stat database (OECD DAC, 2017). Spending by sector is only available 
until the end of the 2015 calendar year.
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under McCully to an increased focus on 
New Zealand’s commercial and geostrategic 
interests emerged from the Cabinet 
decision to align aid with other foreign 
policy goals, of which, the minister stated, 
the most important element was the ability 
‘to align aid policy with trade policy’ 
(McCully, 2009, p.1). The use of aid to 
advance New Zealand’s commercial 
interests became evident in a number of 
aid projects. These included: bringing 
young South East Asian business leaders to 
New Zealand (New Zealand Aid 
Programme, n.d.-b); ‘agricultural 
diplomacy initiatives’ aimed at boosting 
relations between New Zealand and 
ASEAN agricultural agencies and 
agribusinesses (New Zealand Aid 
Programme, n.d.-a); and funding a costly 
dairy farming project in Myanmar which 
had little development justification but 
which brought potential commercial 
benefits for New Zealand (Spratt, 2012, 
2013; NZADDs, 2013; Wood, 2012; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2012). 
An increased focus on New Zealand’s 
commercial and geostrategic interests 
came with costs for other aid work. For 
example, as Figure 5 shows, the share of 
New Zealand aid devoted to education did 
not fall during the years McCully was 
foreign minister. However, the nature of 
New Zealand’s education spending 
changed to increasingly reflect New 
Zealand’s non-development foreign policy 
aims, something that significantly reduced 
the share of funding available for 
development-oriented education spending. 
When McCully took the helm, New 
Zealand’s aid for education was considered 
a strength, with systematic work being 
undertaken in a number of Pacific Island 
countries, particularly in primary 
education. This state of affairs reflected a 
profound shift from the beginning of the 
millennium, when most of New Zealand’s 
education aid was focused on scholarships 
for tertiary study in New Zealand 
(Development Assistance Committee, 2005, 
2000). 
Tertiary scholarships have some 
development merit. However, there is no 
evidence that they are as efficacious in 
fostering development as improving 
primary and secondary education is. On 
the other hand, tertiary education 
scholarships are thought to bring benefits 
to donors who offer them. Scholarships 
bring people, often from the families of 
economic and political elites, from 
developing countries to donor countries, 
where it is hoped they will develop ties 
and relationships and acquire fond 
memories. Through this, it is hoped they 
will become potential advocates and 
supporters, and potentially business 
partners, in the future, thus bringing 
benefits to donor countries. Tertiary 
scholarships also bring revenue to donor 
country tertiary institutions and provide 
free advertising in potential markets 
(Development Assistance Committee, 
2000, p.197). We estimate that at the turn 
of the millennium about 75% of New 
Zealand’s education aid went on 
scholarships. By 2009, reflecting the 
increased development focus of aid during 
the NZAID era, this figure had fallen to 
41%.5 Figure 7 shows a return to a 
scholarship focus under McCully. The 
situation in 2015 was not as bad as that of 
2000. Nevertheless, the share of education 
spending devoted to scholarships was 
increased rapidly under McCully, rising 
12 percentage points in just five years. This 
rise was accompanied by a concomitant 
decrease in the share of education funding 
going to other education types, 
particularly to primary education.
Changes to the purpose of New Zealand 
aid giving was not the only aid quality issue 
to emerge during McCully’s term as foreign 
minister. One of the least positive findings 
of the 2015 New Zealand aid stakeholder 
survey came from answers to the question 
about funding reliability. As Figure 8 shows, 
while for-profit firms polled were fairly 
Figure 6 – Surveyed views on aid programme effectiveness
Note: survey question was, “How would you rate the effectiveness of the aid programme?” All Stakeholder Survey 
data can be downloaded from: http://devpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2015-NZ-for-upload.zip 
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Figure 7 – Scholarship spending over total New Zealand education aid
Note: data are from the OECD’s OECD.stat database (OECD DAC, 2017). Scholarship spending is only available from 2010-2015.
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upbeat about funding predictability, the 
majority of NGOs thought this aspect of 
the aid programme was a weakness or a 
great weakness.
The response of NGO participants to 
this question is unsurprising. Early in his 
time as foreign minister, McCully chose to 
dismantle long-standing NGO funding 
mechanisms – one for humanitarian 
emergency assistance through NGOs, and 
one for longer-term development projects. 
The previously well-functioning 
humanitarian emergency fund for NGOs 
was replaced with a fund that was so poorly 
configured it took six months to release 
funding in response to famine in the Horn 
of Africa, only doing so once stories of its 
dysfunction made it into the media (Wood, 
2011). The humanitarian fund was 
eventually repaired. However, one of the 
issues the most recent OECD Development 
Assistance Committee peer review of New 
Zealand aid highlighted was the fact that 
New Zealand still does not have a well-
functioning generalised NGO funding 
mechanism for longer-term development 
projects (Development Assistance 
Committee, 2015).
Conclusion
Given Minister McCully’s stated desire to 
change New Zealand aid, in many ways it 
is surprising just how little changed. The 
aid budget went up between 2009 and 
2016, but its rate of increase was slight, 
less than the overall growth in the size of 
New Zealand’s economy. Aid spending was 
increased to the Pacific, but once again the 
change was not large and a continuation 
of pre-existing trends. And, despite the 
minister’s own reputed hostility towards 
multilateral institutions, the share of New 
Zealand aid to multilateral organisations 
did not fall in any meaningful way. The 
aid programme did become more focused 
on fostering economic development in 
aid-recipient countries. Yet this shift 
was not so large as to see economic 
development completely dominating the 
aid programme’s work.
One lesson for scholars of aid policy 
from these facts is that some aspects of aid 
policy are remarkably resistant to change. 
Aid forms part of New Zealand’s 
relationships beyond its borders, and these 
relationships place constraints on both 
what can change, and how fast. New 
Zealand could not, all of a sudden, start 
focusing all of its aid on the Pacific: doing 
so would have damaged other important 
international relationships, such as with 
Indonesia and Vietnam, both recipients of 
reasonable amounts of New Zealand aid 
and important emerging international 
actors. Similarly, it would have been hard 
to cease giving aid to Afghanistan, for 
example, without straining New Zealand’s 
alliance with the United States. Dramatically 
reducing multilateral aid is difficult for 
similar reasons. A small country such as 
New Zealand runs risks if it is seen to be 
free-riding in its multilateral engagements. 
Changing the sectoral focus of New 
Zealand aid is easier, but even here existing 
plans with recipient countries and with 
other donors such as Australia, with whom 
New Zealand tries to coordinate, place 
constraints on change. Similarly, the 
emphasis on aid’s development outcomes 
that was cultivated within NZAID left an 
institutional legacy that initially enabled 
the aid programme to continue functioning 
quite well in altered political times, 
although this clearly did not entirely 
insulate the aid programme from the new 
environment, and the potential for further 
deterioration remains. 
And yet McCully did not fail completely 
in his desire to transform New Zealand aid. 
He brought major structural change 
through his reintegration of NZAID into 
MFAT. And with this he shifted the purpose 
of New Zealand aid, placing increased 
emphasis on bringing geostrategic and 
commercial benefits to New Zealand.
We believe that the changes to the 
purpose of New Zealand aid giving were 
clearly for the worse. Public opinion data 
shows that most New Zealanders want 
their government’s aid to be given 
primarily for altruistic ends (Wood and 
Burkot, 2016, p.11), and the ethical case 
for the world’s wealthy nations devoting 
resources to helping poorer countries is 
compelling. We accept that to some extent 
geostrategic concerns need to play some 
role in how New Zealand engages as an 
aid donor, but we believe that in New 
Zealand’s case such concerns can usually 
be met simply by being a good 
international citizen. Moreover, we see no 
reason whatsoever why New Zealand aid 
should be used as a subsidy for commercial 
interests. 
Looking forward, from our perspective 
the resilience of New Zealand aid to change 
may prove to be both a blessing and a curse. 
Because McCully’s changes were less than 
they might have been in some areas, the 
need to remedy his impact on the aid 
programme is less than it could have been. 
However, in the crucial area of the purpose 
of aid giving, he had an impact. And 
because the aid programme is now 
integrated into MFAT – a government 
department with a mandate to advance 
Change and Resilience in New Zealand Aid under Minister McCully
Figure 8 – Predictability of funding
Note: the survey question asked respondents to rank the strengths or weaknesses of a range of aid programme 
attributes including predictability of funding. All Stakeholder Survey data can be downloaded from: 
http://devpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2015-NZ-for-upload.zip 
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New Zealand’s interests – reversing this 
particular change may not necessarily 
come easily. Murray McCully’s impact on 
New Zealand aid was less than it might 
have been, but his legacy may still outlast 
his time as foreign minister.
1 All the quantitative data used in this article can be 
downloaded from https://nzadds.files.wordpress.
com/2018/02/change-and-resilience-data.zip.
2 The multilateral funding amount is based on the OECD’s 
record of core multilateral funding and does not include 
funding given to multilateral organisations tagged to specific 
projects. When specific project funding is included, the share 
of funding going via multilateral organisations increases by 
about nine percentage points. However, there is no obvious 
change in trends when project-tagged funds are included.
3 The most recent aid programme strategic plan states 
that 45% of New Zealand aid will be spent on economic 
development by the end of 2018. This would represent a 
more radical change. However, the trends in Figure 5 do not 
indicate that the target will be met.
4 In analysis available in the online data set we looked at 
sectoral change with the ‘other’ category removed entirely. 
When we did this the falls in the share of aid devoted to 
some of the non-economic sectors became slightly more 
pronounced, but the differences were not dramatic.
5 Our estimates are derived by using the accurate information 
on tertiary scholarships that has been reported from 2010 
onwards and calculating the average ratio of tertiary 
scholarships to post-secondary education given in those 
years. We then applied this ratio to data on post-secondary 
education spending, which has been reliably reported on 
since 2000.
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Abstract
This article proposes greater transparency in and accountability 
for environmental governance, addressing widespread concerns 
about the degradation of New Zealand’s natural environment. It 
assesses national environmental reporting in New Zealand against 
a recognised international framework and compares the wider 
governance framework for environmental management with other 
policy domains, particularly fiscal policy. It proposes significant 
changes to the Environmental Reporting Act 2015, together with 
mechanisms to integrate environmental stewardship more effectively 
into the formulation of government strategies, policymaking and the 
Budget cycle, including a new chapter in the annual Fiscal Strategy 
Report on fiscal policy and the environment.
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This article puts forward a new integrated approach to greater transparency and accountability 
for environmental governance, addressing 
widespread concerns about the 
degradation of New Zealand’s natural 
environment and the sustainability of our 
current economic model. There is a wide 
range of possible approaches and levers 
that can potentially be used to achieve 
better environmental outcomes (Boston, 
2018). The key elements of the proposed 
approach are two-fold: significantly 
augmented arrangements for ex post 
national-level environment reporting; 
and a package of new requirements 
for ex ante transparency of priority 
environmental policy goals and targets, 
systematic monitoring and reporting, and 
ex post accountability to Parliament and 
to the electorate. A number of changes are 
proposed to the Environmental Reporting 
Act 2015, together with mechanisms to 
more effectively integrate environmental 
stewardship into the formulation of 
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government strategies, policymaking and 
the Budget cycle, including a new chapter 
in the annual Fiscal Strategy Report on 
fiscal policy and the environment. 
Problem definition
There is a broad and deep accumulated 
body of evidence and assessments that the 
quality of New Zealand’s environment is 
deteriorating. This poses serious risks to 
the country’s economic sustainability and 
to wider living standards and is largely 
due to policy weaknesses and flaws in the 
systems of governance of environmental 
management. 
In brief, key sources of evidence are the 
following:
•	 degradation	of	natural	capital:	this	has	
been especially pronounced with 
respect to fresh water quality and 
biodiversity (species extinction rates 
are among the highest in the world), as 
well as the major challenges New 
Zealand faces in reaching its Paris 
Agreement targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions, and is well documented in 
the briefings to the incoming minister 
2017 prepared by the Ministry for the 
Environment and the Department of 
Conservation (see also Brown et al., 
2015; OECD, 2017; Statistics New 
Zealand, 2017; Au and Van Zyl, 2018);
•	 New	Zealand	is	reaching	the	environ-
mental limits to its economic growth 
model (Productivity Commission, 
2017; OECD, 2017);
•	 policy	weaknesses	and	inconsistencies:	
failure to appropriately price natural 
resources and environmental externali-
ties (e.g. fresh water, carbon emissions); 
lack of capacity for implementation of 
the Resource Management Act, and lack 
of enforcement of environmental 
regulations; inadequate data (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2017; Department 
of Conservation, 2017; Environmental 
Protection Authority, 2017; Treasury, 
2018b; Brown et al., 2015; OECD, 
2017);
•	 weak	 policy	 governance:	 lack	 of	
comprehensive frameworks for 
objective-setting and reporting (OECD, 
2017). This is the subject of this article.
The key motivation is that the focus of 
successive governments has been on 
economic and fiscal outcomes, and to a 
much lesser extent on environmental 
outcomes (Boston, 2018).
National state of the environment reporting
While there is no current international 
‘standard’ for state of the nation 
environmental reporting, a well-
established framework is the ‘drivers, 
pressures, state, impact, response’ 
(DPSIR) model of intervention (Jackson, 
2017, p.10). According to this systems 
analysis view, human activities or 
drivers (underlying natural and human-
caused forces: e.g. population change 
and economic activity) exert pressures 
(immediate factors) on the environment 
that lead to changes in the state of the 
environment. These changes result in 
impacts on human welfare and ecosystems 
that may elicit a societal response from 
government and non-government actors. 
Responses (adaptation, mitigation) act 
on the driving forces, or on the state of 
the environment, or on impacts.1 Figure 1 
illustrates the framework.
New Zealand’s first two state of the 
environment reports, in 1997 and 2007, 
used the DPSIR framework. However, the 
Environmental Reporting Act 2015 did not 
include either the ‘drivers’ or the ‘responses’ 
elements of the DPSIR framework. By 
comparison, Australia and most EU 
member countries use the full DPSIR 
framework. The Australian 2016 state of 
the environment report notes that the 
inclusion of information on drivers 
provides context for the pressures detailed 
in each of the reports.2 Box 1 outlines the 
key provisions in the New Zealand and 
Australian national environmental 
reporting laws. 
New Zealand and Australia illustrate 
two quite distinctive approaches to 
environmental reporting: a large exercise 
only once every five years in Australia; and 
frequent reporting by domain in New 
Zealand, with a three-yearly synthesis 
report. Australian officials are understood 
to be considering more frequent reporting, 
while New Zealand officials are considering 
the desirability of less frequent reporting 
and better linkages across domains. There 
is also a desire to ensure greater clarity in 
the New Zealand Environmental Reporting 
Act on the purpose of environmental 
reporting. 
One possibility would be to combine 
some domain reports, or even to move to 
a single report every three years covering 
all domains and a synthesis. This could be 
combined with brief annual score cards.
It is generally agreed that state of the 
environment reporting should exclude 
policy recommendations. The value of 
environmental reporting is in regular, 
independent technical data and scientific 
and policy analysis of the state of the 
environment and the effectiveness of 
responses to date. In 2014 the government 
concluded that: ‘it may be difficult to report 
on policy evaluation in a way that is 
perceived as politically neutral’ (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2014, p.20). This 
suggests that there may be constraints on 
the ability of officials to provide free and 
frank advice, and/or constraints on the 
Figure 1: The DPSIR Framework for Reporting on Environmental Issues
Drivers 
Response 
Pressures 
Impact 
State 
Source:  from United Nations Statistics Division (n.d.) 
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public interest element of evaluation 
activities. The appropriate approach is not 
to leave ‘response’ out of the reporting 
framework, but to include it and attempt 
to ensure the technical independence of 
the response analysis.5
Finally, Australian state of the 
environment reports are required to contain 
information about the resilience of the 
environment and the residual risks that 
threaten it, as well as an overall outlook for 
the environment. These forward-looking 
elements are of central importance to 
understanding the state of the environment 
and designing policies. As the New Zealand 
parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment has observed: ‘The significance 
of an environmental issue cannot be judged 
without looking ahead.’ She recommended 
that environmental reports ‘should end with 
outlook sections as is done in Australia’s 
state of the environment reports’ 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2016, p.45).6
Comparative policy governance
This section goes beyond environmental 
reporting to consider the wider framework 
for environmental governance, including 
ex ante transparency of goals and targets 
and reporting against them. It does so by 
taking a high-level view of governance 
arrangements in New Zealand for fiscal 
policy, and for monetary policy, in order 
to identify some fundamental elements of 
policy governance and to consider their 
potential application to the governance 
of environmental policy. It also briefly 
considers environmental governance 
arrangements in Sweden.
New Zealand has very extensive and 
deep outcomes-focused management 
frameworks and accountability 
mechanisms for how governments manage 
fiscal policy and monetary policy. In fact, 
New Zealand was a pioneer in developing 
and implementing these frameworks. Table 
1 assesses these frameworks against a set of 
recognised elements of target setting, 
monitoring and reporting. Table 1 also 
assesses state of the environment reporting 
and wider aspects of environmental 
governance in New Zealand, Australia and 
Sweden. 
New Zealand’s first environmental report prepared consistent 
with the processes established in the Environmental Reporting 
Act 2015, Environment Aotearoa 2015, was published by the 
secretary for the environment and the government statistician 
in 2015 (although the report was published prior to passage 
of the legislation).3 
The framework for environmental reporting, set out in the 
Environmental Reporting (Topics for Environmental Reports) 
Regulations 2016, divides the environment into five domains: 
air; atmosphere and climate; fresh water; land; and marine. 
Ecosystems and biodiversity are cross-cutting aspects that are 
considered in relevant domain reports and covered in each 
synthesis report.
A domain report is required every six months, and a 
synthesis report every three years. The 2015 report was a 
synthesis report across all five environmental domains. Domain 
reports have since been published on three of the five domains. 
Reports are due this year on land (April) and air (October), and 
the next synthesis report is due for publication in April 2019.
The framework used is pressures/state/impacts, but not 
‘drivers’ or ‘responses’ from the DPSIR framework. 
To provide assurance of independence from the government 
of the day, reports are developed and released in line with the 
principles and protocols in place for tier 1 statistics. Under 
section 18 of the act, the parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment may choose to prepare independent commentaries 
on the state of the environment reports (see Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 2016).
In Australia, every five years the federal government 
commissions an independent review of the state of the 
environment, as required under the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.4 The most recent 
report was in 2016. Reports provide readers with: 
•  a comprehensive review of the state and trends of the 
environment; 
•  information about the pressures on the environment and 
the drivers of those pressures; 
•  information about the management initiatives that are 
in place to address environmental concerns, and the 
impacts of those initiatives;
•  information about the resilience of the environment and 
the residual risks that threaten it; 
•  an overall outlook for the Australian environment. 
Information is presented in nine thematic reports: on 
atmosphere, built environment, heritage, biodiversity, land, 
inland water, coasts, marine environment and Antarctic 
environment. 
Assessments for different elements are graded. For instance, 
for pressures there are four grades of level of impact (very low 
impact, low impact, high impact, very high impact). Similar 
graded systems are used for change over time, for state, 
for trends, for management effectiveness, and for ‘level of 
confidence’ of conclusions.
Box 1: Environmental reporting in New Zealand  
and Australia
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Sweden is recognised as a pioneer in 
transparency of national environmental 
goals, targets and progress reports. In 1999 
Sweden created a system of environmental 
quality objectives (EQOs) which are set by 
Parliament but do not have legal status 
(OECD, 2014, p.40). There are 16 EQOs 
that describe the desired state of the 
environment, adopted by the government 
in 2012, and supported by milestone 
targets that specify concrete actions 
towards achieving them. In 2010 the 
government appointed an All-Party 
Committee on Environmental Objectives 
(comprising parliamentarians, external 
stakeholder representatives and experts) to 
advise on how the EQOs can be achieved. 
The EQO system engages government 
agencies at all administrative levels, with 
implementation responsibilities often 
residing at the subnational level. The 
prospects for achieving the EQOs are 
assessed each year to inform the annual 
budget bill and the government’s annual 
progress report to Parliament. 
Table 1 shows that, compared to 
arrangements for fiscal and monetary 
policy, there is a lack of requirements for 
ex ante transparency of environmental 
objectives and milestones and reporting 
against them. While New Zealand 
governments have bound themselves in law 
to a very high degree of transparency and 
accountability in other domains, they have 
generally not done so with respect to 
environmental stewardship – although in 
2014 they imposed a requirement on 
regional councils to publish fresh water 
quality objectives by 2025. One exception 
to this is the framework for fisheries 
management, which contains most of the 
elements in Table 1. The prospective Zero 
Carbon Act will similarly introduce a high 
degree of ex ante and ex post transparency 
and accountability.
Of course, the central government’s 
public finances are to an important extent 
under the government’s direct control, in 
sharp contrast to environmental outcomes. 
Most regulation of activities is conducted 
by local governments – although the 
Crown-owned public conservation lands 
managed by the Department of 
Conservation comprise around one third 
of New Zealand’s land area.
There are also formidable conceptual 
and measurement difficulties and gaps in 
data that help explain this divergence in 
management and accountability 
frameworks. There are current efforts to 
develop coherent multidimensional 
measurement frameworks for environ-
mental management (e.g. natural capital 
accounting, integrated reporting, or 
summary indicators to supplement or 
replace GDP as a measure of performance). 
However, while new measurement 
frameworks will play an important role, 
they will take time to be developed, and 
putting estimates of monetary value on 
environmental stocks and flows will always 
involve debatable judgments, limiting their 
value in measuring progress or shaping 
policy design. On their own, without an ex 
ante element and accountability 
mechanisms, natural capital accounting 
and augmented measures of social progress 
seem likely to have limited impact on 
government decision making and 
accountability.9
Accordingly, there is a good case for 
amending the Environmental Reporting 
Act to require governments to respond 
formally to each state of the environment 
synthesis report, stating the government’s 
assessment of the situation, its medium-
term and long-term strategies, and 
Table 1: Comparative policy governance
Stage  
in policy 
cycle
Parameter Public 
Finance 
Act
Reserve 
Bank Act
NZ environmental 
governance status 
quo
Australian 
environmental 
governance  
satus quo
Swedish 
environmental 
governance status quo
Ex ante 
elements
Legislated outcome targets No Yes No No [yes]7
Targets required Yes Yes No No Yes
Milestones required Yes Yes No No Yes
Ex post
elements
Technically independent 
monitoring reports
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monitoring reports contain:
•Drivers  
•Responses 
•Forward looking data 
•Risks 
•Relative priorities 
•Effectiveness assessment  
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes 
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Alignment with electoral cycle Yes8 No No No No
Technically independent 
commentary Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mandated govt. response Yes No No No Yes
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priority environmental outcomes with 
interim targets and milestones, and 
reporting on progress in the period just 
completed.
Note that the proposed approach does 
not attempt to impose specific policy 
targets in law that reflect a particular view 
of how the trade-offs should be made 
between competing policy objectives. In an 
analogous manner to the Public Finance 
Act, the approach recommended relies on 
a legislative requirement for target setting 
and reporting, with the selection of the 
targets left to the political process.
It is, however, proposed that the 
parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment be invited to indicate, in 
commentary on each state of the 
environment synthesis report, the critical 
few outcomes for focused government 
target setting, management, reporting and 
accountability in the next period. This 
should be based on transparent criteria and 
reasoning.10 This is an attempt to draw on 
the professional expertise and 
independence of the commissioner to 
promote well-reasoned selection of critical 
indicators, while leaving final decisions to 
the government of the day. The incumbent 
government could choose additional 
outcome indicators as policy priorities – 
the statement would be a political 
document of the government – but would 
be legally obliged to include at least the 
core critical indicators, and to justify 
elevation of other indicators as priorities. 
This is analogous to the way in which the 
Public Finance Act obliges the government 
to justify departures from the principles of 
responsible fiscal management. 
Other amendments to the Environ-
mental Reporting Act should include:
· requiring detailed geographical 
breakdowns for most environmental 
indicators, including breakdowns 
aligned with regional and territorial 
government boundaries, to indicate 
where environmental outcomes are of 
most concern and where they are not. 
While some environmental issues 
transcend local or regional government 
boundaries, many do not. Where they 
do this can be recognised through 
aggregated reporting;
· changing the timing of synthesis 
reports so that each three-yearly 
synthesis report is published, in the 
normal course of events, within a 
specified number of months of each 
general election (say, nine months prior 
to the last possible date for the election), 
to promote better informed public 
debate on environmental policies and 
trade-offs with other goals, and stronger 
accountability of government and 
Parliament to the electorate.
Box 2 pulls all the suggested changes 
to the Environmental Reporting Act 
together. The proposals in Box 2 should 
not be viewed as all or nothing. They 
could be introduced on a phased basis. 
For example, initial amendments could 
be made to the act to revise the design 
and timing of reports, introduce the full 
DPSIR framework, require disaggregated 
geographical reporting, and require a 
formal government response. The other 
proposed changes to the Environmental 
Reporting Act might be subject to further 
deliberation and planning. 
Integrating environmental stewardship into 
routine government policymaking: a new 
chapter in the Fiscal Strategy Report on 
fiscal policy and the natural environment
While government regulation plays a 
key role in management of the natural 
environment, the lack of any overarching, 
aggregated approach to regulation (such as 
an annual regulatory policy cycle), and the 
lack of any national planning framework as 
is common in many other countries, means 
that the Budget cycle appeals as the best 
mechanism in New Zealand through which 
to integrate environmental stewardship into 
government strategy and policymaking. 
1. Review the design and timing of 
reports to ensure a more appropri-
ate balance between frequency, 
linkages between environmental 
challenges, efficiency, effective-
ness, transparency and account-
ability, and review the purpose of 
environmental reporting as set out 
in the act.
2. Introduce the full DPSIR frame-
work into the act, to include 
discussion of drivers of environ-
mental pressures as well as ex post 
assessment of central government 
responses.
3. Require detailed geographical 
breakdowns for most environmen-
tal indicators, including break-
downs aligned with regional and 
territorial government boundaries.
4. Require forward-looking informa-
tion on resilience, emerging risks 
and environmental outlooks.
5. Invite the parliamentary com-
missioner for the environment to 
indicate, in commentary on each 
state of the environment synthesis 
report, the critical few outcomes 
for priority government manage-
ment in the next period, based on 
transparent criteria and reasoning.
6. Require a formal government 
response within a specified time 
to each synthesis report and to 
each independent commentary by 
the parliamentary commissioner 
for the environment stating the 
government’s assessment of the 
situation, its medium-term strate-
gies, and priority environmental 
outcomes with interim targets and 
milestones, and reporting on recent 
progress. 
7. Change the timing of synthesis 
reports so that they are published, 
in the normal course of events, 
within a specific number of months 
of each general election. 
Box 2: Proposed changes to the 
Environmental Reporting Act 
2015
Reversing the Degradation of New Zealand’s Environment through Greater Government Transparency and Accountability
Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 – Page 37
Furthermore, there are increasingly 
important interfaces between fiscal and 
regulatory interventions. Some regulatory 
instruments, such as tradable permits, have 
some of the features of fiscal instruments 
and require analysis also from a revenue 
policy perspective. In addition, some fiscal 
instruments, such as green taxes, are 
complements to regulation. There are also 
significant direct interactions between 
fiscal policy and environmental outcomes, 
both on the revenue side of the Budget, and 
on the spending side (e.g. the Department 
of Conservation’s funding for management 
of the public conservation estate, and 
environmental protection expenditures).
Note that section 26M(2) of the Public 
Finance Act stipulates that the Budget 
policy statement must state the broad 
strategic priorities by which the 
government will be guided in preparing 
the Budget, including the overarching 
policy goals that will guide the 
government’s Budget decisions, and the 
policy areas that the government will 
focus on in that year. 
Similarly, one of the principles of 
responsible fiscal management in the 
Public Finance Act is that, when 
formulating fiscal strategy, the government 
must have regard to its likely impact on 
present and future generations (section 
26G). This can be interpreted as referring 
to the intergenerational impacts of 
aggregate fiscal policy (e.g. deficits and net 
debt). However, it might also be argued 
that the environmental and social impacts 
of micro-fiscal policies (expenditure 
policies and tax system design) are also 
covered by section 26G, which would 
support the addition of a new chapter in 
the Fiscal Strategy Report on fiscal policy 
and the environment.
Finally, the Public Finance Act requires 
individual government departments to 
prepare statements of intent with multi-
year strategies and non-financial 
performance information, but the central 
government as a reporting entity is only 
required to publish financial statements. 
Yet it really only makes sense to attempt to 
measure environmental stewardship, and 
the government’s contribution to well-
being, at a whole-of-government level.11
Accordingly, there is a good case for 
including a new chapter in the annual 
Fiscal Strategy Report, which the Public 
Finance Act requires be presented with the 
annual Budget, that discusses the multiple 
points of intersection between fiscal 
policy and the environment. The chapter 
would desirably cover both tax and 
expenditure policies, the interfaces 
between fiscal and regulatory instruments, 
and the adequacy of funding of regulatory 
institutions, including local government 
capacity to implement the Resource 
Management Act and environmental 
monitoring functions.12 The chapter 
would clearly require significant 
contributions from the Ministry for the 
Environment, Statistics New Zealand, the 
Department of Conservation, Inland 
Revenue and others, in close collaboration 
with the Treasury. An outline of the 
proposed chapter is in Box 3.
Such a proposal does not imply that 
fiscal policy is the main influence on 
1. Current government environment strategies, outcome 
targets and milestones, and actual performance, focus-
ing on the core critical environmental outcomes.
2. The latest data on trends in key environmental stocks 
and flows, and the policy implications; priorities for ad-
dressing gaps in data and monitoring systems. 
3. An assessment and, to the extent feasible, quantification 
of the economic impact of recent degradation of eco-
system services (depreciation of natural capital) at the 
margin in a selected high-priority sector, or sectors, and 
the estimated cost of restoration of ecosystem services.13
4. Relevant case studies to illustrate the principles of inte-
grated environmental management and assess current 
performance, e.g. fisheries management.
5. As feasible, an assessment of environmental resilience, 
short- to medium-term risks around key environmental 
outcomes, and threats to long-term sustainability.
6. Evidence on the environmental impacts of fiscal poli-
cies.14
7. An overview of the Department of Conservation’s perfor-
mance in managing the public conservation estate.
8. An overview of government investments in natural capi-
tal, and environmental protection expenditures, in the 
forthcoming Budget.
9. The anticipated positive and negative environmental im-
pacts of the expenditure and revenue policies embodied 
in the forthcoming Budget.15
10. An assessment of the potential for government revenue 
and expenditure policies to improve critical environmen-
tal outcomes.16
11. The interactions between fiscal and regulatory policies 
in terms of environmental outcomes.17
12. A discussion of the levels of short- to medium-term risks 
around environmental outcomes in comparison with 
those around fiscal outcomes.
13. The consistency of government’s environmental targets 
and announced targets in other domains, e.g. GDP 
growth, growth in agricultural production or tourism.
Box 3: Proposed outline of a new chapter on ‘Fiscal 
Policy and the Environment’ in the annual Fiscal 
Strategy Report 
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environmental outcomes (regulation is 
probably the key lever), but a new 
document in the annual Budget 
documents is another ‘hand on the 
elephant’, given the challenges and failures 
of environmental management and the 
lack of alternative mechanisms to link 
government strategies, interventions and 
outcomes. 
This initiative would be fully consistent 
with the Treasury’s Living Standards 
Framework, which has environmental 
quality as one of the key measures of 
current well-being, and natural capital as 
one of the four capital stocks that sustain 
well-being over time.18 The proposal would 
also support and reflect the government’s 
intention for the 2019 Budget to be ‘a well-
being Budget’. 
Some implications of these proposals
It is recognised that these proposals 
involve substantial changes to 
current governance arrangements for 
environmental management. Space 
does not allow for anything more than 
brief identification of some of the more 
important implications:
•	 Significant	increases	would	be	required	
in the resources devoted to environ-
mental monitoring and reporting, the 
development of central guidance, and 
local government capacity building. 
These expenditures should be viewed 
as investments in the essential 
infrastructure for environmental 
stewardship.
•	 There	will	 be	 a	 need	 for	new	 cross-
agency integration and coordination 
mechanisms around specific cross-
domain policy analysis and advice and 
reports.
•	 There	may	need	to	be	changes	to	the	
structure and/or membership of 
parliamentary committees.
•	 New	 arrangements	 for	 cross-party	
political deliberation will be desirable, 
and wider stakeholder and general 
public consultation and engagement, 
to build consensus around the new 
frameworks over time.
•	 Similar	issues	arise	with	respect	to	the	
accountability frameworks and trans-
parency of social outcomes, and the 
interface between fiscal policy and 
social outcomes.
Conclusions
The proposals advanced here for more 
effective environmental governance 
are based on greater transparency, with 
ex ante setting of goals, targets and 
milestones, and comprehensive ex post 
monitoring, reporting and accountability. 
These have become the familiar tools of 
public management in New Zealand, and 
internationally, since the fundamental 
government reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s, as exemplified in how governments 
manage, and how Parliaments and the 
public hold governments accountable for, 
the conduct of fiscal policy and monetary 
policy. These frameworks have enjoyed 
consistent cross-party support and have 
proved sustainable to date.
The proposed approach does not 
attempt to impose specific policy targets 
in law that reflect a particular view of how 
the trade-offs should be made between 
competing policy objectives. In an 
analogous manner to the Public Finance 
Act, the approach recommended relies on 
a legislative requirement for target setting 
and reporting, with the selection of the 
targets left to the political process. The aim 
is to promote better-informed public and 
political deliberation over the current state 
of the environment and the policy choices 
open to New Zealand; in short, to promote 
‘more light and less heat’ in the difficult 
trade-offs, and more sustainable decisions, 
as advocated by Darby (2017) with respect 
to decisions over natural resource 
exploitation.
The proposed initiatives are fully 
consistent with, and indeed strongly 
supportive of, a number of the initiatives 
being adopted and considered by the new 
government, including a Carbon Zero Act, 
the tax review, use of core indicators to 
guide policy, and framing the 2019 Budget 
as a well-being Budget. The proposals 
should not be viewed as all or nothing. 
They could be introduced on a phased 
basis. 
There may be a prospect of cross-party 
support for this type of approach – which 
relies on transparency rather than putting 
specific policy targets in law – if not on 
introduction of legislation, then through 
acceptance of the new frameworks on the 
next and subsequent changes of govern-
ment. Once introduced, fundamental 
governance reforms based on transparency 
appear to be somewhat resilient to political 
cycles.
1.  This model was developed by the European Environmental 
Agency: see Smeets and Weterings, 1999. The UN System 
of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA), a 2012 
international statistical standard for producing statistics on 
environmental stocks and flows and their relationship with 
the economy, is consistent with the DPSIR model – see 
United Nations Statistics Division (n.d.) p.4.
2.  See https://soe.environment.gov.au/sites/g/files/
net806/f/soe2016-approach-launch6march17_0.
pdf?v=1489452161.
3.  http://www.mfe.govt.nz/more/environmental-reporting/about-
act.
4.  Most states and territories in Australia also produce a regular 
state of the environment report, although approaches to 
reporting differ across jurisdictions.
5.  To the extent that the response analysis entails judgments 
about the effectiveness of responses, this  should be the 
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Abstract
Adapting to climate change poses unprecedented technical, 
administrative and political challenges for which New Zealand’s 
current planning, regulatory and funding frameworks are ill-
equipped. Without reform, they will deliver neither efficient nor 
equitable outcomes. Indeed, they will encourage governmental 
delay, incentivise sub-optimal solutions, increase future burdens, 
and reduce societal resilience. For sound anticipatory governance, 
our current frameworks need reform. This article summarises the 
nature of the adaptation challenges facing New Zealand, outlines 
the problems with current policy settings, identifies principles and 
considerations that should guide the reform agenda, and reviews 
several policy options. On balance, we favour creating a new national 
institution mandated to fund or co-fund, in accordance with 
statutory criteria, the major costs of adaptation.
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the case for a new  
policy framework
The task of mitigating climate change (i.e. reducing greenhouse gas emissions) has been called a 
‘super wicked’ policy problem (Lazarus, 
2009). But adapting to, and minimising 
the impacts of, climate change will be no 
less daunting (Mullan et al., 2013; OECD, 
2015; Reisinger et al., 2014). Indeed, 
adaptation poses unprecedented technical, 
administrative and political challenges. 
In effect, policymakers are confronted 
not only with an unparalleled, slow-
motion natural disaster, but also one that 
is destined to intensify in scope and scale 
as the century progresses. There will be 
multiple negative impacts: rising sea levels; 
more severe droughts and rainfall events; 
new biosecurity risks; an accelerated loss of 
biodiversity; and changing human disease 
vectors. Many of these phenomena will be 
outside the variability ranges previously 
experienced.
As an island nation, New Zealand will 
be particularly badly affected over the 
coming century and beyond by coastal 
erosion and inundation (Royal Society of 
New Zealand, 2016; Stephenson, McKenzie 
and Orchiston, 2017). Tens of thousands 
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of people – and perhaps more – will 
eventually need resettling on higher 
ground. Large investments will also be 
required to redesign, reposition and future-
proof public infrastructure, especially 
transport networks and water services. 
Additionally, the damage caused by climate-
related natural disasters will impose 
growing financial burdens – on citizens, 
businesses and public authorities. Already 
the annual cost of repairing land transport 
networks damaged by weather-related 
events has more than quadrupled over the 
past decade, while the economic impact of 
major floods and droughts is increasing. 
The series of major rainfall events which 
afflicted parts of New Zealand in early 2018 
are merely a foretaste of what lies ahead. 
Likewise, the visibility of recent plant 
pathogens affecting our native trees (e.g. 
myrtle rust and kauri die-back), on top of 
the stresses our natural ecosystems are 
exposed to from the combination of exotic 
animal pests (e.g. deer, possums, stoats, rats 
and mice), are a portend for the future 
facing New Zealand. 
Governments will face numerous policy 
challenges in seeking to reduce and mitigate 
such impacts. Many of the likely impacts 
are beset with ‘deep uncertainty’ (Walker, 
Lempert and Kwakkel, 2012; Walker, 
Marchau and Kwakkel, 2013), especially 
beyond mid-century. Policymakers will 
be faced with abrupt and unexpected 
biophysical changes; multiple, com-
pounding and cascading risks (between 
and across sectors and domains of interest); 
the complexities of planning over extremely 
long time horizons; and complicated intra-
generational and intergenerational trade-
offs (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence et al., 
2016). Politically, too, there is an acute 
problem: the adaptation strategies needed 
to safeguard future interests will often 
entail significant upfront costs, not least to 
ensure that today’s investments can be 
adjusted depending on the evolution of 
climate change. Moreover, while such costs 
are visible, direct and relatively certain, 
many of the benefits are indirect and much 
less certain. Concerted public opposition 
to prudent, proactive, anticipatory 
measures is thus inevitable; all the more so 
if those who face substantial losses are 
unable financially to make the necessary 
adjustments in a timely and just manner. 
Are New Zealand’s current funding, 
planning and regulatory frameworks, and 
their related policy tools and instruments, 
well designed to meet the scope, scale and 
duration of the challenges of climate 
change adaptation? In our view, the answer 
is unequivocal: existing arrangements are 
not fit for purpose. They lack the capacity 
to ensure sound anticipatory governance.1 
They will not deliver equitable or efficient 
outcomes. This article explains why. In so 
doing, it gives particular attention to the 
weaknesses in current adaptation funding 
mechanisms and how these might be 
rectified. Here we highlight only a selection 
of issues and consider a limited number of 
policy options. Our primary purpose is to 
underscore the need for reform, rather 
than provide a fully-developed and 
compre-hensive policy approach.
The costs of climate change
Estimating the likely long-term costs of 
climate change poses significant analytical 
and technical challenges. Take, for instance, 
the costs of sea level rise, which is but one 
of the many anticipated impacts (Boettle, 
Rybski and Kropp, 2016; Hallegatte et al., 
2013; Hinkel et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014). The 
expected costs will depend on numerous 
variables, including: the time frames 
under consideration; the path of global 
greenhouse gas emissions; the projected 
impact of global warming on the polar ice 
sheets, ocean currents and storm patterns; 
the assumptions made about the pattern 
and scale of future human development; 
the nature and types of risks considered 
and their related costs (e.g. direct and 
indirect, market and non-market); 
how losses (e.g. of land, buildings and 
infrastructure) are valued; and the kind 
of adaptation measures or protection 
strategies adopted. 
Based on a study of 136 major coastal 
cities, Hallegatte et al. (2013) estimated 
that, in the absence of additional protective 
measures, sea level rise and related changes 
to storm surges, floods and major storms 
could cost globally as much as US$1 trillion 
annually by 2050 and multiple times this 
figure by 2100. Likewise, Hinkel et al. 
(2014) estimate that if the sea level rises by 
1.23 metres by 2100, and if no adaptation 
occurs, then up to 4.6% of the global 
population would be flooded annually, 
with expected losses of over 9% of global 
domestic product annually. Losses of this 
magnitude would be totally unsustainable. 
According to Hinkel et al., effective coastal 
adaptation measures, including managed 
retreat (see Box 1), can be expected to 
reduce these losses substantially (see also 
Reisinger et al., 2015). 
There are no comprehensive estimates 
of the costs of sea level rise for New Zealand 
over the coming century. But an initial 
study of exposed residents, buildings and 
some infrastructure (i.e. roads, railways, 
port and airport facilities, and critical 
facilities or government buildings) by Bell, 
Paulik and Wadwha (2015) for the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment (2015) provides an indication 
of the scale of costs. For instance, it is 
estimated that at least 43,683 homes (or 
about 133,000 people) and 1,448 
commercial properties are within 1.5 
metres of the current average high tide in 
spring (Bell, Paulik and Wadwha, 2015).2 
The buildings affected have a replacement 
cost of about $20 billion (in 2011 dollars). 
Sea level rise of up to three metres would 
affect over 280,000 people and damage 
Based on a study of 136 major coastal 
cities, ... in the absence of additional 
protective measures, sea level rise and 
related changes to storm surges, floods and 
major storms could cost globally as much 
as US$1 trillion annually by 2050 ...
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buildings with a replacement cost exceeding 
$50 billion (in 2011 dollars). Public 
infrastructure, including transport 
networks, energy systems and water 
services, will also be significantly affected 
(e.g. coastal roads and numerous waste 
water treatment plants). Much of this 
infrastructure is the responsibility of 
subnational government and some of it has 
not been well maintained (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2014).
Several matters are clear: a) the costs 
will increase in a non-linear manner (i.e. 
as seas rise, the costs will rise even faster); 
b) the costs will be greater if global 
emissions peak late and then fall slowly; c) 
the costs will escalate significantly as the 
century advances; d) the costs will be 
greater if urban development continues in 
areas exposed to rising seas and inundation; 
e) the costs will fall unevenly geographically 
and intermittently; and f) the costs will be 
greater if governments (national and 
subnational) fail to plan and invest in 
effective risk reduction and adaptation 
initiatives. 
Aside from sea level rise, New Zealand 
faces many other climate-related costs. For 
instance, insured losses due to extreme 
weather events were $175 million in 2013 
and $135 million in 2014 (Insurance 
Council of New Zealand, 2017). The 
Treasury estimates that the drought in 2013 
cost New Zealand around $1.5 billion. 
Meanwhile, the cost of repairing land 
transport networks damaged by weather-
related events continues to increase, quite 
apart from the ongoing disruption to 
people and the economy. 
Fortunately, the impacts of climate 
change and their related costs can be 
reduced by preventing further housing 
developments in risky areas, relocating 
existing settlements, and prudent 
investments in more resilient infrastructure. 
Significantly, Local Government New 
Zealand estimates that $1 spent on risk 
reduction saves at least $3 in future disaster 
costs by avoiding losses and disruption 
(Deloitte Access Economics, 2013). Some 
international estimates of the likely savings 
are substantially higher (Healy and 
Malhotra, 2009). But there is a problem: 
public expenditure on pre-event risk 
reduction is much harder to ‘sell’ politically 
than the funding of post-disaster recovery. 
Voters, it seems, reward governments that 
spend money on disaster relief, but not 
those investing in prevention and 
preparedness (ibid.). This phenomenon is 
common across advanced democracies. It 
reflects humanity’s cognitive biases, 
including myopia: citizens tend to value 
post-event cures over preventative 
interventions (Boston, 2017a, 2017b; White 
and Haughton, 2017). Finding ways to 
counter such propensities will be crucial 
over the coming decades. Otherwise, there 
will be many sub-optimal policy decisions 
– ones that increase and entrench risk 
exposure, thereby placing additional 
burdens on future generations. This works 
in the opposite direction to what effective 
adaptation requires, namely to reduce risk 
now and for the future.
The problems with current funding, planning 
and regulatory frameworks
New Zealand’s current policy frameworks 
are poorly equipped to address the nature, 
magnitude and duration of the problems 
posed by climate change (Lawrence, 2015, 
2016).3 We address the most obvious 
limitations and deficiencies here.
First, while local authorities in New 
Zealand have various proactive legislative 
responsibilities to reduce the risks posed 
by natural hazards, including the effects of 
climate change, the relevant statutes (e.g. 
the Resource Management Act 1991 
(RMA), the Soil Conservation and Rivers 
Control Act 1941, the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002 and the 
Building Act 2004) are poorly aligned. For 
instance, whereas the Building Act focuses 
on a 50-year time frame, the New Zealand 
Coastal Policy Statement issued under the 
RMA requires local authorities to look 
forward ‘at least 100 years’. Additionally, the 
various legislative and regulatory 
requirements are not being applied 
consistently by decision-makers. Some 
local authorities have been much more 
proactive than others. Guidance and 
support from central government has been 
generally insufficient.
Second, notwithstanding their 
responsibilities to mitigate long-term risks, 
many local authorities, often under 
pressure from property developers, have 
been approving major new subdivisions 
and other developments in areas that are 
likely to be vulnerable to rising seas later 
in the century (see, for example, Gibson 
and Mason, 2017). This suggests that 
current policy frameworks and regulatory 
standards may need adjustment, or at least 
that ways must be found to ensure that 
councils use their available powers more 
effectively to safeguard future interests.
Third, the existing policy arrangements 
focus too much on post-event responses 
(e.g. post-disaster assistance and recovery) 
and too little on pre-event responses – that 
is, public funding designed to enhance 
societal resilience, minimise risk, and 
enable cost-effective adjustments and 
transitions. Hence, New Zealand has a 
Natural Disaster Fund (administered by 
EQC) and an Adverse Events Fund 
(administered by the Ministry for Primary 
Industries to assist rural communities), but 
no equivalent dedicated funds to reduce 
risk exposure (i.e. arising from climate 
change). Similarly, there are different 
national-level policies for repairing and 
future-proofing local government 
infrastructure. For instance, the national 
Fortunately, the impacts of climate 
change and their related costs can 
be reduced by preventing further 
housing developments in risky areas, 
relocating existing settlements, and 
prudent investments in more resilient 
infrastructure. 
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civil defence plan provides for central 
government to contribute up to 60% of the 
costs of repairing underground water and 
sewerage services after a catastrophic event, 
but there are no similar guaranteed 
contributions for future-proofing 
infrastructure.4 
Fourth, and related to this, the 
provisions in most household insurance 
contracts (and related EQC cover) do not 
provide for ‘betterment’. This means, for 
instance, that an insurer will repair a home 
which is at risk of future flooding but will 
not contribute to the relocation of the 
home or the construction of a new home 
on a safer site. As a result, risk exposures 
have become entrenched. Eventually, some 
residents will be unable to secure adequate 
insurance for their properties.
Fifth, regarding the overall role of 
insurance, it is sometimes argued that 
governments should rely on private 
insurance markets, the pricing of risk and 
individual self-interest to generate the 
desired adaptive responses by citizens to 
climate change. But insurance merely 
redistributes and transfers risk; it does not 
lessen it. Hence, while insurance is a 
desirable – indeed vital – complement to 
robust risk management, it is no substitute 
for it. Moreover, the limitations of 
insurance markets will be exacerbated as 
risk profiles change over coming decades 
(IPCC, 2014; Kunreuther and Lyster, 2016; 
Storey et al., 2017; O’Hare, White and 
Connelly, 2016; Treasury, 2015).
Finally, aside from the post-event focus 
of much disaster-related funding, there are 
multiple other problems with existing 
funding arrangements for adaptation:
· Currently, local government owns and 
manages at least $120 billion of fixed 
assets (including 100% of the country’s 
drinking water, waste water and storm 
water assets, and 88% of the roads) 
(Office of the Auditor-General, 2014). 
But there is a gross mismatch between 
the resources and capabilities available 
to local authorities and the scale of their 
adaptation challenges. For instance, 
many communities (e.g. Dunedin, the 
eastern Bay of Plenty and the West 
Coast of the South Island) face the 
prospect of relocating significant 
numbers of people by mid-century, but 
they lack the capacity (via their rating 
base and borrowing limits) to fund 
large-scale relocation of affected assets 
and communities, the purchase of land 
for resettlement, and the construction 
of new infrastructure. More generally, 
many local authorities – and especially 
those with ageing populations – will 
struggle to raise the capital necessary 
for renewing, upgrading and future-
proofing their public infrastructure. 
· The current mechanisms through 
which the central government provides 
financial assistance to communities, 
businesses and households affected by 
natural disasters tend to be ad hoc and 
inconsistent. For instance, in response 
to the severe flooding of Edgecumbe in 
the Bay of Plenty in 2017, where around 
70% of the town’s properties were 
damaged, the government announced 
that EQC would be responsible for 
cleaning up and repairing all affected 
properties, including the 100 or so that 
were not insured or where the owners 
lacked the necessary funds to undertake 
repairs. Residents in many other 
communities similarly affected by 
severe flooding have not always been 
so fortunate. Meanwhile, special 
arrangements were made for the many 
thousands of Christchurch residents 
whose properties were ‘red-zoned’ as a 
result of the major earthquakes in 
2010–11.
· Leaving aside the inequities caused by 
inconsistent Crown ‘bailouts’ following 
natural disasters, bailouts cause several 
other problems. First, they raise public 
expectations of continued structural 
protection and funding assistance. This 
creates a high degree of path 
dependence, at least politically, and 
perpetuates lock-in of communities in 
risky areas. Second, it generates a 
potential ‘safety paradox’, where 
communities are lulled into a feeling of 
safety which can then rebound on 
public authorities when the next 
‘disaster’ happens. 
· There is no current consistent and 
centrally managed mechanism for 
funding the costs of managed retreat 
(see Box 1). As a result, local authorities 
are attempting to develop their own 
approaches. But these will generate 
inconsistencies and inequities across 
New Zealand. Moreover, without a fair, 
consistent and nationally mandated 
approach to adaptation funding, 
affected residents are likely to resist 
locally crafted proposals for managed 
retreat. This poses at least three 
problems: a) the risk of lengthy and 
expensive legal proceedings; b) the 
prospect of prevarication and long 
delays in decision making, thereby 
intensifying risk exposure, exacerbating 
future damages, and increasing the 
overall long-term costs of adjustment; 
and c) the likelihood that residents will 
demand the construction of hard 
structures to protect their properties; 
in many cases such structures will not 
be cost-effective and will offer only 
temporary protection.
· There are no mechanisms to ensure that 
the costs of climate change adaptation 
are shared equitably, whether 
intergenerationally or intra-
generationally. 
In short, current regulatory, planning 
and funding arrangements are not 
adequate for the policy challenges posed 
by climate change. This applies not only 
Adaptation funding arrangements 
which seek to reduce exposure to 
climate change risks should have 
two overarching goals: long-term cost 
minimisation and equitable burden 
sharing.
Page 44 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018
to the problems generated by sea level rise 
and more severe rainfall events, but also 
to many of the other impacts that climate 
change will generate (e.g. the impacts on 
agriculture, aquaculture and fishing 
resulting from warmer temperatures, 
more severe droughts and ocean 
acidification). Without appropriate 
reforms, existing policy frameworks are 
destined to increase, rather than reduce, 
risk exposure, exacerbate future 
adaptation costs, and contribute to 
multiple inequities. In the interests of 
sound anticipatory governance, a better 
framework is required.
Funding climate change adaptation – 
guiding principles
Any new policy framework for climate 
change adaptation must be guided by 
sound principles. Adaptation funding 
arrangements which seek to reduce 
exposure to climate change risks should 
have two overarching goals: long-term 
cost minimisation and equitable burden 
sharing.
1. Long-term cost minimisation – funding 
arrangements should seek to minimise 
the long-term net costs of climate 
change adaptation by encouraging 
cost-effective decisions regarding 
district planning and investment in 
public infrastructure. The aim would 
be to reduce the likely costs of climate-
related impacts (e.g. from major floods) 
through cost-effective measures to 
future-proof infrastruc-ture and 
undertake managed retreat. Successful 
adaptation will, in turn, help to reduce 
future insurance (including EQC) costs, 
thereby keeping insurance more 
affordable and available. Consistent 
with this, funding arrangements, and 
related planning and regulatory 
frameworks, must be well-coordinated 
and designed to minimise moral hazard 
(e.g. the risk of giving individuals, 
companies or other organisations 
incentives to act in ways that are likely 
to increase overall adaptation costs and/
or shift costs inappropriately onto 
taxpayers or ratepayers).
2. Equitable burden sharing – funding 
arrangements should be consistent 
with widely accepted principles of 
social equity (or distributive justice) 
(Kunreuther and Pauly, 2017). Such 
principles include the fair opportunity 
requirement. This is the idea that 
people should not be discriminated 
against or suffer disadvantages for 
things over which they have little or 
no control. Such a principle provides 
an ethical basis for funding assistance 
for people who suffer an accident or 
are harmed by a natural disaster which 
could not have been reasonably 
foreseen or avoided. Another relevant 
principle is that of ‘comparative justice’ 
Technically, ‘managed retreat’ has been defined in a coastal 
setting as ‘the application of coastal zone management and 
mitigation tools designed to move existing and planned 
development out of the path of eroding coastlines and coastal 
hazards’ (quoted in Hino, Field and Mach, 2017, p.1). It is 
deliberate, coordinated and planned. The aim is to reduce 
natural hazard risk permanently, rather than temporarily. 
According to Hino, Field and Mach, over the past three 
decades approximately 1.3 million people in 22 countries 
have been relocated – in both pre- and post-disaster contexts 
and both voluntarily and involuntarily – through managed 
retreat. While significant, this is a tiny number compared to 
the scale of displacement expected during the 21st century 
and beyond (which will affect hundreds of millions globally). 
Understandably, managed retreat is often viewed as complex 
and controversial, partly because of the financial costs, but also 
because of the more intangible costs – the loss of ‘place’, the 
social, emotional and psychological challenges of displacing 
people from their homes, the disruption to community life, 
and the loss of buildings or land of architectural, aesthetic or 
spiritual value. However, managed retreat can be implemented 
in a staged and progressive manner, as ‘managed’ suggests, 
preferably through community engagement processes that can 
address the sense of loss of place and value.
An example in New Zealand where managed retreat has 
been implemented is Twin Streams in Waitäkere, Auckland 
(Vandenbeld and MacDonald, 2013). Voluntary property 
purchase was offered within an inclusive participatory process 
across the community which linked environmental, social, 
economic and cultural goals by providing new public resources 
and accommodating those who moved to other areas. The 
availability of a regional fund enabled the retreat from flooding 
to be implemented. 
Managed retreat options are being considered currently as 
part of a suite of adaptation options in two coastal localities. In 
Matatä in the Bay of Plenty a voluntary retreat option has been 
included after ten years of investigations following a weather-
induced debris flow that engulfed a coastal community.5 For 
voluntary retreat, landowner support will be essential for any 
property purchase arrangements. If retreat were to be enforced, 
empowering legislation is likely to be required. Funding to 
incentivise implementation is beyond the means of most district 
councils, which means that regional and central government 
funding would be required. Other issues make implementation 
difficult: rating equity; confirmation of retreat boundaries; 
availability of affordable alternative building sites; existing use 
rights; planning issues; and property purchase criteria. 
In the second case, the Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards 
Strategy 2120 in Hawke’s Bay included managed retreat within 
adaptive pathways for the medium-to-long term in a year-
long community engagement process that has recommended 
adaptive pathways to the three participating councils for 
implementation.6
Box 1: Managed retreat
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or ‘like treatment’: cases that are alike 
in all relevant respects should be 
treated alike; where cases differ, 
‘material principles’ of justice can be 
applied to determine the extent to 
which, and the means by which, 
differential treatment is justified. 
These include considerations of need, 
the capacity to pay, and various 
notions of moral responsibility (Miller, 
2007). One of the latter, known as 
‘outcome responsibility’, is the idea that 
people (and public authorities) should 
bear responsibility for their own 
actions and decisions. Another is the 
idea of ‘remedial responsibility’: this 
responsibility arises whenever there is 
a situation needing a remedy. If those 
who have caused the harm are in a 
position to rectify the problem, then 
they have a moral responsibility to do 
so. If they unable to, but there are 
others with the requisite capacity (e.g. 
a central government), then the 
remedial responsibility falls to those 
who are most capable. Regarding the 
costs of climate change adaptation, the 
relevant principles of distributive 
justice should be applied both 
intergenerationally and intra-
generationally. 
Any adaptation funding framework 
(and related institutional arrangements 
and policy instruments) should also take 
into account a range of other considerations 
(Boston, 2017a), including:
· making the best possible use of the 
available scientific evidence and 
relevant expert advice;
· minimising administrative and 
compliance costs;
· ensuring procedural fairness and 
thereby minimising the likelihood of 
costly litigation;
· ensuring sufficient policy clarity, 
consistency and stability over time to 
facilitate effective long-term regional 
spatial planning and infrastructure 
investment, thus generating an 
adequate degree of certainty for 
affected households, businesses and 
other organisations;
· enabling sufficient policy flexibility to 
accommodate changing risk profiles;
· disincentivising policy responses that 
create path dependence;
· ensuring a high level of transparency 
in relation to revenue collection and 
funding allocations; and
· ensuring fiscal sustainability.
Applying these principles to the 
question of who pays, for what and when 
raises some practical questions. First, is 
there a case for pre-funding some of the 
expected costs of adaptation? Second, are 
there grounds for the central government 
to contribute to the adaptation costs facing 
subnational governments? Third, is there 
a case for public authorities compensating 
those harmed by the impacts of climate 
change: for instance, by funding some or 
all of citizens’ private property losses 
(including land) or funding some or all of 
the costs of managed retreat (e.g. moving 
expenses, the loss of business income, 
providing risk-free land, etc.)? 
The issue of pre-funding future adaptation 
costs
The case for pre-funding rests primarily 
on the principle of responsibility, namely 
that those who have caused a harm should 
be required to contribute to alleviating the 
damage they have caused (or will cause 
in the future). This principle of justice is 
embodied in the idea of polluter pays. In 
the case of climate change, the damage 
that will be inflicted on current and 
future generations (and hence the costs of 
adaptation that they will bear) is largely 
due to the activities of recent generations. 
Accordingly, there is a strong case for 
taxing current citizens (e.g. taxpayers and 
ratepayers) and building up a public fund 
(or funds) which can be deployed to help 
cover the financial costs of adapting to 
climate change later in the century.
Against this, the scale of the costs of 
adaptation remains uncertain. Also, future 
technological innovations may significantly 
reduce them, thus enhancing their 
affordability. Perhaps the strongest 
objection, however, is the claim that future 
generations will be better off than current 
generations, at least in terms of real 
incomes per capita. Hence, they will be in 
a better position than those alive today to 
cover the long-term costs of adaptation. 
Also, if the costs are much less than some 
fear, future governments will have little 
difficulty covering them from normal 
ongoing revenues.
But there can be no guarantee that 
future generations will be better off, 
however ‘better off ’ is defined. After all, 
humanity’s failure to live within safe and 
sustainable planetary boundaries may curb 
future economic growth. And even if per 
capita incomes continue to rise, there 
remain strong moral grounds for those 
who have caused climate-related harm to 
bear part of the cost. Societies do not, after 
all, avoid prosecuting and penalising 
criminals who are poorer than their victims. 
In our view, there is a plausible prima 
facie case for proportionate pre-funding of 
future costs of climate change adaptation. 
This suggests that any overall adaptation 
funding framework should include a 
mechanism – perhaps similar in concept 
to the New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
– to help cover future climate-related 
liabilities. A potential source for pre-
funding could be revenue generated via an 
additional levy on fossil fuels, with the 
pooled funds invested and then drawn 
down progressively later in the century. 
National cost sharing
There are multiple grounds for sharing 
the costs of adaptation across central and 
subnational government, including the 
considerations of efficiency and equity 
(including the principle of remedial 
responsibility). As noted earlier, adaptation 
costs are bound to vary – often significantly 
... even if per capita incomes continue to 
rise, there remain strong moral grounds 
for those who have caused climate-
related harm to bear part of the cost.
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– across different households, communities, 
regions and economic sectors. Many of the 
costs will fall in arbitrary ways, with little or 
no regard to the extent of each citizen’s (or 
region’s) contribution to climate change 
(i.e. via their cumulative greenhouse 
gas emissions) or their capacity to pay 
either for the damages inflicted or for the 
measures required to minimise future 
risks (e.g. by relocating to safer locations). 
Importantly, the resources available to 
subnational governments to implement 
prudent and cost-effective adaptation 
measures vary (depending on their relative 
wealth, demographic structure, etc.). Some 
may face only modest costs, yet have ample 
resources; others will face very large 
costs, yet have limited resources. Without 
some form of national cost sharing, the 
principles of need and ability to pay will 
almost certainly be violated. Equally, it will 
be hard for poorer communities to find 
the resources necessary to fund proactive 
measures to mitigate future risks.
Public compensation for losses
The question of whether those faced with 
the loss of property (including land) and/or 
income should receive public compensation 
is challenging (Sprinz and von Bünau, 
2013). There are various, often conflicting, 
principles. For instance, it might seem 
inequitable to provide compensation to 
wealthy people who have purchased second 
or third homes on vulnerable coasts in the 
full knowledge that climate change might 
render their properties uninhabitable at 
some future date. Against this, it is often 
hard to determine whether particular 
risks could have reasonably been foreseen 
and how readily those affected can bear 
the expected losses. In practice, many of 
the situations that will arise over coming 
decades are likely to be complex, not least 
because of rapidly changing risk profiles 
and unpleasant surprises. For instance, 
increased drought risk will have impacts 
on the range within which current land 
uses can operate, triggering potentially 
disruptive changes if inadequately 
anticipated and planned for, stranding 
assets and livelihoods. Similarly, coastal 
areas previously deemed to be safe may 
unexpectedly face the risk of inundation 
or the sea level may rise much faster in 
certain areas than previously projected. In 
some cases the relevant authorities may 
be obliged to force people to relocate to 
safer areas. Where compulsion is involved 
in acquiring land, there has been a long 
history in New Zealand (and elsewhere) of 
providing compensation to those directly 
affected (and sometimes those indirectly 
affected). The provisions relating to such 
compensation in New Zealand are set out 
in considerable detail in the Public Works 
Act 1981.
While designing compensatory 
arrangements is beyond the scope of this 
article, several matters deserve emphasis:
· Given the long-standing practice in 
New Zealand of societal risk pooling 
and cost sharing for natural disasters, 
the public are likely to expect 
governments to compensate (at least 
partially) those suffering loss and 
damage from climate change, including 
those facing significant costs in order 
to reduce climate-related risks (e.g. 
relocation). In these circumstances, any 
government pronouncement that 
compensation will not be provided (e.g. 
to those who build in certain vulnerable 
areas) is unlikely to be believed. In 
short, a credible commitment problem 
seems bound to arise.
· There will be strong pressures, in the 
interests of overall fairness, for any 
compensatory arrangements to be 
broadly consistent, both across the 
country and over extended periods of 
time. This points to the need for a 
nationally mandated framework with 
cross-party support. 
· In the absence of a well-designed, 
principled and consistent system of 
compensation, there will be political 
pressures for governments to implement 
high-cost engineering ‘solutions’ to 
protect vulnerable properties (and also 
threats of legal action). Yet many of these 
potential ‘adaptations’ will provide only 
temporary respite. 
· Pre-event compensation could generate 
moral hazard (e.g. by encouraging risky 
investments). It will be imperative to 
mitigate such risks through well-
designed regulatory and planning 
frameworks. 
Any compensatory regime will be 
controversial and its implementation open 
to fraudulent claims.7 As indicated, there 
are many relevant principles and 
considerations, and some of these will be 
in tension. It will be important, therefore, 
to design any regime carefully, with proper 
public engagement on the relevant issues 
and options, and detailed stakeholder 
involvement.
Reforming the funding of climate change 
adaptation – the broad options
In terms of the future funding of climate 
change adaptation, there are at least four 
possible options:
1. expand and modify existing local 
government funding instruments;
2. expand and modify existing central 
government funding instruments 
(excluding EQC), albeit in the context 
of annual appropriations;
3. amend the legislative mandate of EQC 
so that it becomes responsible for both 
pre-disaster funding (i.e. for protective 
and preventative measures) and post-
disaster funding; and
... it might seem inequitable to provide 
compensation to ... people who have 
purchased second or third homes on 
vulnerable coasts in the full knowledge 
that climate change might render their 
properties uninhabitable at some future 
date.
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4. establish a new national Climate 
Change Adaptation Fund with a 
statutory mandate to fully fund, part-
fund or co-fund various specified 
adaptation-related costs.
In our view, the first three options are 
unlikely to satisfy the relevant funding 
principles discussed above. Hence, the 
fourth option is the one that could be 
developed further, potentially to apply to 
the full range of climate change impacts.
Regarding option 1, as previously 
argued, existing local government funding 
arrangements will not be sufficient to meet 
the expected costs of climate change 
adaptation, including large-scale managed 
retreat and major infrastructure 
investments. Only central government has 
the necessary resources and mechanisms 
to undertake such tasks.
Regarding option 2, central government 
could, at least in theory, rely on existing 
funding instruments, using annual 
appropriations to co-fund some of the 
costs of climate change adaptation. 
Potentially, it could also fund specific 
adaptation projects (including managed 
retreat) directly, rather than funding local 
authorities to do it. The funding of ‘red-
zoned’ properties in Christchurch provides 
a possible model (Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority, 2016). But such 
arrangements would be ad hoc and thus 
unlikely to generate the desired level of 
consistency, certainty, stability, credibility 
or long-term durability. Moreover, as the 
scale of the adaptation challenges increases 
over coming decades, there are bound to 
be political pressures – from subnational 
governments, civil society and affected 
citizens – for the central government to 
develop more comprehensive, principled 
and tailored approaches. Aside from this, 
there would be limited scope under current 
fiscal arrangements for specific pre-funding 
of future adaptation costs, except via more 
concerted efforts to reduce net Crown debt. 
Option 3 would involve amending the 
legislative mandate of EQC and extending 
the role of the Natural Disaster Fund to 
include proactive, pre-event adaptation 
funding. Arguably, this would provide EQC 
with both a stronger incentive and a greater 
capacity to reduce post-disaster costs 
through cost-effective adaptation measures. 
Assuming that the commission was 
adequately funded to undertake such 
interventions, it could reduce the 
commission’s future liabilities and the 
overall financial costs of climate change 
impacts. Further, under such an approach 
responsibilities for (some aspects of) 
funding adaptation would be assigned to 
an independent body operating in 
accordance with statutory criteria. 
Potentially this would increase the 
likelihood of funding decisions being 
evidence-informed and principled, and 
broadly consistent over time, thus 
increasing the fairness and legitimacy of 
the policy regime. A modified EQC could 
also incorporate an element of pre-funding 
for future adaptation costs.
Against this, giving EQC major 
responsibilities for pre-event adaptation 
funding would fundamentally alter the 
commission’s current role as an insurer. It 
would result in the commission having 
multiple and potentially conflicting 
objectives – serving simultaneously as an 
insurer of residential properties (with a 
primary focus on seismic events), a 
mechanism for mitigating a wide range of 
risks, and a funder (or co-funder) of often 
large-scale adaptation projects, including 
major infrastructure investments and 
residential relocation. Among other things, 
it would raise questions over whether the 
insurance mandate of EQC should be 
extended (e.g. to include public property 
and businesses). It would also pose the risk 
that any fund that was built up over time to 
help pay for the future costs of adaptation 
could be depleted (unless quarantined 
separately from the post-disaster fund) 
every time a major natural disaster occurred. 
Aside from this, questions would arise 
about how EQC should be funded. 
Currently, those who are not insured, 
together with commercial property owners, 
do not pay the EQC levy. Yet many of these 
households and businesses will stand to 
gain significantly if the EQC becomes a 
pre-event funder of managed retreat and 
other large-scale, area-wide adaptation 
responses. Lastly, effective pre-event 
planning and adaptation will require 
extensive public consultation and 
deliberation. Such processes and 
procedures are far removed from those 
currently undertaken by EQC. This, in turn, 
would entail very different skills and 
expertise. For such reasons, we do not 
favour option 3.
The final option would be to create a 
new funding entity – such as a Climate 
Change Adaptation Fund – and modify 
other policy settings accordingly. The 
primary aims of such an entity would be 
to enhance the capacity for sound 
anticipatory governance through the 
funding of cost-effective and equitable 
responses, thereby reducing climate change 
risk exposure over time and minimising 
future damage and loss. Ideally, such a fund 
would complement existing post-event 
funding mechanisms, such as EQC and 
private insurance arrangements, so long as 
conflicting outcomes between them were 
addressed at the same time. As with the 
Natural Disaster Fund, a funding pool 
could be built up over several decades for 
allocation increasingly over the century, 
thereby enabling the burden of climate 
change adaptation to be shared more fairly 
across several generations.
An advantage of such an approach is 
that it would enable policymakers to 
establish a purpose-built institution with 
a specific and enduring statutory mandate. 
Creating any new statutory funding entity, 
however, raises multiple and complex 
design issues. These include its institutional 
form and mode of governance and the 
The primary aims [of a new funding entity] 
would be to enhance the capacity for 
sound anticipatory governance through 
the funding of cost-effective and equitable 
responses ...
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nature and scope of its funding 
responsibilities (e.g. whether these should 
cover the full range of climate change 
impacts or only specific types, and whether 
there should be transitional assistance 
available for industries or regions facing 
large-scale, compounded climate-related 
impacts). Similarly, there is the question of 
what specific costs should be funded, to 
what extent and in accordance with what 
criteria. Different types of responses (e.g. 
investment in public infrastructure, the 
funding of managed retreat, transitional 
assistance, etc.) would require very different 
criteria. At the same time, any large-scale 
relocations will require new infrastructure 
investments, so the two functions would 
need to be properly integrated. 
Related to this, concomitant changes to 
current regional and district planning 
arrangements would also need to be made. 
If the central government becomes a major 
funder of adaptation – albeit via an arm’s-
length statutory entity – it would require 
a greater influence over long-term spatial 
planning, not least to minimise the risk of 
moral hazard. But this raises important 
constitutional issues regarding the 
respective roles of central and subnational 
government, some of which are bound to 
be politically sensitive. Consideration of 
such institutional design issues raised here 
deserves rigorous analysis and public 
deliberation.
Conclusion
New Zealand’s existing institutional 
arrangements are poorly designed for 
the adaptation challenges posed by 
climate change: they are too ad hoc and 
post hoc, inadequately proactive and 
preventative, and poorly integrated. Not 
only are overall resources insufficient for 
the required adaptive responses – such 
as building resilient public infrastructure, 
undertaking large-scale managed retreat, 
and transitioning to more sustainable rural 
land uses as the frequency and magnitude 
of impacts increase – but in many cases 
there is a gross mismatch between the 
resources and capabilities available to 
local authorities and the scale of the 
task in hand. For such reasons, current 
arrangements will not achieve the goals of 
cost minimisation and equitable burden 
sharing, whether intra-generationally 
or intergenerationally. Instead, they will 
contribute to sub-optimal decisions 
and outcomes, thereby unnecessarily 
burdening future generations. As part 
of any comprehensive plan to enhance 
the country’s adaptive capacity, there is a 
good case for establishing a new national, 
publicly administered fund that is pre-event 
and preventative. Such a fund would need 
to be carefully designed, with the relevant 
criteria for its funding responsibilities 
clearly prescribed in enabling legislation. 
Creating such a fund would require 
potentially significant changes to current 
spatial planning rules, building regulations, 
insurance arrangements and the funding 
of local infrastructure. Accordingly, any 
move in this direction will need thorough 
independent scrutiny, extensive public 
deliberation and a concerted political 
effort to achieve a durable cross-party 
consensus on the new policy framework.
1 For analyses of ‘anticipatory governance’, see Boston 
(2017b), Guston (2014) and Quay (2010).
2 This study covered only the more populated regions of New 
Zealand. It included only some infrastructure assets.
3 See also recent contributions from the Society of Local 
Government Managers (2015) and Local Government New 
Zealand (2016a, 2016b).
4 Note that a Housing Infrastructure Fund was announced 
in early February 2017. This is designed to assist councils 
in high-growth areas with significant housing pressures 
to fund new public infrastructure (including water supply, 
storm water, waste water and roading). Funding of around 
$1 billion is available to eligible councils via a competitive 
bidding process.
5 ‘A process towards a settlement framework to mitigate 
debris flow risk – Awatarariki fanhead, Matatä’, https://
www.whakatane.govt.nz/sites/www.whakatane.govt.nz/files/
documents/about-council/council-projects/debris-flow-and-
landslide-hazards/policy_committee_2_july_2015.pdf.
6 Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards Strategy, http://www.
hbcoast.co.nz/strategy-development/.
7 So far in Christchurch, for instance, EQC has identified 
fraudulent claims following the earthquakes worth about 
$4.6 million, and 979 fraudulent claims have been 
prosecuted. 
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Abstract
New Zealand’s Resource Management Act is frequently criticised 
for the costs and delays it imposes on activities, but less attention 
is given to the consistency of values it applies to environmental 
effects through its decisions. The wide variety of parties who exercise 
decision roles under the act lack guidance on the economic value of 
the environment, and non-market valuation studies are too costly 
to be widely used and too few and varied to infer reliable generic 
values. Drawing on experience in estimating the public value of 
safety improvements, this article proposes an alternative approach 
that measures people’s aversion to the risk of environmental impacts 
of different scales and severity which could yield values sufficiently 
generic to be widely used, and outlines its uses both within and 
beyond the RMA applications.
Keywords Resource management, non-market valuation, risk, 
environmental accidents
While the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) attracts frequent criticism for imposing 
costs and delays on activities, less attention 
is paid to whether it consistently accounts 
for the environmental effects of its 
decisions across the country. Could a more 
coherent approach be adopted, rather 
than relying on the vagaries of particular 
councils, courts or individual decision 
makers? Our answer is ‘yes’ – by applying 
the approach proposed and developed in 
this article, which avoids the limitations of 
current evaluation approaches.
Although the RMA’s purpose includes 
providing for ‘economic well-being’ 
(section 2), the idea that environmental 
condition is part of the ‘consumption set’ 
that determines peoples’ well-being is not 
commonly considered in economic terms 
within the act’s evaluation processes. These 
are legislated by politicians, administered 
by planners and adjudicated by courts 
which emphasise legalistic and scientific 
aspects, with economic assessments largely 
focused on job creation and economic 
growth. Hence, the environment is valued 
in an ad hoc manner, implied through 
project approvals and other decisions. 
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This is unlikely to result in an optimal level 
of environmental protection across New 
Zealand since it leaves unanswered the 
economic question of how much is it worth 
to avoid adverse environmental effects?
The new and alternative approach 
combines the principles of environmental 
and safety valuation to deliver a flexible 
mechanism for environmental decision 
making, applicable not just to RMA 
decisions, but to other processes, such as 
biosecurity assessments, that consider 
environmental values. We term this a 
VMAEE (value of a major adverse effect on 
the environment), the reasons for which 
are considered below. 
The VMAEE sits within a wider context 
of economists’ varied attempts to place 
monetary value on things which do not 
have prices revealed in market trades. The 
natural environment has numerous 
‘missing markets’, sometimes because it is 
impractical to regulate the use of 
environmental resources (like the quality 
of the air we breathe) and sometimes 
because of what might be called 
‘administrative failure’ to define and enforce 
entitlements to use resources that could 
reveal value through trade. Markets can be 
created for some resources: tradable quotas 
for commercial fishing, for example, and 
emissions trading to tackle climate change. 
However, many environmental effects are 
too diffuse to enable well-functioning 
markets to be established.
Various methods have been devised to 
address this problem – e.g. non-market 
valuations of environmental resources – 
which have sometimes influenced resource 
use decisions (see, for instance, Harris and 
Meister, 1983). But applications of such 
methods can be time-consuming and 
costly, they address particular clients’ 
concerns, and in New Zealand at least there 
are too few estimates employing too widely 
varying methods to infer generic values for 
environmental resources such as water 
quality, biodiversity or natural settings. The 
cost of generating bespoke values has been 
prohibitive, so decisions will often be taken 
with no explicit economic values attached 
to environmental impacts. In such cases, 
economic values are implied by the 
decisions taken: for example, if a decision 
causes an environmental resource to 
contract, that resource is implicitly valued 
less than the opportunity cost of forgoing 
the project that alters it. Leaving decisions 
to be made without explicit focus on 
economic value by a variety of decision 
makers is not a recipe for efficient resource 
use.
These issues are not unique to New 
Zealand and can be placed in a wider 
context. Since the 1990s international 
agencies such as the World Bank, the 
OECD and the United Nations have steered 
a more consistent approach to placing 
values on the natural environment, driven 
by the premise that in the absence of a 
monetary value, the natural environment 
may not be properly taken into account in 
public policy deliberations at national or 
regional level, nor in private corporate 
decision making. The World Bank has 
developed frameworks for comprehensive 
wealth, inclusive wealth and genuine 
savings indicators which treat the 
environment as a source of natural capital 
to be measured alongside the produced 
capital of machinery and infrastructure, 
human capital (capabilities and skills), 
institutional capital (laws and governance) 
and net foreign assets.
In parallel with this, the United Nations 
has developed a System of Environmental 
Economic Accounting (SEEA), which sets 
standards for preparing natural resource 
accounts consistent with (but not part of) 
its System of National Accounts which 
records national economic aggregates like 
GDP. Its latest SEEA guidelines issued in 
2012 included a core framework covering 
resources that give rise to marketable goods 
(such as hydrocarbon and mineral stocks) 
and an experimental framework that 
covers non-market resources (like 
recreation space and biodiversity). Statistics 
New Zealand has prepared satellite 
accounts using SEEA’s core framework, on 
energy and minerals, water, fisheries and 
forestry (recently updated in Statistics New 
Zealand, 2018).
More recently, the notion of ecosystem 
services has received prominence through 
the UN-initiated Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment in 2005, and the United 
Kingdom’s National Ecosystem Assessment 
in 2011. The ecosystem services framework 
draws direct links between the condition 
of the natural environment’s ecosystems 
and the beneficial services of value it 
supplies to human activities, under four 
distinct categories of service: provisioning 
(supply of materials and energy), regulating 
(such as carbon sequestration and water 
flow moderation), cultural (settings for 
recreation, tourism and cultural heritage) 
and supporting (nutrient cycling and 
pollination). 
The UN’s SEEA, capital accounting and 
ecosystem services frameworks are all 
attempts at a more interdisciplinary 
approach to economic valuation, but 
integration of science and economics is not 
yet fully resolved. All have received official 
endorsement and are being implemented 
by governments to varying degree, but they 
are primarily oriented towards measuring 
stocks of natural resources, rather than the 
changes in environmental condition and 
flows of effects that result from individual 
policies, plan changes or consenting 
decisions. A further limiting feature is that 
the average values inferred from them are 
not the marginal values needed to assess 
individual policy changes or projects, 
which will vary with the conditions of 
abundance or scarcity in each situation. 
The principal use of these aggregate stock 
measures is in comparing periodic 
snapshots of the position of natural 
resources in the national economy, rather 
than in assessing whether a particular 
The [value of a major adverse effect on 
the environment] is primarily aimed at 
deriving marginal values that can inform 
decisions at individual project or policy 
change level. 
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project or plan change would produce 
benefits in excess of its full social costs, 
including costs of environmental changes.
The VMAEE is primarily aimed at 
deriving marginal values that can inform 
decisions at individual project or policy 
change level. It complements and serves a 
different purpose to the valuation of 
aggregate stocks in the SEEA. 
Valuing the seemingly priceless: the 
conceptual underpinnings of the VMAEE 
framework
The VMAEE combines two pre-existing 
economic frameworks: the total 
economic value (TEV) model of natural 
environmental resources with public good 
characteristics, which includes current 
use values, future use (or option) values 
and non-use (like existence and bequest) 
values;1 and the value of preventing a 
fatality (VPF) approach2 to valuing safety 
improvements in public sector projects. 
However, while we retain the essence of 
the TEV approach, we avoid the most 
trenchant criticism of environmental 
valuation studies – in New Zealand3 and 
elsewhere – which have focused on specific 
species or habitats, resulting in a myriad of 
site-specific values generated from one-off 
(costly) studies that risk overstating value 
in one context by under-accounting in 
others, and which sometimes have 
(mistakenly) been applied to valuing the 
current stock.4 VMAEE achieves this by 
adopting a multi-site approach, mirroring 
the VPF approach currently applied in 
transport appraisal of the value of 
preventing fatalities, which provides a 
utility-theoretic measure for safety. 
In that approach, safety has a clear unit 
of measure, whereby the VPF is the aggregate 
willingness to pay, summed over a large 
group of individuals, for small reductions 
in each individual’s risk of premature death, 
where the risk reductions are such that they 
will reduce the expected number of 
premature fatalities in the affected group by 
one and hence prevent one ‘statistical fatality’ 
in the forthcoming period. Applying the 
VPF means that the benefit of avoiding 
fatalities can be directly compared to its 
marginal costs, unlike in environmental 
assessment where the benefits of reducing 
the risk of environmental harm are only 
implicitly considered, or, worse, effectively 
valued at zero. 
The VPF is portable across any policy 
domain that has an impact on human 
safety. This is a particularly useful feature 
and provides the rationale for incorporating 
it as the second stage of our framework. It 
is conceptually simple in respect of how it 
treats the policy output – the prevention 
of a fatality – as no effort is made to 
distinguish between different accident 
types or different ways of dying in such an 
accident. This contrasts with environmental 
valuation, which often has multiple, diverse 
units of output measures – for example, 
particular species saved from extinction, 
characteristics of water quality, ill-defined 
‘amenity’ of landscapes – making it difficult 
to generalise any damages away from a 
specific site.
VPF also permits public preferences to 
be incorporated into appraisals in a 
transparent manner, consistent with 
economic theory. This contrasts with 
current RMA process, under which, even 
if the public is consulted, it is unclear how 
these consultations affect the final decision. 
The final distinguishing feature of the 
VPF is its integral treatment of risk. It is 
reduction in the risk of a fatality that is 
valued, not the certain death of an 
identified person. Our framework 
incorporates this principle, unlike standard 
environmental valuation, which often 
posits (certain) changes in environmental 
attributes. 
The distinction made above between a 
multi-layered, complex environment and 
simpler preferences for protecting human 
life should not preclude the adoption of a 
VPF-style approach to environmental 
valuation. A VPF is a single clear entity 
which becomes a benchmark value which 
can be adjusted for use in other contexts. 
In environmental matters, there is no such 
benchmark value except in rare cases such 
as global carbon credits, leaving councils, 
Environment Court judges and even 
sometimes central  government 
policymakers without guidance on 
economic value when deciding what weight 
to place on protecting or allowing change 
in the natural environment. In many 
situations, it is difficult to build up a 
tailored layer cake of values that reflect all 
the facets of environmental change, 
without resorting to values transferred 
from elsewhere or averages that do not 
accurately reflect the marginal choices. 
Seeking public preferences to avert the risk 
of different scales of impact, without being 
precise on details, may have its limitations, 
but does have the advantage that it replaces 
the zero price implicitly applied to 
environmental change in much RMA 
decision making, which must surely be a 
gross underestimate. At the very least it 
removes the current anomaly in New 
Zealand whereby the transport sector 
explicitly values the protection of humans 
and directly embeds it into policy while 
environmental protection remains 
unquantified.
Value of a major adverse effect on the 
environment (VMAEE) framework
Although the VMAEE framework is 
pitched at a higher level than individual 
species, sites or attributes, it also has an 
inbuilt flexibility that can accommodate 
differing severities of environmental 
harm. It explicitly recognises that, for 
some aspects of environmental value, 
protection of existing features may be 
mission-critical (e.g. habitat essential 
Although the VMAEE framework is 
pitched at a higher level than individual 
species, sites or attributes, it also has an 
inbuilt flexibility that can accommodate 
differing severities of environmental 
harm. 
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for species survival), but for others 
some level of change may be acceptable 
because of substitution possibilities (e.g. 
recreation transferring from native to 
planted forests). It also requires a bridge 
between the valuation both of safety 
and of environmental impacts. This 
is provided by the concept of a major 
accident to the environment (MATTE), 
which underpins the Control of Major 
Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 
1999 in the UK,5 but has no equivalent in 
New Zealand. In RMA language it might 
be termed a major adverse effect on the 
environment (MAEE). An MAEE would 
be flexible enough to cover both the risk 
of immediate catastrophic loss and the 
‘accident by stealth’ of continued exposure 
to risk of degradation. 
Applying the MAEE
Defining major environmental ‘accident’ 
scenarios in terms of scale, long- and 
short-term effects and the extent of 
impact on human population centres or 
natural areas allows non-market valuation 
techniques to be applied to establish 
people’s preferences for reducing the 
risk of different combinations of effects 
at a range of prices, thus capturing the 
reduction in TEV from an MAEE. The 
arguments for and against different 
valuation methods and the often-voiced 
reservations about their validity are well 
rehearsed elsewhere and are not repeated 
here (see, for instance, NZIER, 2010; 
Pearce, Atkinson and Mourato, 2006). This 
does not negate the conceptual framework 
underpinning VMAEE elicitation but 
will undoubtedly have an impact on its 
empirical application. A VMAEE elicited 
using state-of the-art methods will clearly 
be less prone to error and bias than one 
elicited under outdated practices. 
Operationalising the VMAEE
The VPF is the value of reducing the risk 
of the most severe life ‘event’, death, but 
reducing the risk of non-fatal injuries 
of varying severity is also used in 
regulatory analysis, requiring a value of 
preventing injury (VPI).6 Likewise, our 
framework also accommodates adverse 
environmental effects of differing severity. 
Thus, an MAEE might be so serious that 
any environmental losses are irreversible 
(e.g. global extinction of a species, or the 
extinction of a keystone species in a habitat 
of national significance), but others might 
have a different scale and significance – e.g. 
serious but without the irreversibility of 
potential losses (localised extinction of a 
species abundant elsewhere). Quantifying 
the VPF is straightforward: it is calculated 
by dividing mean willingness to pay by 
the risk reduction.7 The environmental 
analogue value – the VMAEE – would 
be calculated in similar manner, with less 
serious adverse effects scaled accordingly. 
Defining a VMAEE requires overlaying 
the VPF concept with the components of 
TEV. As an illustrative, not prescriptive, 
example, Figure 1 delineates a VMAEE in 
terms of the degree of severity of 
environmental damage, and demonstrates 
how each environmental outcome maps to 
value. We restrict this to three types of 
MAEE, although more could be included 
and gradations could exist between these 
three types: for instance, an effect with 
characteristics of a major VMAEE except 
for the availability of close substitutes 
elsewhere would attract lesser value than a 
full major VMAEE, but perhaps higher 
value than the moderate VMAEE. In simple 
terms, environmental degradation that has 
a negative impact on human well-being 
reduces one or more of option value (OV), 
existence value (EV) or use value (UV). 
The value of reducing the risk of MAEEs 
of different severities is captured by the 
public’s willingness to pay (in the same way 
as VPF is calculated). This will result in a 
range of indicative values for differing 
environmental effects and how the values 
change at the margin.
This differs crucially from existing 
approaches to project appraisal. Rather 
than having to determine the weight to be 
applied to individual environmental effects, 
the impact of these adverse effects is 
combined and assigned to varying 
categories of severity, determined by 
scientific/ecological characteristics. 
Economics can also inform this 
categorisation: for instance, scarcity and 
irreversibility enhance value, whereas 
abundance, availability of substitutes and 
ease of reproduction have the opposite 
effect. But the VMAEE is inherently 
interdisciplinary in approach. Economists 
need to draw on other disciplines’ experts 
in characterising the nature and 
probabilities of accidental outcomes for the 
environment in the different severity 
scenarios, but once the values have been 
estimated they can be entered into the 
wider policy process, which includes both 
Figure 1: A VMAEE incorporating decreasing severity of environmental impact
MAJOR
VMAEE
MODERATE
VMAEE
MINOR
VMAEE
Characteristics Characteristics Characteristics
Major Environmental
Loss (EV) 
Serious Environmental
Detriment (EV) 
Minor Environmental
Impairment (EV) 
Nationally Significant
Impact (OV) 
Nationally Significant
Impact (OV) 
Locally Significant
Impact (OV) 
Irreversible Loss (OV) Loss Recoverable in
Long Term (OV) 
Loss Recoverable in
Short Term (OV) 
No Close Substitutes
(UV) 
Substitutes at High
Cost (UV) 
Substitutes at low
cost (UV) 
Examples
Species extinction
Loss of unique
cultural artefacts
Major landscape loss
and transformation
Examples
Habitat reduction
Loss of nationally
significant recreation
space
Loss of mature
landscape features
Contamination of land,
water or biosphere   
Examples
Minor habitat change
Loss of locally
significant recreation
space
Minor landscape
change 
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economic and non-economic considera-
tions.
Deriving and applying a VMAEE in resource 
management
Derivation
Here we illustrate a hypothetical 
application of the framework at national 
level, although it could be amended 
to a smaller operational scale. Under 
this scenario, the government, through 
the RMA, sets the frame for regulating 
environmental harm (or preservation) 
across the country. A priori, it is unknown 
which particular site will be affected; 
instead there is a small risk at all sites. Thus, 
any value which reflects this risk can be 
applied to any proposed project (or to any 
site that might be vulnerable to adverse 
effects).
To be applicable at the national level we 
assume that at least some people derive 
existence value and/or some people would 
adopt an altruistic stance (Aldred, 1994), 
and hence be prepared to contribute to the 
prevention or reduction in the risk of an 
MAEE elsewhere in the country as well as 
in their immediate neighbourhood. This 
allows us to draw directly on the conceptual 
framework in Appendix 1 to inform the 
design of any empirical study to estimate 
a VMAEE.8
Willingness to pay values could be 
derived from various methods: e.g. hedonic 
pricing methods, random utility travel cost 
models, contingent valuation or choice 
modelling (Freeman, Herriges and Kling, 
2014). We develop our example in the 
context of a choice experiment (based on 
Lancaster’s (1966) model of consumer 
preferences and widely applied in health 
(Ryan et al., 2006), transportation (Hensher 
and Rose, 2005) and the environment 
(Adamowicz et al., 1998)). This could be 
informed by deliberative processes or focus 
groups which examine potential trade-offs 
in depth, and which can be used to refine 
the questions before applying them to a 
wider sample survey representative of the 
population at large.
In a VMAEE context, people’s utility is 
a function of the different environmental 
attributes and the reduction in risk to these 
attributes. To facilitate generalisability and 
avoid the site-specificity problems 
discussed above, broad sets of attributes at 
risk of damage are defined in TEV terms. 
Respondents would first be made aware of 
the current conditions with respect to 
biodiversity significance, recreational 
opportunities and so on. They would then 
face a series of choice sets (see example in 
Figure 2) consisting of two or more 
differently specified, but related, sets in 
which they indicate their most preferred 
option.9 By varying the attributes, levels of 
risk and price across choice sets, marginal 
values for each attribute can be recovered 
directly via econometric procedures 
(Freeman, Herriges and Kling, 2014), while 
estimates of overall welfare gains from the 
intervention as a whole can also be 
estimated (indirectly).
Moving forward, assume that a mean 
willingness to pay for a reduction in a risk 
to the environment has been estimated 
from a sample of New Zealand households. 
Appendix 2 considers a simple example of 
reducing the risk of an MAEE by 1 in 
100,000 per site and shows how this can be 
aggregated into a societal value for this risk 
reduction – i.e. a VMAEE. This ex ante 
measure assumes that at the time of 
enactment the policy will be expected to 
prevent one adverse event in the 
forthcoming period, although in some 
periods more than one adverse event may 
be prevented and, in some periods, none. 
This mirrors the VPF, which is the value of 
preventing one fatality on average in the 
next period. 
A VMAEE in this form could 
complement rather than supplant other 
forms of environmental valuation, by 
indicating public value of protection 
against the risk of adverse effects that 
cannot be valued in other ways. This is 
similar to the VPF, which is sometimes 
called the human cost of accidents, and 
combined with other accident cost 
estimates such as the cost of property 
damage, emergency services attending the 
scene, policing, and justice system costs 
that may follow if fault is established. Thus, 
the VMAEE would not preclude the use of 
biodiversity offsets as a means of mitigating 
the environmental impacts: if a choice set 
includes offsets, the reduction in risk to 
biodiversity would be assigned a less major 
VMAEE than it would if offsets were not 
feasible.
Applications
We now consider how the VMAEE 
approach could inform decisions made on 
biosecurity, freshwater management, the 
RMA and national living standards.
Ecosystems
In biosecurity, a key issue is what value 
should be placed on avoiding risks to 
species or habitats that are unique to New 
Zealand. There are periodic incursion 
risks, such as myrtle rust which threatens 
indigenous trees such as mänuka and the 
red-flowering pöhutukawa. There are also 
chronic risks from established introduced 
predators like stoats and possums, against 
which the government has granted 
initial funding of $28 million towards 
making New Zealand predator-free by 
2050. Diminishing returns and increasing 
Figure 2: An Example VMAEE Choice Set
ATTRIBUTE CHOICE A CHOICE B STATUS QUO
Risk: Habitat loss Reduced by 10% No change High
Risk: Landscape Change increased by 2% Increased by 5% Low
Risk: Contamination No Change Reduced by 10% Medium
Recreation Improved trails (10%) Improved trails (15%) No improvement
Location 100 km away 1 km away 50 km away
Cost NZ$30 NZ$50 NZ$0
Note: Risk reductions could be presented as 1/100, for example  
Location can be expressed in distance bands to a site for a representative New Zealand
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marginal costs may make eradicating the 
last breeding specimens prohibitively 
expensive, but policymakers are still 
interested in how much the public is 
willing to pay for more intensive predator 
management than is currently achieved.10
Protecting more habitats and wildlife 
communities lowers the probability of their 
being driven to extinction. A VMAEE could 
help infer societal values for risk and help 
prioritise how much habitat to protect and 
where, informing the trade-off between 
social and scientific objectives, although in 
some cases, such as risks involving pivotal 
keystone species, scientific considerations 
may continue to dominate. For example, in 
a New Zealand context, the Department of 
Conservation may have some scientifically 
determined bottom lines in terms of the 
portfolio of sites it needs to secure the 
survival of species, a representative 
diversity of habitats and the supply of 
ecosystem services. But the VMAEE could 
show the relative public value of securing 
environmental condition above those levels, 
which could assist the department with its 
priority setting and in demonstrating 
public value from extra investment funding. 
Freshwater management
Deteriorating freshwater quality has 
recently risen in public awareness, due 
partly to agricultural intensification, 
which increases nutrient discharges to the 
environment, and partly to one-off events 
like the 2015 gastroenteritis outbreak in 
Havelock North, attributed to intrusion 
of faecal matter from sheep pastures into 
bores during rainstorms. These raise 
questions about the value of protecting 
surface water quality and groundwater 
against contamination, reducing the risk 
of infection from contact with water.
The question is whether the costs of so 
doing are justified by the benefits of 
reducing the frequency of such 
contamination. Risk of contamination 
varies with localised factors, such as the 
depth of aquifers, the location of recharge 
areas and the population potentially at risk 
– all matters which could be reflected in a 
VMAEE. Where water contamination has 
wider ramifications – e.g. affecting New 
Zealand’s reputation as a tourist destination 
– a VMAEE could be informative in 
considering national assistance to poorer 
communities to enable them to reach a 
higher basic standard.
A VMAEE could also inform the 
National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management, which in 2014 set a national 
objective of improving the quality of all 
freshwater bodies to safely ‘wadeable’. This 
was amended in 2017 with a new target of 
90% of all rivers and lakes being safely 
‘swimmable’ by 2040 (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2017). At what point would 
the costs incurred exceed the benefits 
gained? A VMAEE could help determine 
this by providing a comparable monetary 
value of benefits to assist in identifying 
where to prioritise improving water quality.
The RMA
The RMA has come under increasing 
scrutiny over whether it appropriately 
balances the needs of development 
and environmental protection. Since 
coming into force, there have been 21 
amendment acts and 34 regulations 
issued to give direction for more consistent 
implementation by the 16 regional 
authorities and 68 district and city 
councils that exercise powers under the act. 
Disputes under the act have recourse to 
the Environment Court, whose decisions 
can be appealed in the High Court, so the 
judiciary also influences implementation.
There are unavoidable trade-offs 
between environment and economic 
outcome in every decision under the act, 
but little guidance exists on how to make 
these trade-offs in economic terms. For 
RMA applications for local plan changes 
or consents for new land uses or discharges 
into air and water, the decision makers are 
left to weigh the benefits of approval 
against the localised environmental 
changes and an overlay of national 
priorities. Experts on ecology, visual 
amenity and recreation may assess the 
significance of an affected site from their 
own perspectives, but consideration of 
economic consequences is often limited to 
potential impacts on jobs and incomes, not 
the potential losses people face from 
changes in the environment and their 
willingness to pay to reduce the risk of loss, 
as captured by TEV. This can result in 
perverse outcomes: for instance, 
authorising the destruction of very rare 
habitats to enable a project that would 
create jobs and outputs that could be 
readily replicated by relocating the activity 
elsewhere.11 A VMAEE would provide 
objective guidance on the relative value of 
different potential losses and improve 
consistency of decisions.
The government
The Treasury could adapt the VMAEE 
approach to its Living Standards 
Framework to place monetary values on 
natural capital (see van Zul and Au, 2018) 
and changes in environmental outcomes 
over time. The VMAEE approach could 
also be used to provide a monetary 
overlay to the initiatives of Ministry for the 
Environment and Statistics New Zealand 
in environmental reporting (see Ministry 
for the Environment, 2015), and be a step 
towards more explicit consideration of the 
economic value of (changes in) natural 
stocks than the natural resource satellite 
accounts prepared using the UN SEEA 
guidance for fisheries, forests, minerals and 
water (see Statistics New Zealand, 2018). 
The approach can also be used by other 
government departments, e.g. the Ministry 
for Primary Industries and agencies 
wherever there are environments at risk 
The VMAEE framework developed in this 
article combines the existing frameworks 
of TEV and the VPF applied to safety 
and adapts them to derive valuations 
of public aversion to risks to the 
environment. 
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of degradation, and to which measures 
can be applied that affect the probability 
of adverse effects occurring. 
Concluding comments
The VMAEE framework developed 
in this article combines the existing 
frameworks of TEV and the VPF applied 
to safety and adapts them to derive 
valuations of public aversion to risks to 
the environment. It complies with the 
economic principle of marginal values, 
but also meets policymakers’ needs for 
flexibility, consistency and transparency. It 
can generate a small number of values that 
can be applied in any domain, ensuring 
that environmental resources are given the 
same weight across different sectors, while 
acknowledging that some Department 
of Conservation preservation activities 
with hard-to-ascertain probabilities and 
involving potentially irreversible outcomes 
can still be determined separately. In 
providing such a framework, we place 
the environment at the heart of, rather 
than adjunct to, economic decisions over 
natural resources in New Zealand.
The VMAEE serves a different purpose 
from the valuations of stocks in the SEEA. 
But it has some overlap with the ecosystem 
services approach, which provides a 
typography for identifying services from 
the natural environment that can be valued 
and mapped against TEV (as in Appendix 
1). There is potential to develop this linkage 
in future as both the VMAEE and ecosystem 
services approaches evolve.
The advantages of the VMAEE are that 
it generalises the object of valuation 
around the scale and characteristics of 
environmental risks, rather than valuing 
specific environmental features, which may 
affect the non-market valuation responses 
(for example, charismatic ‘mega-fauna’ 
attract higher survey response values than 
do less visible but rarer species more 
pivotal in ecosystem functioning). It would 
be less prone to ‘focus illusion’, which lifts 
the values of subjects by bringing attention 
to them, and which also contributes to the 
widely reported ‘part–whole bias’, in which 
respondents indicate similar value for 
environmental attributes of greatly 
different scale and significance. And having 
a single suite of values for effects of 
different severity derived by a common 
method would be more widely applicable, 
and ultimately less costly to obtain, than 
the assortment of current ad hoc valuation 
estimates of specific issues. 
1 Built on ideas attributed to Krutilla, 1967. 
2 VPF is equivalent to the value of statistical life (VSL) seen in 
some literature. We use VPF here following practice in the 
UK, where it is considered a more accurate description of 
what it does: see Clough, Guria and Bealing (2015).
3 For example, Lincoln University hosts a New Zealand non-
market valuation database with summary details of over 150 
empirical studies applying various methods to recreation, 
pollution, aesthetics, risk, transport and environmental 
protection; however, these provide insufficient estimates on 
particular topics to infer reliable generic estimates.
4 An example of this, which combines environmental 
consumer surplus values with GDP without adjusting for 
consumer surpluses on non-environmental consumption, is 
Costanza et al. (1997). While this approach allows society 
to track the value of stock over time, it is not appropriate to 
the type of natural resource management addressed in this 
article.
5 The mechanism by which the UK implements the Seveso 
Directive (82/501/EEC).
6 For example, the NZ Transport Agency values the reduction 
in risk of serious injury (requiring hospitalisation) at 10% of 
the VPF.
7 For instance, if the average willingness to pay to reduce 
the risk of fatality by 1 in 100,000 is $20, society’s 
willingness to pay to avoid one anonymous fatality, the VPF, 
is $20÷0.0000001=$2 million (Lindhjem and Navrud, 
2010). 
8 Further assumptions would be required to enable the 
VMAEE to be used in economic regulation, although we do 
not develop them formally here. As in the VPF, we assume 
financial risk aversion and prudence with respect to current 
wealth. The environment is considered a normal good, so 
a person places higher value on a larger than a smaller 
reduction in a particular environmental hazard.
9 Following standard practice, such surveys are subject to 
extensive pre-testing and piloting to ensure that respondents 
understand the information and tasks, while retaining their 
scientific validity.
10 By comparison, in 2014 the Department of Conservation 
spent $31 million on pest control, mainly on reserve areas, 
and Operational Solutions for Primary Industry (OSPRI) 
spent $47 million on control of bovine Tb vectors on 
farmland and interstitial bush areas. The cost of ridding 
the country of introduced predators has been estimated at 
between $9 billion and $31 billion.
11 For example, on the Escarpment mine on the Denniston 
Plateau, the Environmental Court granted consent for 
an opencast coal mine that would destroy habitats that 
ecological experts for both sides agreed were extremely rare, 
although the economic benefits of jobs and incomes could 
be obtained from extraction elsewhere, as coal is not scarce 
in the region.
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Appendix 1: Total Economic Value And Ecosystem Services
Total Economic Value approach
Value Category Sub- Category Value from… Ecosystem services
Non- use Value
Existence value Retaining species, sites, habitats for their own sake Cultural services
Su
pp
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Bequest value Retaining unique natural features for future generations
Non- material services obtained 
from ecosystems
Scientific value Potential for new scientific and educational understanding
Spiritual/culture value Deeper experience of a place that transcends amenity, associative and commemorative values
Commemorative value Connections with a significant event, idea or person
Associative value Essential element of wider identity
Amenity/aesthetics Visual qualities of physical attributes
Future Use Value
Quasi- option value Retaining potential until better informed
Option value Retaining potential to use in future Regulatory services
Current Use Value
Indirect use value Use supports other activities Benefits from regulating services of ecosystems
Direct use value Provisioning services
Non- consumptive Use does not deplete resource Products obtained from  
ecosystems (food, materials, 
energy, water)
Consumptive use Use extracts or depletes resource
Aggregate annual WTP = $V x 1.47 x 106  (1)  
 ...Discounted present value of aggregate WTP over 20 years at public sector discount rate of 4% 
per annum
 = $V x 1.47 x 106 x 14.2 (2)
 = $V x 20.9 x 106  (3)
Expected number of MAEE prevented over 20 years as a result of risk reduction
 = 1000 x (10-4- 10-6) x 20 (4)
 = 1000 x (99 x 10-6) x 20 (5)
 = 1.98  (6)
This is typically referred to as the prevention of 1.98 “statistical” MAEE.  Hence from (3) and (6) the 
aggregate WTP-based value per statistical MAEE prevented = 
   $V x 20 x 106
  19.8 
(7)
 = $V x 10.1 x 10   (8)
 However, the overall reduction in risk per MAEE site
 = (10-4- 10-6) x 20  (9)
 = 99 x 10-6 x 20  (10)
 = 1.98 x 10-3   (11)
 Hence the WTP-based value of the 20 year reduction 
in risk per MAEE site
 = ($V x 10.1 x 106) x 1.98 x 10-3 (12)
 = $V x 0.020 x 106  (13)
 = $V x 0.020 million  (14)
It is then easy to calculate the value of a 20 year risk reduction for a MAEE site for different mean 
WTP amounts. If mean annual WTP per household was $2.50 a VMAEE would be $51,900 while a 
$200 mean annual household WTP would generate a VMAEE of over $4.0 million. Table A1.1 
contains implied VMAEES for WTP amounts between these two values.  Note that this value applies 
to each MAEE site.
Table A2.1 Implied VMAEES for Different 
Household Mean WTP
Mean annual 
household 
willingness to pay
Value of 20 year 
risk reduction per 
MAEE site $’000
$2.50 51.9
$5.00 103.9
$10.00 207.8
$20.00 415.5
$50.00 1,038.8
$100.00 2,077.7
$200.00 4,155.4
Appendix 2:  Calculating And Applying A VMAEE For Policy
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Delivering  
on Outcomes 
the experience of Ma-ori  
health service providers
Abstract
This article explores the service delivery experience of Mäori 
health service providers within the context of contracting. It draws 
on selected findings from a three-year Health Research Council-
funded study and discusses how Mäori health service providers 
are evidencing that their service delivery is contributing to positive 
outcomes for whänau. Although generally outcomes contracting 
appears to be fraught for providers, the foundations of a policy 
platform for effective outcomes contracting ‘by Mäori for Mäori’ 
has been established through the Whänau Ora policy. 
Keywords Mäori health service providers, outcomes contracting
This article explores the service delivery experience of Mäori health service providers (MHSPs) within 
the context of contracting, particularly 
contracting for outcomes. It draws on 
selected findings from the final two phases 
of a three-year Health Research Council-
funded study. In the first phase, we 
partnered with three MHSPs, in Taranaki, 
Whanganui and on the West Coast of the 
South Island, to define the specific chronic 
conditions prevention model of service 
delivery being developed by each (Gifford 
et al., 2017). We have since used these 
models as a primary vehicle for exploring 
how MHSPs are evidencing that their 
service delivery is contributing to positive 
outcomes for whänau. 
We begin by outlining the characteristics 
of MHSPs and their unique role in chronic 
conditions prevention. We then overview 
recent key shifts in the state’s approach to 
service provision and consider the impact 
of these for MHSPs. Issues we explore 
include contracting, and the more recent 
introduction of contracting for outcomes 
and commissioning for outcomes in the 
specific context of MHSP Whänau Ora 
service provision. Finally, we outline study 
data collection methods, before presenting 
results and discussion. 
Background 
Boulton et al. (2013) observe that 
MHSPs are typically ‘owned’ by a tribal 
or community-based group, and have 
inextricable links to their communities 
and a focus on putting in place services 
responsive to the cultural needs of Mäori 
service users. MHSP governance and 
service delivery reflect tikanga Mäori, or 
Mäori-defined, frameworks (Crengle, 
1999). The combination of these factors 
is likely to enhance MHSP efficacy for 
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Mäori. Across New Zealand there are a 
range of MHSPs: some with a few, small 
contracts with state agencies, and others 
holding much larger contracts and offering 
services including medical, allied health 
and community care (Abel et al., 2005). 
MHSPs are uniquely placed to promote 
Mäori well-being, including through 
addressing the critical gaps in chronic 
conditions prevention (Gifford et al., 2017). 
There is some urgency around the 
prevention-related work they do, given the 
devastating impact on indigenous peoples 
of chronic conditions, which is significantly 
contributing to health disparities 
(Anderson et al., 2016). In the New Zealand 
context, health outcomes for Mäori are 
poorer than for non-Mäori, with 
pronounced disparities related to chronic 
condition outcomes (Ministry of Health, 
2013).
MHSPs are responsible for tracking, 
assessing and reporting on the impact of 
their service delivery for whänau, including 
prevention interventions related to chronic 
conditions. That activity does not occur in 
isolation; it is influenced by the broader 
approach of the state, and state agencies, to 
determining the needs of populations, 
along with related service provision, 
funding and success measurement. Since 
the mid-1980s New Zealand, along with 
other Western nations, has adopted a neo-
liberal approach to social service provision, 
which has been extensively documented 
(Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave, 2008; 
O’Brien, 2016; Ryan, 2011; Stace and 
Cumming, 2006). Defining characteristics 
of neo-liberalism include a focus on 
contracts-based funding (O’Brien, Sanders 
and Tennant, 2009), along with limited 
public provision and an emphasis on 
individual responsibility for personal well-
being (O’Brien, 2016). 
While neo-liberalism brought with it 
unsettling changes for the social services 
non-profit sector generally, it can be argued 
that for MHSPs new opportunities 
emerged. MHSPs burgeoned in number 
during the 1990s precisely because of the 
neo-liberal preference for devolution of 
service provision beyond the state sector, 
which allowed a more diverse range of 
organisations to enter into contractual 
relationships for provision (O’Brien, 
Sanders and Tennant, 2009; Rickard, 2014). 
The growth in MHSP numbers reflects the 
state’s acceptance that, in some instances 
at least, services developed and delivered 
‘by Mäori for Mäori’ are best placed to meet 
the needs of Mäori (Crengle, 2000; Ellison-
Loschmann and Pearce, 2006).
Tension exists, however, and it appears 
that much of that tension can be traced to 
the nature of the relationship between the 
state and providers inherent in contracting 
arrangements. Key characteristics of that 
relationship include its formality and 
narrow parameters (Nowland-Foreman, 
2015). For MHSPs, additionally, balancing 
the demands of state contracts that do not 
necessarily take account of a Mäori world 
view with a commitment to indigenous 
philosophy and practice is particularly 
challenging (Boulton, 2007; Walsh-Tapiata 
cited in Rickard, 2014).
Accountability in contracting arrange-
ments was initially focused on the outputs 
generated by providers, but more recently 
outcomes-based contracting has re-
emerged as a state preference in contracting 
arrangements (Nowland-Foreman, 2015; 
O’Brien, Sanders and Tennant, 2009). 
Outcome priorities are predominantly 
determined by the state rather than by 
communities using services or by providers 
themselves (O’Brien, 2015). Moore and 
Moore (2015) observe that the move to 
outcomes-based contracting is influenced 
by the state’s ongoing commitment to a 
market-led approach to service provision. 
Outcomes contracting requires services to 
effectively evidence the positive changes 
occurring within their client groups as a 
‘product’ of their intervention. Change in 
this context may include increases in client 
knowledge and skill acquisition, along with 
shifts in attitude, behaviour or well-being 
(Nowland-Foreman, 2015). 
Although attributing causality in this 
way may sound simple enough, Boston 
(2017) observes that understanding of 
causality in the social sciences, in terms of 
identifying the relationships between input, 
outputs and outcomes, remains 
underdeveloped. Nowland-Foreman in 
turn cautions that the measuring of 
outcomes ‘is neither simple nor 
straightforward, but a sophisticated and 
specialised skill, and inherently difficult’ 
(Nowland-Foreman, 2015, p.13). Moore 
and Moore add that the preferred service 
outcome measures of the contract 
purchaser and the provider may well be 
markedly different: whereas the former 
may seek ‘evidence which “scientifically” 
proves efficacy’ (Moore and Moore, 2015, 
p.5), a provider may prioritise the narratives 
and feedback of service users (Boulton, 
2005; Moore and Moore, 2015). Whether 
contracting for outcomes can readily 
accommodate the diverse interests of the 
contracting parties is contentious. 
Contracting for outcomes thus appears 
fraught with challenges, primarily in 
relation to determining how outcomes are 
measured, by whom and for what purpose. 
Nevertheless, there has been some 
development in the use of an outcomes 
approach that is confronting these 
challenges: namely, the Mäori-specific 
outcome measures that have been more 
formally adopted at all levels of the health 
system in the last decade, and, most notably, 
the outcome framework associated with the 
Whänau Ora policy. Whänau Ora as an 
approach to service provision emerged 
from the work of the Whänau Ora Taskforce 
Ma-ori concepts of well-being, including 
broader social, cultural and economic 
indicators, are utilised which focus on 
collective, wha-nau-level outcomes, 
ensuring an approach ‘that is intimately 
connected to Ma-ori values and practices’... 
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(Taskforce on Whänau-Centred Initiatives, 
2010). It includes MHSP capability 
building, integrated contracting and 
government agency support for whänau 
integration, innovation and engagement 
(Office of the Auditor-General, 2015). The 
Whänau Ora Outcomes Framework was 
developed jointly by iwi leaders and Crown 
ministers under the auspices of the Whänau 
Ora Partnership Group, building on the 
work of the taskforce. Mäori concepts of 
well-being, including broader social, 
cultural and economic indicators, are 
utilised which focus on collective, whänau-
level outcomes, ensuring an approach ‘that 
is intimately connected to Mäori values and 
practices’ (Moore, 2014, p.iii). Dwyer et al. 
discuss the accountability attributed to 
MHSPs for outcomes under Whänau Ora, 
identifying an opportunity here for 
effectively ‘rebalancing accountability to 
funders with accountability to community’ 
(Dwyer et al., 2014, p.1102). 
Commissioning has now emerged as a 
model for the purchasing of outcomes 
under Whänau Ora. The state has 
established three Whänau Ora 
commissioning agencies, with the 
documented aims of reducing the provider 
compliance burden as well as improving 
funding and accountability mechanisms, 
to support the success of Whänau Ora 
(Whänau Ora Partnership Group, 2014). 
These commissioning agencies are 
contracted to invest directly into their 
communities. Unique within the non-
profit sector, MHSPs and Pasifika providers 
are the primary organisations contracted 
by the commissioners, with the contracting 
focus being specifically on outcomes. All 
three agencies are developing their own 
commissioning styles. 
Boulton et al. (2017), in recent research 
with Te Pou Matakana, the North Island 
commissioning agency, examined a specific 
model of Whänau Ora commissioning as 
an approach for the purchasing of 
outcomes. They found that the indigenous 
principles outlined in the Whänau Ora 
policy, and their underlying values, 
benefited overall commissioning practice. 
There was some evidence, for example, of 
service design by consumers, of working 
closely with providers towards shared goals, 
of a focus on agreed outcomes and on 
flexibility, of being whänau-centred and of 
adopting a concerted cross-sector 
approach. Despite a broadly positive 
assessment of the Te Pou Matakana 
commissioning model, however, Boulton 
et al. also draw attention to challenges 
inherent in commissioning, including 
responding effectively to providers’ 
expectations of greater levels of financial 
and performance information transparency. 
Inadequate resourcing of the model, along 
with inordinate levels of state scrutiny, were 
identified as having a negative impact on 
both the commissioning agency and its 
commissioned providers in a variety of 
ways.
Having now set the wider policy stage 
for exploring the ways in which our MHSPs 
are experiencing relationships with funders, 
we present the study itself, our data 
collection methods, results and discussion. 
The study 
Informed by a kaupapa Mäori approach,1 
and using a case study design, our 
preventing chronic conditions research 
drew on qualitative and evaluation-
based research methods (Patton, 2015) 
to examine three prevention models. The 
preventative principles and emerging 
practices manifested by each case study 
have previously been delineated (Gifford 
et al., 2017). Phases two and three of the 
study include an examination of the recent 
MHSP experience of state contracting 
for services with a focus on funding for 
outcomes.
Multiple data sources informed the 
analysis in these phases of the study, 
including a review of the outcomes 
literature in relation to MHSPs, 
complementing the broader review of the 
literature conducted in phase one; face-to-
face MHSP key informant and focus group 
interviews with whänau participants, 
kaimahi, practice supervisors and 
managers; case study organisational 
document review; observations; and field 
notes, along with the detailed internal case 
record (Patton, 2015) prepared by case 
study site lead researchers. 
The data were independently analysed 
by all eight members of the research team. 
The team then met face to face to carry out 
a mahi a röpü process, further refining the 
independent analyses. The mahi a röpü 
process involves the thematic analysis of 
data at a group level (Boulton and Gifford, 
2014). Data synthesis was later conducted 
by two senior research team members, with 
the synthesis being taken back to the 
research team for final mahi a röpü 
consolidation. Analysis of the data, at each 
stage in the process, was carried out across 
three interrelated nested environment 
levels (Berkeley and Springett, 2006): policy 
(government), practice (provider) and 
whänau (community). Multi-level analysis 
included exploring understandings of 
service delivery outcomes; outcomes 
expectations, including reporting 
requirements; diversity in perspectives; and 
experiences among informants.
Findings and discussion 
Utilising all data sources, we defined five 
key theme areas when reviewing the data 
on outcome frameworks within the MHSP 
case study sites. Data is considered under 
the areas defined as: control, complexity, 
conscience, consideration and capacity. 
Themes are presented using a nested 
environments approach, discussing how 
outcomes have an impact at various levels 
of the system, including policymakers, 
providers and whänau. 
Control
In contrast to some of the concerns 
identified in the literature, which 
highlight state control in determining 
We found evidence of the Wha-nau Ora 
Outcomes Framework not only being 
implemented by MHSPs, but also being 
adapted to suit local settings. 
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how outcomes are measured, we found 
at least one example where control was 
largely in the hands of Mäori at policy, 
provider and whänau levels. We found 
evidence of the Whänau Ora Outcomes 
Framework not only being implemented 
by MHSPs, but also being adapted to suit 
local settings. For example, each of the 
seven outcome domains for Whänau Ora 
are clearly described in the overarching 
Whänau Ora Outcomes Framework 
(Whänau Ora Partnership Group, 2015). 
Te Pou Matakana has in turn conducted a 
significant amount of work to incorporate 
these outcomes into their own outcomes 
matrix, noting the need to develop a 
shared framework in collaboration with 
whänau and with service providers (Te Pou 
Matakana Commissioning Agency, 2015). 
Two of our case study sites hold contracts 
with Te Pou Matakana. One of these 
sites has a strong history of developing 
Whänau Ora service models and outcome 
measurement prior to the work occurring 
nationally under the taskforce (Boulton, 
Tamehana and Brannelly, 2013), and has 
continued this work under the now widely 
adopted Whänau Ora policy. The site is 
continually adapting to more closely align 
outcomes with local need and to better 
support whänau to realise their Whänau 
Ora aspirations. 
The overarching framework therefore 
appears to be able to accommodate some 
level of flexibility without losing its 
integrity. The values underpinning the 
framework include, but are not limited to, 
notions of collective well-being at a whänau 
level, strengths-based practice that looks 
for solutions to complex issues, being 
whänau driven through self-identification 
of outcome goals, and a cross-sector 
approach required to resolve what are 
complex issues facing Mäori whänau. 
This theme of control is significant in 
the context of our findings. There is some 
evidence that for MHSPs, Whänau Ora 
reflects initial progress towards enhanced 
Mäori control over what counts as 
outcomes and how outcomes are measured. 
Within the specific context of Whänau Ora 
contracting for outcomes, we recognise the 
potential opportunity for Mäori despite 
also having some misgivings with respect 
to the neo-liberal approach to social 
provision generally and its impact on 
Mäori well-being. O’Brien, Sanders and 
Tennant (2009) suggest that outcomes-
focused contracting could potentially 
provide a vehicle to ‘achieve an improved, 
more consultative engagement between 
government agencies and non-profit 
services’ (O’Brien, Sanders and Tennant, 
2009, p.24). The recent work of Boulton et 
al. (2017) identifies some level of outcomes-
focused progress with specific reference to 
Whänau Ora commissioned services. For 
our MHSPs, it would appear that the 
potential of Whänau Ora outcomes 
contracting may be beginning to be 
realised. We are mindful, however, of the 
myriad issues surrounding influence in 
relation to outcomes, including who 
determines what outcomes are meaningful 
and how, as outlined above in the 
background section of this article.
Complexity
Outcome measurement, within the 
context of the case studies, is complex not 
only for providers but also for funders 
and policymakers. There are multiple 
competing demands at a variety of levels. 
These include the state’s need to ensure 
accountability in relation to the use of 
public funds and to satisfy expectations 
that services will deliver clearly identified 
outcomes (Moore and Moore, 2015); the 
requirement for funders, or government 
agents, to develop a range of outcome 
measurement tools appropriate for 
operationalising across multiple sectors; 
and the pressure on providers to implement 
the various measurement frameworks. 
For our MHSPs, the complexity of 
outcome measurement is further 
exacerbated by the recent addition of 
Whänau Ora commissioning to the mix. 
These new additions to the outcome 
environment do create yet another layer of 
accountability for MHSPs. Despite that 
development, and other state initiatives to 
promote integrated contracting for 
outcomes, the MHSPs we partnered with 
in the preventing chronic conditions 
research continued to hold multiple 
contracts, including output-focused 
contracts, across the health and social 
services sector; sometimes, even, several 
contracts were held with a single funder. 
The multiplicity of contracts in turn creates 
a multiplicity of accountability lines, with 
MHSPs being required to report in various 
ways, and many times, often against similar 
measurements, creating a sometimes 
overwhelming sense of duplication. 
O’Brien, Sanders and Tennant (2009) note 
that state initiatives to promote contracting 
for outcomes had been expected to simplify 
the process of contracting, as well as reduce 
the reporting burden for providers. For our 
MHSPs, however, the contracting 
environment was akin to that described, 
almost a decade ago, by the non-profit 
sector as being both ‘onerous and 
demanding’ (O’Brien, Sanders and 
Tennant, 2009, p.28), suggesting limited 
progress is being achieved.
Conscience 
Conscience, in the context of this article, 
refers to the overarching values and 
principles informing the implementation 
of policy such as that concerned with 
outcome frameworks. As has been 
noted above, outcomes definition and 
measurement is neither neutral nor 
value free. Indeed, over the last decade 
the emphasis on measuring outcomes 
has been imposed largely in a top-down 
manner, informed by priorities including 
accountability in the use of public funding 
and the requirement for data to assist 
in prioritising services and purchasing 
services at a time of fiscal constraint. 
The top-down drive to generate data for 
For our MHSPs, the complexity of 
outcome measurement is further 
exacerbated by the recent addition of 
Wha-nau Ora commissioning to the mix. 
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outcomes tends to focus at a personal level, 
assuming an individualistic responsibility 
by at-risk groups for demonstrating 
outcomes. There is a tension between the 
principles underpinning this approach, 
and a broader systems-level view which 
sees the responsibility for change coming 
from a need to improve social cohesion, 
enhance environments and improve 
system responsiveness to individuals. 
That broader systems-level view sits 
more comfortably with the principles 
and whänau-focused Mäori well-being 
aspirational goals of He Korowai Oranga, 
the Mäori Health Strategy (King and Turia, 
2002), and indeed with the aspirations of 
Whänau Ora. 
The narrow descriptors favoured by 
state agencies, somewhat a necessity in 
outcome measurement, do not capture the 
richness and depth of change over time for 
collectives such as whänau, nor do they 
capture the breadth of the work undertaken 
by MHSPs in contributing to social change 
for whänau. We note, too, a concern about 
privacy issues regarding the use of 
individual and whänau data to measure 
outcomes. Some of the ‘stories’ collected 
from whänau are being used as exemplars 
to demonstrate outcomes; this type of data 
used in this way is potentially traceable 
back to specific whänau. Further discussion 
is therefore required to ensure that whänau 
are fully informed about, and consent to, 
the potential wider use of their personal 
information in the process of the 
refinement of outcomes measurement in 
services provision beyond Whänau Ora. 
Consideration 
There are significant missed opportunities, 
at all levels of the system, to review outcome 
data more regularly and consistently to 
improve health service delivery. Generally, 
our research with the three MHSPs showed 
that outcomes are largely determined at 
funder level. Reports are then populated 
from the bottom up, with little interaction 
and reflection on the data as it moves 
through the system. Whänau and 
individuals provide information to their 
provider, and case-level workers collect 
the data and feed it up through the system 
to provider managers, who collate the data 
across a range of contractual reports and 
then deliver this to district health boards 
(DHBs) and government ministries. There 
are multiple points at which the data can 
be used for reflection and improvement. 
However, it appears that the lack of 
engagement with, and reflection on, the 
data is driven by a strong ‘reporting to 
funders’ ethos, as opposed to an iterative 
quality improvement process, where data 
is included as part of a cycle of reflection, 
change and reassessment. Both approaches 
are needed.
Concern around the dearth of feedback 
from DHBs to non-profit service providers 
is not new. For example, over a decade ago 
that very concern was highlighted in 
response to a survey by the working group 
of member non-government organisations 
regarding their relationships with DHBs 
(Stace and Cumming, 2006). Boulton, 
similarly, in the Mäori mental health 
provider context, found that DHBs rarely 
used reporting information, whether 
output or narrative outcome reports, to 
address or respond to provider concerns 
(Boulton, 2005). Tight time frames for 
reporting, which are often quarterly, the 
workloads of individuals at all levels in the 
system, the capacity for analysis and the 
restrictive narrow measures used in 
outcomes discourage the use of outcome 
data as a quality improvement tool. With 
respect to the outcomes reporting required 
of the MHSPs to Whänau Ora 
commissioners, we similarly noted some 
room for improvement in the outcome/
reflection cycle.
Capacity
Our study identified variable capacity 
across the three MHSPs to develop, measure 
and utilise outcome data for analysis. Some 
of that variability was due to provider 
size and maturity, with larger providers 
managing the complexity and demands of 
outcome reporting more confidently than 
smaller, less well-developed providers. Two 
of the cases had internal capacity both to 
respond to outcome data requests and to 
be involved in the design and development 
of locally tailored outcome measurement 
tools specifically in relation to Whänau Ora 
services. However, for providers struggling 
with outcome measurement it was a 
challenge to collect data, and there appeared 
to be virtually no in-house capacity for 
analysing and utilising outcome data for 
service improvement. Four components 
were identified as influencing outcome 
measurement capacity at the provider 
level: financial resources, training 
opportunities, workforce capacity and 
information technology capacity. Some 
providers struggle to fund the purchase 
of the tools necessary for collecting and 
collating data for outcomes, along with 
the training required to strengthen the 
workforce capacity to collect outcomes 
data. Two of the three MHSPs had no in-
house specialist analyst capacity that could 
enhance regular review of the data. 
Conclusion and issues for further 
consideration
MHSPs are well placed to work effectively 
with Mäori, including through addressing 
critical gaps in Mäori chronic conditions 
prevention. The work they do takes place 
within the broad context of the neo-liberal 
transition, from the mid-1980s, that has 
seen varying degrees of state focus on 
market-driven solutions, limited provision 
and individual responsibility for personal 
well-being. Contracts-based funding 
opened up doors to forge relationships 
with a diversity of non-state actors, 
including MHSPs. Tensions for MHSPs 
exist, however, despite the opportunities 
afforded by neo-liberalism. Much of that 
tension can be traced to the nature of 
contracting itself, with contracts still being 
MHSPs are well placed to work 
effectively with Ma-ori, including through 
addressing critical gaps in Ma-ori chronic 
conditions prevention. 
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time-bound, formalised, prescriptive and 
predicated on compliance. For MHSPs, 
balancing the demands of contracts that 
do not necessarily take account of a Mäori 
world view is particularly challenging 
(Boulton, 2007). 
In recent times, contracting for 
outcomes has become increasingly popular, 
raising its own set of challenges for MHSPs, 
given the tensions around who gets to 
determine what outcomes are important, 
how these outcomes are ‘measured’ and by 
whom. While it appears that the state is 
driving much of the outcomes decision 
making across contracting with the health 
and social services sector, contracting for 
Whänau Ora is apparently forging a unique 
direction. The high-level outcomes the 
Whänau Ora Outcomes Framework 
identifies have been directly influenced by 
Mäori leaders, with commissioning 
emerging more recently as a model for the 
purchasing of these outcomes. Whänau 
Ora commissioning agencies have the 
documented aim of reducing the 
compliance burden, as well as improving 
funding and accountability mechanisms, 
to support the success of Whänau Ora. The 
indigenous principles outlined in Whänau 
Ora policy, and their underlying values, 
may potentially benefit overall 
commissioning practice. Recent research 
with one of the commissioning agencies 
(Boulton et al., 2017), for example, 
highlighted service design by consumers, 
close work with providers towards shared 
goals, a focus on agreed outcomes and 
flexibility, being whänau centred and 
adopting a concerted cross-sector 
approach. Despite a broadly positive 
assessment, however, significant 
commissioning challenges were also 
highlighted.
Though the overall outcomes 
contracting space appears to be fraught for 
providers, the foundations of a policy 
platform for effective outcomes contracting 
‘by Mäori for Mäori’ has been established 
with the advent of the Whänau Ora services 
commissioning model. We found evidence 
of the Whänau Ora Outcomes Framework 
being implemented by MHSPs and being 
adapted to suit local circumstances. For our 
MHSPs, the potential of Whänau Ora 
outcomes may be beginning to be realised. 
We are mindful, however, of the many 
issues surrounding competing interests in 
relation both to Whänau Ora outcomes 
and to outcomes generally. Our findings 
highlight complexity of outcomes 
measurement, and of contract reporting 
overall, that remains problematic. MHSPs 
continue to juggle multiple contracts and 
experience ‘report fatigue’, despite state 
resolutions, initiated almost a decade ago, 
to simplify contracting.The potential for 
‘unbundled’ contracts and of cross-sector 
and ‘high trust’ contracting remains far 
from being realised. 
The outcomes space is clearly values 
driven and is vigorously contested, 
including by the state, Mäori interests and 
the broader non-profit sector. Making 
explicit the values driving state outcomes 
contracting, and taking account of these, is 
important if the work of MHSPs is to be 
adequately and safely framed and 
recognised. We note the ongoing lack of 
opportunities being utilised to reflect on 
outcomes data at all levels of the system, 
from central government through to flax-
root service delivery. Our study reinforces 
that there continues to be a lack of useful 
and timely feedback to MHSPs from state 
sector service contract purchasers, along 
with an ongoing tendency for outcomes to 
be largely determined in a top-down 
manner. Finally, we note that larger and 
more mature MHSPs may be in a better 
position to absorb some of the costs 
invariably associated with outcomes 
reporting. Others are likely to be 
considerably disadvantaged in relation to 
effective outcomes reporting.
In response to these findings, we note 
that if MHSPs are to actively participate in 
the outcomes space it is critical that:
· the work already being done, under 
Whänau Ora, to enhance Mäori 
control of outcomes decision making 
be consolidated and extended beyond 
Whänau Ora;
· a simplified contracting and reporting 
environment, more commensurate 
with funding levels, is established;
· they be adequately resourced to 
usefully reflect on results, at all 
organisational levels, and can benefit 
from improved contractor feedback 
loops; and 
· they be appropriately supported to 
access and effectively utilise 
measurement tools; this is especially 
so in the case of smaller providers.
1 Meaning that the study was Mäori-driven, focusing on 
issues of concern to Mäori; drew on methods and practices 
consistent with tikanga, Mäori knowledge and contemporary 
realities; privileged Mäori research aspirations; and looked to 
build Mäori research capacity (Gifford et al., 2017).
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Lara Rangiwhetu, Nevil Pierse, Helen Viggers 
and Philippa Howden-Chapman
Cold New Zealand 
Council Housing 
Abstract
As people spend most of their time at home, residential thermal 
conditions are important. Central government debate about 
minimum temperature requirements for rental properties requires an 
evidence base of indoor temperature data. We collected temperature, 
humidity and energy data from 49 council housing dwellings in 
Wellington over winter, and self-reported thermal comfort and 
heating behaviour. Mean indoor temperature was 14.9°C, colder 
than the national average, with 67% of readings under 16°C, which 
the World Health Organization associates with health implications. 
With New Zealand’s high rate of excess winter mortality and children 
hospitalised for housing-related diseases, cold housing should be 
addressed.
Keywords temperature, thermal comfort, building performance, 
energy use, public health, council housing
Getting an Upgrade
New Zealand housing is cold. New Zealand houses are often poorly constructed and heated, and 
indoor temperatures tend to be colder than 
18°C, the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) recommended minimum 
(Howden-Chapman, Viggers et al., 2009). 
In other temperate countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, 91% of homes have 
central heating, compared to only 5% of 
New Zealand homes (Isaacs et al., 2010). 
In the latest New Zealand national study, 
conducted in 1999–2005, the mean living 
room temperature recorded was 15.8°C 
during the day in winter (ibid.). In the 
evening, average living room temperature 
rose to 17.8°C, but this is still below the 
recommended minimum level. Typically, 
rental housing is in worse condition than 
owner-occupied houses (White et al., 
2017).
Household temperature is a topical 
issue in New Zealand politics. In 2016 the 
Labour Party’s Healthy Homes Guarantee 
Bill (No 2) proposed a set minimum indoor 
temperature for all rental properties, and 
a number of councils are undertaking a 
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quasi-experimental study with researchers 
to introduce a rental warrant of fitness 
(Telfar-Barnard et al., 2017). Despite this, 
little has been published on indoor 
temperature measurements in New 
Zealand homes to inform the policy debate.
To the authors’ knowledge only two 
national studies on residential temperature 
have been completed, the 1971/72 
Household Electricity Survey and the 
Household Energy End-use Project (HEEP) 
conducted between 1999 and 2005 (Isaacs 
et al., 2010). Eight more concentrated 
studies which utilise temperature 
measurements are listed below by date of 
data collection:
· nearly 1,350 homes in eight 
communities, from the North and 
South Islands, in 2001 and 2002 
(Howden-Chapman, Matheson et al., 
2007);
· 111 state housing upgrades in Dunedin, 
Invercargill and Gore in 2003 and 2004 
(Lloyd and Callau, 2006);
· 40 low-income private rentals in 
Dunedin in 2004 (Povey and Harris, 
2005);
· 409 homes in Porirua, Hutt Valley, 
Christchurch, Dunedin and Bluff in 
2006 (Howden-Chapman, Pierse et al., 
2008; Pierse et al., 2013);
· nine homes in Papakowhai and 
Wellington between 2006 and 2008 
(Burgess et al., 2008);
· 500 homes in Whanganui, Wellington 
and Christchurch between 2010 and 
2012 (Viggers et al., 2013);
· 15 homes in Auckland, Palmerston 
North and Dunedin in 2011 and 2012 
(Rosemeier, 2014);
· five upgraded council houses in 
Wellington in 2015 (Rangiwhetu, Pierse 
and Howden-Chapman, 2017).
There is growing evidence of cold 
housing increasing health risks, and 
international guidelines are currently being 
finalised by the WHO (Telfar-Barnard et 
al., 2017). Increased risk of respiratory and 
cardiovascular disease is associated with 
low indoor temperatures (see Table 1). In 
New Zealand, 42,000 children are 
hospitalised annually with housing-related 
diseases (Hansard, 2016a). According to 
Davie et al. (2007), New Zealand also has 
one of the highest excess mortality rates in 
the world. The excess winter mortality 
(EWM) phenomenon is where a greater 
proportion of deaths occur in winter 
compared to summer. New Zealand data 
shows excess hospital admissions in winter 
for those with lower household income and 
in certain housing types (Hales et al., 2012; 
Telfar-Barnard, Baker and Hales, 2008). In 
comparison, when outdoor temperature 
dropped below –20.0°C in Siberia the 
average indoor temperature was noted to 
be 19.6°, and no evidence of overall EWM 
was found (Donaldson et al., 1998). 
In New Zealand, those of lower socio-
economic status are more vulnerable to 
most health effects (Taptiklis and Phipps, 
2017). On average New Zealanders spend 
70% of their time at home indoors, with 
vulnerable populations (such as babies, the 
elderly and those on low incomes) spending 
up to 90% of their time at home (Baker et 
al., 2007), making them even more 
susceptible to housing-related health risks. 
Fuel poverty, where a household spends 
more than 10% of its income on energy, is 
recognised as an issue for a substantial 
proportion of New Zealand households, 
and further exacerbates potential health 
issues for low-income households 
(Howden-Chapman, Viggers et al., 2012; 
Statistics New Zealand, 2017). Therefore, it 
is particularly important to investigate low-
income housing conditions, specifically 
temperatures and tenants’ thermal comfort 
in social housing.
Background to the research
Wellington City Council, with co-funding 
from central government, has undertaken 
to upgrade its council housing (Stitt, 2013). 
An assessment of the council’s housing 
in 2006 found moisture problems in 
dwellings in Arlington, the largest council 
housing complex, and tenants complained 
of being cold. 
Arlington is the focus of our study. 
Stage one of the complex was built between 
1971 and 1976, and the final stage was 
completed between 1981 and 1984. Before 
the upgrade began there were 269 dwellings 
on the site: 75 apartments in a high-rise 
tower, 172 medium-density apartments, 
two apartments above the community 
house and 20 townhouses, ranging in size 
from studios to five-bedroom dwellings. 
This differs from the average New Zealand 
home, which is a stand-alone house.
Arlington’s redevelopment commenced 
in 2016. At least one section has been 
demolished and will be rebuilt to create 
‘warm, healthy and efficient housing’ with 
the aim of ‘safeguard[ing] people from 
illness caused by low temperature and high 
moisture levels’ (Wellington City Council, 
2016, pp.21, 92). The council’s City Housing 
Design Guide states that a heater is to be 
provided in each living space, with a target 
indoor temperature of 16–19°C. Insulation, 
double glazing and curtains will be installed 
to increase thermal performance and 
mechanical/forced ventilation in 
bathrooms and kitchens to reduce 
dampness.
The intervention provided an 
opportunity to investigate the temperature 
of the dwellings and the upgrade’s impact. 
This article looks at the condition of the 
housing before the upgrade.
The research
Objectives
The objectives of this research were to:
1. determine indoor temperatures at 
Arlington and contribute to indoor 
temperature data for New Zealand;
2. provide a baseline for understanding 
the impact of upgraded dwellings;
Table 1: Impact of Temperature on Health
Indoor temperature Effect
21ºC People suffering from Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease should 
maintain temperatures at this level for at least 9 hours to avoid 
deteriorating health
20ºC To prevent health risks in the elderly and the very young a 1987 WHO 
report recommended this minimum temperature
18ºC To prevent health risks in the general population, WHO has 
recommended this as a minimum indoor temperature since 1982
Under 16ºC Resistance to respiratory diseases may be diminished
6 – 12ºC Blood pressure rises and increases risk of cardio-vascular disease
*Information sourced from Ormandy and Ezratty (2012)
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3. look at how temperatures compared 
with New Zealand homes and WHO 
recommendations.
Method
We surveyed tenants about the warmth of 
their home and monitored temperature, 
humidity and energy usage of dwellings. 
Heating, house age, thermal insulation 
and outdoor temperatures influence 
indoor temperatures and were taken 
into consideration (French et al., 2006; 
Giancola et al., 2014; Howden-Chapman, 
Matheson et al., 2007). We intend to collect 
follow-up data after the upgrade.
Recruitment
A list of eligible dwellings was provided by 
the landlord, City Housing. The research 
was introduced to tenants at a community 
meeting and in a tenant newsletter. The 
study was fully explained to tenants when 
recruiting participants via door knocking 
and an information sheet was provided.
Sample
The study’s inclusion criteria were 
Arlington tenants willing to answer a face-
to-face survey and allow temperature 
monitoring of their dwelling. Viable 
temperature data were collected from 49 
dwellings. Seventy-eight tenants, over the 
age of 16, who lived in these dwellings 
completed face-to-face surveys about 
indoor thermal comfort.
Temperature and humidity measurement
Ibuttons and HOBO data loggers were 
installed in participants’ homes over the 
winter months, June, July and August 
2015. These are small, robust data loggers, 
programmed to record temperature and 
humidity every hour within ±0.5°C and 
±5.0% RH accuracy (Maxim Integrated, 
2014; OneTemp, 2015). 
In total 124 data loggers were installed, 
typically in the living room and the main 
bedroom. If children were living in the 
dwelling a third data logger was placed in 
the youngest child’s room. In studios, only 
one data logger was placed in the main 
room. One hundred and two data loggers 
produced viable results from 49 dwellings. 
Other data loggers were lost, had been 
moved, or the tenants had moved out. Two 
were faulty.
Hourly outdoor temperature and 
humidity was sourced from MetService’s 
Wellington airport climate monitoring 
station, located less than 5km from the 
complex. 
Energy usage information
Electricity information was sourced as a 
proxy for heating behaviour. Valid energy 
meter readings were obtained for 48 of the 
49 dwellings with viable temperature data 
for a five-week period over winter. Gas 
is not permitted on City Housing sites 
(Wellington City Council, 2015a).
Data analysis
Data collected from data loggers, energy 
meter readings and surveys were compiled 
together. Data were then analysed to explore 
the distribution of indoor temperatures, 
and tenants’ thermal comfort and heating 
behaviour. We examined the strength 
of the relationship between the indoor 
temperature and influential factors such 
as outdoor temperature and energy usage. 
Results were also compared with the most 
recently recorded New Zealand indoor 
temperatures.
Table 2: Temperature Readings Compared to WHO Recommendations
Readings Proportion of time Percentage of dwellings that 
experienced these temperatures
Less than 10ºC 1% 20%
Less than 12ºC 9% 73%
Less than 14ºC 33% 94%
Less than 16ºC 67% 98%
Less than 18ºC 87% 100%
Less than 21ºC 97% 100%
Figure 1: Distribution of living room temperatures
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
6 7 8 9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
2
7
2
8
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Living room temperature (ºC)
Figure 2: Distribution of bedroom temperatures
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Results
Indoor temperatures ranged from 6.0°C to 
28.5°C, with a mean temperature of 14.9°C. 
Most of the time (87%), indoor temperatures 
were lower than WHO recommendations 
(see Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2). Two thirds 
of the time indoor temperatures were less 
than 16°C, where resistance to respiratory 
disease is diminished, and 9% of the time 
dwellings were at temperatures of less than 
12°C, with increased risk of cardiovascular 
disease. This issue is widespread, as almost 
all dwellings experienced temperatures of 
less than 16°C and close to three quarters 
of the dwellings experienced temperatures 
below 12°C. 
Temperature ranges for each individual 
data logger varied substantially (Figure 3). 
The smallest temperature fluctuation was 
5.0°C, measured in the bedrooms of two 
dwellings. The largest temperature 
fluctuation was 18.5°C, measured in 
another bedroom. For seven of the 49 
dwellings the maximum temperature did 
not reach the WHO recommended 
minimum of 18°C. No minimum 
temperatures reached 18°C.
Analysis of survey data found that 42% 
claimed their homes were ‘often’ or ‘always’ 
cold throughout the year, 51% ‘sometimes’ 
and 8% ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ cold. In 
comparison, a city-wide survey found only 
15% of Wellingtonians thought their 
homes were ‘often’ or ‘always’ cold, 44% 
‘sometimes’ and 41% ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ cold 
(Wellington City Council, 2015b).
Participants’ reports of thermal comfort 
at Arlington were compared with 
temperature readings (see Table 3). There 
was a slight decrease in the proportion of 
time dwellings were at lower temperatures 
across those rating their homes as ‘always’, 
‘often’ and ‘rarely’ cold. The proportion of 
time dwellings were at lower temperatures 
in households rated as ‘sometimes’ cold by 
the occupants disrupted this trend. This is 
likely to be because respondents who did 
not know what to select chose the middle 
response option.
Ten per cent of all respondents did not 
use heating when it was cold, 44% used 
heating ‘sometimes’, 22% ‘often’ and 24% 
‘always’ when cold. The most commonly 
given reason for the home being colder 
than participants would like was to keep 
the cost of heating down. Twenty-eight per 
cent of respondents also claimed their 
homes were ‘often’ or ‘always’ hard to heat, 
but the majority (54%) claimed their home 
was ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ hard to heat. In 
comparison, only 14% of Wellingtonians 
claimed their homes were ‘often’ or ‘always’ 
hard to heat, with 57% reporting that their 
home was ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ hard to heat 
(Wellington City Council, 2015b).
Temperatures fluctuated during the day. 
On average, dwellings were coldest in the 
morning and warmest in the evening (see 
Figure 4 and Table 4). The average living 
room and bedroom temperatures had a 
moderate but significant correlation with 
outdoor temperature (r=0.599 and 0.621 
respectively, p<00.5).
Average energy meter readings ranged 
from 31.20 to 345.80kWh per week. On 
average energy usage was 127.20kWh per 
week. Pearson correlation showed that 
mean indoor temperatures for dwellings 
Figure 3: Minimum and maximum temperatures recorded
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Note:  Size of bubble refers to number of data loggers that recorded the same minimum and maximum temperatures. The further the 
bubbles are perpendicularly from the line, the larger the range.
Table 3: Temperatures Experienced by Participants Reporting Different Levels of  
Thermal Comfort
Thermal comfort rating* 
Proportion of 
temperature 
readings that 
were
Always cold Often cold Sometimes cold Rarely cold
Less than 10ºC 3% 1% 0% 0%
Less than 12ºC 13% 10% 0% 6%
Less than 14ºC 40% 34% 0% 21%
Less than 16ºC 72% 64% 24% 53%
Less than 18ºC 86% 83% 77% 84%
Less than 21ºC 94% 94% 98% 98%
Mean 14.8ºC 15.2ºC 15.2ºC 15.6ºC
Range 6.5 – 27.5ºC 6.0 – 28.0ºC 14.0 – 24.5ºC 8.0 – 26.0ºC
N** 18 14 39 6
Dwellings*** 17 14 16 5
Note: household temperature data was pooled together from the loggers in each dwelling
 An example of how to read the table is as follows - those who considered their dwelling to be ‘often cold’ had 83% of their 
temperature readings below 18ºC
 * 0 respondents claimed their home was ‘never’ cold
 **77 out of 78 participants answered the question about how often their home was cold
 ***dwellings sum to more than 49, as some participants lived together
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had a significant moderate positive 
correlation with electricity usage 
information (r=0.576, p<0.05). The 
strength of correlation with indoor 
temperature was similar for both heating 
and outdoor temperature.
Humidity readings ranged from 34%RH 
to 93%RH, with an average humidity 
reading of 68%RH. Approximately three 
quarters of humidity readings were over 
60%RH, with a quarter of humidity readings 
over 75%RH. This is not ideal, as high 
humidity levels encourage growth of mould 
and bacteria and should be avoided 
(Environmental Protection Authority, n.d.). 
Thirty-one per cent of participants reported 
that their homes were ‘often’ or ‘always’ 
damp, 33% ‘sometimes’, and 36% ‘rarely’ or 
‘never’ damp. In comparison, 10% of 
Wellingtonians reported that their homes 
were ‘often’ or ‘always’ damp, 21% 
‘sometimes’ and 70% ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ damp 
(Wellington City Council, 2015b). 
Discussion
Independent readings found council 
housing, before the upgrade, both colder 
and more humid than recommended, 
which is concerning for tenants’ health. 
Compared to city-wide findings, Arlington 
was also rated as colder, damper and harder 
to heat than Wellington housing in general. 
Although thermal comfort had a complex 
relationship with temperature data, this 
study found that, overall, comfort tended 
to decrease with lower temperatures.
Like Arlington, the average New 
Zealand home does not meet WHO 
temperature recommendations the 
majority of the time. Arlington’s mean 
indoor evening temperature in the living 
room (15.6°C) was considerably less than 
the mean national temperature in the 
HEEP study (17.8°C). This is despite mean 
evening outdoor temperature being 
relatively similar between the studies (see 
Table 5). In the morning, Arlington’s mean 
temperature was 0.6°C warmer in the living 
room and 1.9°C warmer in the bedroom 
than the mean national temperature, but 
outdoor temperature was 2.3°C warmer in 
our study.
Heating behaviour may explain the 
difference in evening living room 
temperature noted. The HEEP study found 
that New Zealanders typically heat one 
room, usually the living room, in the 
evening (Isaacs et al., 2010). This accounts 
for the difference of 2.8°C between living 
room and bedroom temperatures in the 
HEEP study in the evening. In our study 
there is little variation between evening 
living and bedroom temperatures (0.3°C). 
This difference could be due to a lack of 
heating, with 10% of participants stating 
they never used heating when cold, 
compared to around 2% of New Zealand 
households who do not heat their homes 
at all (Howden-Chapman, Viggers et al., 
2009). This may be due to the low income 
of social housing tenants (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2017), or to the size of dwellings, 
with heat transfer potentially easier 
between rooms in Arlington, which are 
typically apartments, compared to 
predominantly stand-alone houses in the 
HEEP study.
Comparing energy usage, participants 
in our study appear to use less energy than 
those in the HEEP study. The bottom 20% 
of energy users in the HEEP study 
consumed approximately 175kWh per 
week over winter,1 nearly 40% more energy 
than the average weekly use in this study 
(127.20kWh per week) (Isaacs et al., 2006). 
Using less energy could be to do with 
affordability. After deregulation, power 
prices increased 85% nominally or 41% in 
Figure 4: Average temperatures during winter
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Table 4: Mean Temperatures at Arlington Over Winter
Mean temperatures (ºC)
Room Overall Morning  
(7 – 9am)
Day  
(9am – 5pm)
Evening   
(5 – 11pm)
Night  
(11pm – 7am)
Arlington 
living room 14.9 14.1 14.8 15.6 14.7
Arlington 
bedroom 15.0 14.5 14.9 15.3 15.1
Outdoor 10.2 10.1 11.1 10.1 9.5
Table 5: Mean Temperatures in NZ over winter from the HEEP study
Mean temperatures (ºC)
Room Morning  
(7 – 9am)
Day  
(9am – 5pm)
Evening  
(5 – 11pm)
Night  
(11pm – 7am)
Living room 13.5 [0.6] 15.8 [-1.0] 17.8 [-2.5] 14.8 [-0.3]
Bedroom 12.6 [1.9] 14.2 [0.7] 15.0 [0.3] 13.6 [1.5]
Outdoor 7.8 [2.3] 12.0 [-0.9] 9.4 [0.7] 7.6 [1.9]
Source: adapted from Isaacs et al., 2010
Note:  Difference in temperature from the current study is reported in square brackets. Negative figures indicate the national figures are 
greater than those at Arlington.
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real terms when adjusted by the consumers 
price index between 2003 and 2016 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, 2017), the approximate time 
between the studies. However, again it 
could be that the size of the dwelling means 
less energy is required to heat Arlington 
dwellings to similar temperatures. 
New Zealand has a diversity of climates, 
with the far north warmer than the far 
south. Therefore, it is important to try 
and compare temperatures in similar 
locations where possible. The 1971/72 
Household Electricity Survey and the 
HEEP study (1999, 2002–04) reported 
mean living room temperatures, and 
temperature differentials with the 
outdoors, for the southern part of the 
North Island, where Wellington and the 
Arlington dwellings are located (see Table 
6). Arlington dwellings were colder, and 
had a lower temperature differential 
between indoors and outdoors. This 
implies that the council housing was 
colder than the average New Zealand 
household, although readings were taken 
at slightly different times of the year.
In New Zealand, houses built after 1 April 
1978 required a minimum level of insulation. 
For the section of the Arlington complex built 
after 1978, the mean temperature was 15.2°C, 
compared to 14.6°C in the pre-1978 section. 
This difference aligns with findings from 
other studies about the effects of insulation 
and house age. On average, indoor 
temperature increased by 1°C after retrofitting 
a small amount of insulation to the subfloor 
and ceiling of uninsulated New Zealand 
homes (Howden-Chapman, Matheson et al., 
2007; Howden-Chapman, Pierse et al., 2008). 
The HEEP study found that post-1978 homes 
had on average 1°C warmer living room 
temperatures in the evening compared to 
pre-1978 homes (Isaacs et al., 2010). With 
respect to house age, the HEEP study also 
found that on average temperature fell 
0.20±0.05°C per decade (French et al., 2006).
Given that Arlington is obviously 
considerably colder than desired, it is 
positive that Wellington City Council is 
trying to remedy the situation for its 
vulnerable tenants. It is recommended that 
all new council housing has a targeted 
minimum temperature of 18°C to meet 
WHO recommendations.
When the Labour Party’s Healthy 
Homes Guarantee Bill (No 2) was put 
forward, the then building and housing 
minister, Nick Smith, claimed that a 
minimum temperature requirement for 
rental homes was ‘impractical and stupid’, 
as landlords cannot control tenants’ heating 
behaviour (Hansard, 2016a, p.1). John Key, 
then prime minister, added that the bill 
only attempted to regulate indoor 
temperatures, as regulation could only be 
enforced after ‘walking around other 
people’s living rooms and bedrooms with 
a thermometer’, which is impractical 
(Hansard, 2016b, p.1). Our research shows 
that temperature measurements can be 
taken in an unobtrusive manner. Work by 
He Kainga Oranga, the Housing and Health 
Research Programme has also identified 
structural means to address the issue of 
cold housing.
Late in 2016 the Residential Tenancies 
Amendment Bill came into effect, requiring 
rental properties to be insulated to at least 
1978 standards. The debate continues, 
though, as the initial proposer of the bill, 
Andrew Little, claimed erroneously that 
there was no point in insulating homes if 
they are not heated properly (Sachdeva, 
2016). It is noted that insulation by itself is 
insufficient to meet WHO indoor 
temperature recommendations, but it is a 
necessary precondition for effective heating.
In other temperate climates, such as the 
United Kingdom, average indoor 
temperatures have been increasing and are 
above WHO recommended levels. In 
national household surveys there, average 
winter living room temperatures were 
recorded as 18.3°C in 1978 and 19.1°C in 
1996, an increase of 0.4°C per decade 
(Mavrogianni et al., 2013). Average 
bedroom temperatures increased to a 
greater extent by 1.8°C per decade, from 
15.2°C in 1978 to 18.5°C in 1996. Policies 
should be enacted to ensure that New 
Zealand indoor temperatures are also 
improving.
Limitations
This study focused on low-income council 
housing tenants. However, out of necessity 
we compared our findings with nationally 
representative studies. 
Average temperature changes 
demonstrate the overall trend, but hide a 
wide variation between individual 
dwellings, as demonstrated by the range of 
temperatures recorded. Minimum 
temperatures ranged from 6.0–14.5°C, 
with maximum temperatures ranging from 
15.0–28.5°C.
Participants had varying definitions of 
what they perceived as cold. Homes where 
temperatures ranged from 6.0–15.0°C in 
one dwelling and 17.0–27.0°C in another 
were both rated by occupants as ‘always’ 
cold. Occupants in the same household 
also rated the warmth of their home 
differently.
An individual’s exposure to different 
temperatures and therefore the health 
impact based on indoor temperature is 
unknown, as it is uncertain how much, 
when, and in what rooms individuals 
spend time at home. The notion that on 
average vulnerable New Zealanders spend 
90% of their time at home indoors, when 
87% of readings do not meet WHO 
recommendations, implies that residents 
are exposed to less than ideal temperatures 
for a substantial portion of time.
Policy implications
The council dwellings studied are thought 
to be colder than the average New Zealand 
houses. This aligns with expectations 
that owner-occupied houses are in better 
condition than rental housing. However, 
Table 6: Mean Indoor Temperatures in Southern North Island
Study Mean indoor living 
room temperature
Outdoor temperature 
differential*
1971/72 Household Electricity Survey 
(August – September) 16.6ºC 5.6ºC
1999, 2002 – 2004 HEEP Study 
(August – September) 16.1ºC 6.9ºC
2015 Arlington Study 
(June – August) 14.9ºC 4.7ºC
Note: Data on other studies from Isaacs et al. (2010)
 * Living room temperature less outdoor temperature
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on average social housing is in better 
condition than private rentals (Buckett, 
Jones and Marston, 2011; Howden-
Chapman, Baker and Bierre, 2013). With 
home ownership rates falling in New 
Zealand, more active government policies 
are needed to address housing conditions 
of rental properties. To be most effective a 
range of interventions to improve indoor 
temperature are required.
As a first step, information should be 
provided to those in high-risk dwellings 
about how to reduce damp and cold. 
Housing New Zealand’s graphic, ‘Keeping 
your home warm and dry’, is a good resource 
(Housing New Zealand Corporation, 2017). 
Such information can be particularly useful 
to people unfamiliar with New Zealand’s 
climate and housing. 
A free home energy assessment is 
available for Wellington and Upper Hutt city 
ratepayers. This educates people on the 
energy performance of their home and how 
they can adjust their behaviour to be more 
energy efficient, and provides a small 
subsidy for products such as draught 
stoppers and window insulation kits. Such 
an initiative could be rolled out across the 
country. 
The government should provide 
adequate subsidies for insulating housing. 
Instead of wrapping up the Warm Up New 
Zealand: Healthy Homes insulation grants 
programme in June 2018 as planned by the 
previous government, this should be 
extended and the eligibility criteria 
expanded so that all housing is properly 
insulated. Insulation has been shown to 
have a positive benefit–cost ratio of five to 
one, with health benefits for occupants 
(Grimes et al., 2012).
The government should also support a 
national roll-out of the rental warrant of 
fitness scheme to ensure that all rental 
properties meet acceptable health and 
living standards. The scheme is currently 
voluntary in Wellington, supported by the 
Wellington City Council. With respect to 
temperature-related interventions in 
dwellings, it looks at insulation as well as 
double glazing, effective curtains or blinds 
and weathertightness. Components need 
to meet adequate standards to pass (Telfar-
Barnard et al., 2017). 
Labour should implement its Healthy 
Homes Guarantee Bill (No 2), make changes 
to the building code, and adopt the winter 
energy payment it proposed (New Zealand 
Labour Party, n.d.), underpinned by research 
(Viggers et al., 2013), so that tenants are able 
to maintain their dwelling at 18°C at 
reasonable cost. Wellington City Council and 
Housing New Zealand already build housing 
to a higher standard than the current building 
code, indicating it is insufficient.
The winter energy payment is intended 
for superannuitants and beneficiaries to 
spend on improving the warmth of their 
housing through heating and investing in 
draught-stopping and insulation. This is 
similar to the UK’s winter fuel payments 
introduced in 1997, which provide 
household grants to improve energy 
efficiency, non-means-tested winter fuel 
payments for those over 60, and warm 
home discounts and cold weather payments 
for those on low incomes. The payments 
for older people have been criticised as 
unfocused and poorly targeted at those 
suffering from fuel poverty (Thurley and 
Kennedy, 2017). However, research has 
attributed a reduction in deaths of 12,000 
annually to the payments (Age UK, 2015; 
Iparraguirre, 2014).
With respect to other related UK 
initiatives, the Home Energy Conservation 
Act 1995 requires local councils to have an 
action plan to improve the energy efficiency 
of housing in their area and report back to 
the government on progress (Test Valley 
Borough Council, 2017; UK Government, 
2017). A first report was to be completed 
by councils by 31 March 2017 and 
biennially after this. It will be interesting 
to see the impact on housing temperature 
and whether it should be adopted in New 
Zealand.
The temperature of New Zealand 
housing should be monitored on a 
systematic and ongoing basis, in order to 
determine whether the issue of cold 
housing is improving and in response to 
what initiatives. Temperature measures are 
currently being planned in conjunction 
with the next New Zealand General Social 
Survey in 2018.
Conclusion
New Zealand still has a way to go to meet 
minimum temperature recommendations. 
With New Zealand’s high rate of excess 
winter mortality and 42,000 children 
hospitalised every year for diseases 
associated with unhealthy homes, this 
is something that should be addressed 
sooner rather than later.
1 This has been derived from Isaacs et al.’s (2006) finding 
that the bottom 20% of households use 4,860 kWh/yr of 
electricity. On average this equates to 93.46kWh per week. 
However, Isaacs et al. also state that household energy 
consumption varies seasonally and often rises by a factor of 
nearly three from summer to winter.
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Official Information Act. I have analysed 
this approach in Stephens (2014), which 
gives some insights into changes in the 
refugee quota under the fifth National 
government. The present article forms 
the most in-depth analysis of the regional 
changes yet. It adds to already published 
Twitter threads, press releases, interviews 
and editorials discussing these policies. 
Whereas previous discussion had aimed at 
highlighting concerns with the policy in 
an attempt to embarrass the government 
into a change, the current article takes a 
different approach. Here I seek to bolster 
the arguments against the policy which 
have already been made by a range of 
government departments.
What is the refugee quota and why is it 
important? 
The refugee quota is an annual intake 
of refugees, the number and regional 
make-up of which is decided by New 
Zealand, which then works with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) to fill those places. 
The people who become quota refugees 
are assessed, interviewed and ultimately 
selected in their first country of protection. 
For example, Syrian refugees from our 
Murdoch Stephens leads the Doing Our Bit campaign to double New Zealand’s refugee quota and 
recently received a PhD from Massey University for his research into critical theory and climate change.
In this article I consider changes to the regional composition of New Zealand’s annual refugee resettlement quota 
under the fifth National government. The 
article draws from research conducted in 
the course of the successful Doing Our 
Bit campaign to double New Zealand’s 
refugee resettlement quota. I outline these 
changes, the stated rationale behind them 
and the effect of the changes, and provide 
an argument for them to be reversed. 
Approach
I draw primary material from a range 
of Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE), Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and Office of Ethnic 
Affairs documents released under the 
which regions does New Zealand  
take refugees from and why?
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most recent intakes have been assessed in 
Lebanon, their first county of protection, 
before being flown to New Zealand as part 
of our annual quota. 
The refugee quota is one of three main 
ways that a refugee can gain protection in 
New Zealand, alongside making a successful 
claim for asylum, which requires them to 
be in New Zealand, or being welcomed as 
part of a family reunification programme. 
Internationally, the vast majority of 
refugees who gain a new residency receive 
protection as asylum seekers: this was the 
case for the refugees who sought protection 
in Europe during the peak of the refugee 
crisis of 2015. Whereas asylum seekers are 
assessed, and either accepted or rejected, 
once they’re in the country from which 
they seek protection, quota refugees have 
already gone through that process before 
they arrive. To think of it another way: 
some people use the term onshore to 
describe asylum seekers, as they are granted 
protection only once they have already 
arrived; offshore is used to describe quota 
refugees and those coming under the 
family reunification programme, as they 
are recognised as refugees before arriving.
The refugee quota is important as it 
provides a vehicle for the most vulnerable, 
as selected by the UNHCR, to receive 
protection. While asylum is more often 
claimed by those with the skills, resources 
or will to get to a country that may accept 
them, the refugee quota protects those who 
are least likely to survive prolonged 
displacement and who have the least 
prospects for either voluntary repatriation 
or local integration (UNHCR, 2017a). The 
quota tends to be used most by countries 
that are a long way from conflict zones 
where large numbers of refugees originate 
(UNHCR, 2017b). Resettlement through 
the refugee quota is particularly strong in 
North America and Australasia, with some 
nascent programmes in Europe.
We might think of the quota as the way 
for countries who don’t receive a large 
number of refugees applying for asylum to 
do their bit for refugee protection. In that 
sense, while the quota is technically a limit 
on the number of people who can come, it 
places no limit on the number of asylum 
seeker places. A better way of thinking of 
the quota is as an artificial minimum – like 
a minimum wage – which ensures that a 
certain number of people gain protection. 
The Doing Our Bit campaign was 
occasionally confronted with people who 
wanted to abolish the refugee quota, 
thinking this was the equivalent of opening 
our borders to all people seeking protection. 
By way of comparison, that would be like 
hoping the abolition of a minimum wage 
would lead to higher wages.
What is New Zealand’s regional refugee ban 
and what is its effect?
In 2009 the incoming National-led 
government worked with MBIE’s 
predecessor, the Department of Labour, 
to streamline the assessment of refugees 
in Immigration New Zealand offshore 
interviews. This led a year later to a three-
year planning and implementation stage 
for selecting who would arrive under the 
refugee quota. In the first analysis of what 
that three-year quota would look like the 
new government sought to refocus New 
Zealand’s refugee quota on the Asia–Pacific 
region.1 The initial proposal suggested 
moving the entirety of New Zealand’s 
refugee intake to this region as a response 
to ‘regional pressures’.2
Three core reasons emerged for this 
refocus. The first reason was cost: it was 
both cheaper to fly people in from South 
East Asia, where the majority of these 
people would arrive from, and to focus just 
on this area would allow economies of scale 
in the process where New Zealand 
immigration officials interview potential 
quota refugees referred to us by the 
UNHCR. The second reason expands on 
the notion of regional pressures: specifically, 
the aim was to stem the number of people 
who might attempt to make the dangerous 
journey by boat to Australia from Indonesia. 
By resettling people from South East Asia, 
the government hoped that this would 
create hope that the refugee quota system 
might be the best avenue for registered 
refugees to find protection in a resettlement 
country like New Zealand.
The final reason behind a restructure 
was described as ‘broad security concerns’. 
I will give attention here to this reason as 
it is the one that focuses on the 
characteristics of those not from the Asia–
Pacific rather than the characteristics of 
those who are. One might also be inclined 
to devote more attention to this reason 
because it is the most sensitive of the three, 
as indicated by the persistent redaction of 
discussion of it in OIA responses. Similarly, 
scholars have devoted considerable 
attention to the ‘securitisation’ of forced 
migration, which focuses on the threat of 
refugees to the country accepting them, 
rather than on the risk to refugees (for 
example, see Hammerstadt, 2014 for a 
critical reading). Those risks are twofold: 
those posed by the circumstances of forced 
migration, such as the original war and 
persecution, and then the dangers 
associated with displacement, such as 
smuggling, disappearances and the lure of 
dangerous journeys to claim asylum.
From the texts available, it appears 
‘broad security concerns’ are threefold. First, 
there may be a ‘risk to New Zealand’s 
international reputation’. This concern 
focuses on the potential for New Zealand 
to accept refugees whom we may one day 
find were not eligible to be refugees. This 
concern also speaks to a broad description 
of people who may pose a risk to New 
Zealand. The second concern is over 
Legal advice suggested ... that only taking 
refugees from the Asia–Pacific region may 
result in a breach of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights, as it may restrict the ability of 
already resettled refugees to use the quota 
as one avenue for family reunification. 
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credibility issues with the statements and 
claims made by prospective refugees. The 
final concern is based on the difficulties 
potential refugees might have resettling in 
New Zealand, which one document 
describes as ‘insurmountable’. Of the three, 
the final two are elaborated upon in the 
documents – with no specific mention of 
African and Middle Eastern refugees. 
Almost all of the elaboration on security 
concerns has been redacted, which, despite 
some persistence, was not overturned in a 
lengthy appeals process with the 
ombudsman.
Legal advice suggested, however, that 
only taking refugees from the Asia–Pacific 
region may result in a breach of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights, as it may restrict the 
ability of already resettled refugees to use 
the quota as one avenue for family 
reunification. An alternative to the 100% 
Asia–Pacific intake was suggested, agreed to 
and put into practice: 50% of quota refugees 
were to come from the Asia–Pacific, 15% 
from the Middle East, 17% from Africa and 
18% from the Americas.3 This alternative, it 
was argued, would also help assuage ‘likely 
concerns’ from the UNHCR, which, it was 
noted, has a global objective to focus 
resettlement on those refugees in the greatest 
need, ‘the majority of which are in Africa 
and the Middle East’. Prior to the Asia–
Pacific focus, the regional intake was split at 
around 30% each for Africa, the Middle East 
and the Asia–Pacific.4
The family link criterion as restriction
If the new regional quotas were the extent 
of the rearrangement of New Zealand’s 
refugee quota they might escape scrutiny. 
However, a proviso was also placed on 
refugees from the Middle East and Africa 
that they would only be accepted if they 
already had family in New Zealand. This 
proviso was not extended to refugees 
from the Americas, so we might deduce 
that what became known as the ‘family link 
criterion’ is less a function of cost or helping 
with pressures in the Asia–Pacific and 
more about the broad security concerns 
identified earlier. A rosier interpretation 
might be that as it was only in 2007 that the 
Americas was introduced as a resettlement 
region, the exemption from the ‘family 
link criterion’ for the Americas might be 
intended to build a sustainable community 
among this recent intake.
Regardless of the reason for placing a 
family link criterion on refugees from Africa 
and the Middle East and not the Americas, 
the agreement on the composition of the 
refugee quota explicitly stated that the 
ministers of immigration and foreign affairs 
would decide on the new allocations. 
Without fail they redirected the percentage 
of refugees originally allocated to Africa and 
the Middle East to the Asia–Pacific region 
when insufficient family-linked places were 
found. Over the years, a lack of people 
qualifying for the family link criterion 
became the norm, with intakes from both 
Africa and the Middle East dwindling to 
single figures. This was not due to a lack of 
possible family to bring to New Zealand, but 
because these potential quota refugees 
needed to be outside their country of origin 
and registered with the UNHCR, which did 
not have the facilities or resources to 
specifically seek out these cases.
One way around these restrictions was 
found when 100 Syrian refugees were 
welcomed in 2014–16 in an emergency 
category from within the quota. This intake 
preceded the 600 extra places granted at 
the height of the refugee crisis. These 
Syrians bolstered the numbers coming 
from the Middle East; without it, the 
number of refugees from the Middle East 
would be almost as low as of those from 
Africa. 
So, while we have proposed intakes 
from the Middle East and Africa in the 
double digits, our actual intakes are much 
smaller. Consider the 2014/15 intake5 in 
Figure 1, which shows both the actual, in 
contrast to the proposed, intake.6
Thanks to the enthusiasm for blocking 
out large amounts of text in OIA releases, 
researchers are forced to speculate as to 
what the middle column in this table might 
represent. Given that the reason cited is to 
do with information having been entrusted 
to the government by an international 
organisation, and that the UNHCR in 
Canberra was the only group asked about 
our quota composition, it is fair to guess 
that the missing column is a recommended 
intake from them. From my dealings with 
the UNHCR in Canberra I would expect 
these recommendations to have a much 
more even split between regions.
While New Zealand has not explicitly 
banned refugees from the Middle East and 
Africa, the policies implemented by the 
National-led government have effectively 
led to that outcome for refugees from 
Figure 1: 2014/15 agreed and actual intake
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Africa, and to a significant decrease for 
Middle Eastern refugees, augmented by the 
emergency places for Syrians. If American 
president Donald Trump’s rejection of 
Middle Eastern and African refugees has 
been evidenced by a series of smoking gun 
tweets, New Zealand’s move away from the 
same regions is a purposeful, but difficult-
to-prove death by a thousand cuts.
Resistance to the ban from government 
departments and political opposition
This policy has not gone without comment 
from the relevant government departments. 
From 2013, MBIE has noted their inability 
to fill the African percentage of the 
quota and suggested that the minister of 
immigration approach Cabinet about 
removing the family link criterion so that 
the full percentage of the quota from 
Africa might be welcomed. Ignoring the 
advice from MBIE, as well as advice that 
the current situation means New Zealand 
will not meet its proposed regional goals, 
Cabinet has retained the family link criteria.
The only successful challenge to the 
restrictions was made in 2013 when the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
MBIE, contrary to earlier claims of 
pressure in the Asia–Pacific region, noted 
that they were likely to struggle to find 
enough refugees in the Asia–Pacific to fill 
a regional intake that had become more 
than two thirds of the quota. They 
successfully argued for allowing Afghan 
refugees who were living in Pakistan to be 
classified as part of the Asia–Pacific region. 
The Afghan refugees are predominantly 
from the Hazara group, a minority group 
in Afghanistan persecuted for their Shia 
faith. Hazara have had a long connection 
with New Zealand, with a large number 
of the Tampa refugees being Hazara. They 
also have connections forged with the 
New Zealand Defence Force’s provisional 
reconstruction team in Bamiyan, the 
heartland of the Hazara people.
During the 2016 triennial review of the 
refugee quota, the Office of Ethnic Affairs 
responded to a request for comment by 
noting that ‘some of our community 
stakeholders from former refugee 
backgrounds perceive the current family 
link criterion is unfair and discriminatory’. 
Despite these concerns, the family link 
criterion – the effective ban on new 
refugees from the Middle East and Africa, 
with a few small exceptions – was retained. 
Even though the minister was by now fully 
aware that the proposed percentages would 
not be met, no suggestion was made to 
remove the family link criterion or make 
the proposed percentage more reflective of 
the difficulty of filling these family-linked 
places. If the community concerns about 
the unfair and discriminatory aspect of the 
family link criterion were included in the 
final aide-memoire that went to Cabinet, 
they are in the redacted portion of the 
document.
At the 2017 election, the restrictions 
became the subject of parliamentary 
discussion when the Greens took a stand 
against the family link criterion, 
campaigning to remove it (Green Party of 
Aotearoa New Zealand, 2017). When James 
Shaw questioned the then prime minister, 
Bill English, about the criterion, English 
referred to the Syrian emergency intake as 
a way to suggest that the restrictions do not 
exist:
James Shaw: Can he confirm that his 
Government cut the number of 
refugees New Zealand takes from Africa 
and the Middle East when it is precisely 
those people who are in the most 
precarious and needy situation?
Rt Hon BILL ENGLISH: There will 
be a range of opinions about the 
relative need among refugees, but the 
Government did respond to the very 
large number of refugees from Syria by 
opting to take several hundred more of 
them over the next few years. (Hansard, 
2017)
This denial was indicative of what I 
speculate to be embarrassment felt by the 
government about the policy, as evidenced 
by their OIA redactions, obfuscation in the 
House of Representatives, and inflated 
proposals for regional intakes that they had 
repeatedly been told would not be met.
What is the problem with the ban?
There are four significant problems with the 
family link criterion that has banned new 
refugees from Africa and the Middle East 
from being settled in New Zealand, with 
the three exceptions of an emergency intake, 
family link or if they have been able to 
escape the region. These problems have all 
been touched on already, but I want to focus 
on each one in more depth. The problems 
are how the changes (1) undermine the 
UNHCR focus on the most vulnerable; 
(2) compromise the universalism of 
human rights that underwrites accepting 
refugees; (3) discriminate against existing 
communities; and (4) represent a de-
basement of the political process.
First, the ban on these new refugees 
undermines the UNHCR’s focus on using 
the scant resettlement places for those most 
at risk. While New Zealand has maintained 
a commitment to resettling women at risk, 
one of these core categories, it is clear that 
the greatest regional need has been in Africa 
and the Middle East, where conflicts – 
including but not limited to those is Syria, 
Iraq and South Sudan – have created 
substantial crises. While the recent escalation 
of displacement of Rohingya from Myanmar 
has created a new need for resettlement 
from the Asia–Pacific region, it would still 
be difficult to justify taking more than 50% 
There are four significant problems with 
the family link criterion that has banned 
new refugees from Africa and the Middle 
East from being settled in New Zealand, 
with the three exceptions of an emergency 
intake, family link or if they have been 
able to escape the region. 
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of our quota from this region. Similarly, the 
level of need in the Asia–Pacific has no 
relation to the policy of only taking family-
linked refugees from Africa and the Middle 
East, while accepting those from the 
Americas regardless of a family link.
The second problem with the ban is 
more philosophical, but is no less 
important. By placing caveats on who we 
will or won’t take based on generalised 
concerns about potential security risks, the 
universalism of human rights is 
undermined. If human rights only apply 
to people outside the regions where the 
greatest needs and challenges are, a state of 
exception is created that undermines the 
very basis of human rights.7 Persecuted 
groups are rarely made refugees in a one-
off act; first, their status as deserving of 
human rights is undermined and their very 
being debased.8 When New Zealand buys 
into this generalised debasement and 
penalises all potential refugees from both 
Africa and the Middle East under the rubric 
of security concerns, then we are buying 
into the process of persecution.
The third problem is that raised by the 
criticism made by the Office of Ethnic 
Affairs, and is an extension of that originally 
used as a justification against taking the 
full quota from the Asia–Pacific region: 
discrimination against potential refugees 
based on their region discriminates against 
existing resettled communities. The small 
size of New Zealand’s refugee quota has 
meant that resettled communities already 
struggle to maintain members in the face 
of larger communities in Australia and 
elsewhere abroad. The message from the 
government that these refugees are not 
seen as capable of resettlement success 
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy for those 
communities already resettled.
Finally, there is something 
fundamentally dishonest in the descriptions 
and reasons employed by the previous 
government in their restrictions of refugees 
from these two regions. Where Trump was 
very direct about banning people from 
certain countries from entering the United 
States, giving the rationale for it as religion, 
our government was not so clear. The 
tendency to describe this policy as 
providing ‘opportunities’ for family 
reunification might strike the uninitiated 
reader as positive. But these opportunities 
are merely the reuniting of families from 
previous intakes while slamming the door 
on any new resettlement from those 
regions. This kind of doublespeak does 
nothing to endear politicians or the 
democratic process to the general public, 
leading to cynicism and disengagement 
from the political process.  
Speaking of race, refugees and migration
Assumptions and stereotypes based on 
race and religion contribute to how people 
view New Zealand’s refugee resettlement 
programme. Opposition to refugees as a 
whole has not been coherently expressed 
in the mainstream media in New Zealand. 
Commentators who take positions 
opposed to the refugee quota tend to 
either focus on opposition to certain 
kinds of refugees and on their likelihood 
of integrating into New Zealand society, or 
erroneously assume that New Zealand’s 
refugee resettlement programme is the 
same as the asylum seeker movements 
across Europe that they have seen on 
the six o’clock news. See, for example, 
Cameron Slater on his blog Whale Oil, who 
says, ‘I have no problem with the concept 
of refugees, or even the doubling of a 
quota’ (Slater, 2016). Similarly, Karl Du 
Fresne focuses on Islamic asylum seekers, 
the inclination of liberals to welcome them, 
and the need to avoid giving asylum in case 
this leads to an ‘ugly Far Right’ resistance 
in New Zealand (Du Fresne, 2016).
Pro-refugee advocates tend to focus 
their attention on the latest conflict that 
has received media attention, from Syria 
through to the more recent focus on 
Rohingya refugees. While this focus on 
those most in danger is important, it also 
fuels a short-term focus on emergency 
intakes that struggles to lead to long-term 
or systemic solutions. This approach also 
rarely discusses systemic racism (or even 
mention race at all, except to denounce 
those like Slater and Du Fresne), accepting 
the premises by which particular refugee 
situations lead to media coverage, while 
others do not.
The kind of plain talking about race 
and refugees that would offer truly liberal 
outcomes – that is, outcomes not 
determined by race, religion or anything 
other than immediate need – is rare. Ann 
Beaglehole, in both Refuge New Zealand 
(2013) and in interviews, provides a 
striking example of acknowledging the role 
of race in refugee resettlement. In a 
discussion with myself and Wallace 
Chapman on RNZ’s Sunday Morning 
programme, she noted the ease of her own 
experience as a refugee arriving in New 
Zealand in the 1950s: ‘Hungarians on the 
whole had a very good reception because 
we were white and I had blue eyes’. Speaking 
of newer refugees, she notes, plainly ‘there 
would have been some prejudice against 
them because they didn’t have white skin’ 
(RNZ, 2016).
While contemporary mutations of 
racism may be more sophisticated than 
Commentators who take positions 
opposed to the refugee quota tend to 
either focus on opposition to certain kinds 
of refugees and on their likelihood of 
integrating into New Zealand society, or 
erroneously assume that New Zealand’s 
refugee resettlement programme is the 
same as the asylum seeker movements 
across Europe that they have seen on the 
six o’clock news. 
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overt talk of skin colour, this does not 
mean that racism has gone away. 
Commentators like Slater generalise 
terrorism to all 1.3 billion of the world’s 
Muslims; Du Fresne expresses specific 
concern about Muslims from North Africa 
and the Middle East. At the softer end of 
the spectrum, a spokesperson for New 
Zealand Customs explains why returning 
Syrian New Zealanders are being regularly 
submitted to extensive post-travel 
screening: ‘A range of indicators are 
considered when deciding to interact with 
passengers – from nationality (to determine 
if a passenger has originated travel in, or 
passed through, a region of risk), through 
to body language and general demeanour. 
Customs does not profile passengers based 
on religion or belief ’ (Vance, 2017). Where 
Slater and Du Fresne are clear and precise 
about who they are opposed to coming to 
New Zealand, New Zealand Customs and 
the National-led government have 
obscured the basis of the securitisation 
which has taken precedence over 
humanitarian concerns and universal 
human rights in their work. 
Conclusions and recommendation
While a surface reading of the official 
documents might not show the kind 
of profiling based on religion or belief 
that the world has come to expect in an 
age of Trump, which has rarely been the 
New Zealand way, a close reading of the 
multiple documents, across nine years 
of the previous government, shows that 
this government systematically used the 
logic and language of risk and security 
to minimise the number of African 
and Middle Eastern refugees accorded 
protection in New Zealand. It ignored the 
advice of its departments and turned the 
protection of refugees into a question of 
our security, with little consideration for 
theirs.
But this is not the whole story. Given 
the overwhelming opposition to the family 
link criterion in advice on the refugee 
quota from MBIE and other government 
departments, there is reason to hope the 
new government will reject the regional 
allocations and restrictions of its 
predecessors. Just as Nicky Hager 
concluded his Other People’s Wars (2011) 
with praise for the New Zealand Defence 
Force soldiers who confiscated a rifle from 
an Afghan farmer rather than simply 
shooting him, I am heartened by the 
commitment to the universalism of human 
rights underwriting their consistent advice 
to reject the family link criterion. I hope 
that, even prior to the 2019 refugee quota 
review, the new government will accept the 
advice of MBIE (or whatever new ministry 
it becomes) and remove the family link 
criterion. Doing so is the only way for our 
refugee quota to truly play our little part 
in meeting the world’s humanitarian needs.
1 While the quota is planned to cover a three-year block (e.g. 
July 2010–June 2013), it is also planned and implemented 
on a year by year basis, hence the annual quota is the block 
of time most commonly referred to.
2 As the documents referred to here are spread across many 
OIA responses, each consisting of multiple papers and 
working papers, I won’t reference specific papers. Instead 
I would point interested parties to two ways of seeing 
the original documents: first, all of the OIA responses 
have been collected at https://fyi.org.nz/user/m_stephens; 
second, a Twitter thread shows the original selections 
of documents here: https://twitter.com/DoingOurBitNZ/
status/825554122938081281.
3 Note that these regional allocations were not for the regions 
refugees originated from, but where they had applied for 
protection. For example, a Somalian making a claim in 
Malaysia would be considered under the Asia–Pacific quota.
4 The last ten years of refugee quota arrivals are recorded by 
Immigration New Zealand at https://www.immigration.govt.
nz/documents/statistics/rqbarrivalsstatpak.pdf. However, for 
a longer term view see the useful archive at http://www.
refugee.org.nz/stats.htm. 
5 Intakes run from 1 July–30 June, so overlap two calendar 
years.
6 I have left in the sections redacted from this OIA release to 
give some sense of the difficulty knowing the exact reasons 
for these restrictions on African and Middle Eastern refugees.
7 Giorgio Agamben has offered a rich critique of this 
circumvention of rights in his State of Exception (2005).
8 For an excellent contemporary documentation and analysis 
of this process see Steffen Krüger’s ‘Barbarous hordes, brutal 
elites’ (Kruger, 2017).
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ICTs as an Antidote 
to Hardship and 
Inequality implications 
Catherine Cotter1
Abstract
Contemporary ICTs such as mobile phones and the internet, are 
increasingly viewed as potential solutions to some of humanity’s most 
complex and pressing problems, including poverty and inequality. 
But in New Zealand the evidence shows there are large gaps in the 
ICT-related resources and support available to New Zealand’s digitally 
poor. Among the shortcomings are a profound lack of integration of 
ICT needs into social policy design and implementation, the absence 
of a programme of ongoing policy review and update, and insufficient 
research.
Keywords digital divide, digital inclusion, ICTs, social policy, poverty, 
inequality
case in point (see Statistics New Zealand, 
2018; Wilson, 2018). Yet discussion about 
ICTs as a form of government assistance 
to improve the lives of the digitally 
disadvantaged in developed countries 
is largely absent. This article focuses on 
the government’s role in creating and 
providing new kinds of ICT-related safety 
nets and services for New Zealand’s poor. 
It begins by introducing a model from the 
development literature that enables analysis 
of the rationale and achievements of ICT 
investment aimed at public goals (Heeks, 
2010, 2014). The model’s domains are 
applied to arrangements in New Zealand 
today, guided by the objective of using 
ICTs to achieve greater social and economic 
equality and less hardship. The ensuing 
discussion examines who is doing what 
to support the digitally excluded, with a 
focus on the role of the government. Public 
policy consequences and options for New 
Zealand conclude the article. Because some 
data were initially collated in early 2016, 
brief comment is also able to be made on 
relevant changes since then. First, however, 
is the need to define key terms and describe 
the nature and magnitude of digital divides 
in New Zealand today.
Catherine Cotter has worked in and around New Zealand and Australia’s public services for more 
than 20 years. Her current interests are government and society in the information age, and public 
sector governance, strategy and change.
Modern information and com-munication technologies (ICTs) are credited with improving 
the lives of people everywhere.2 They are 
also increasingly a part of everyday life 
for a growing proportion of the world’s 
population. Among the consequences of this 
pervasiveness is heightened debate about so-
called digital divides: New Zealand’s ‘digital 
first’ national census in March 2018 was a 
for New Zealand
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Key terms
The rapid pace at which digital 
technologies, such as laptops, the internet, 
apps and mobile phones, are evolving and 
converging means there are advantages to 
referring to them collectively. Here the ICTs 
under discussion are the broad assortment 
of ‘tools to collect, store, analyse, and share 
information digitally’ (World Bank, 2016, 
p.2). Poverty is taken to mean a lack of 
money or other resources ‘to participate 
fully in life’s opportunities’ (Boston and 
Chapple, 2014, p.21). Inequality is used in 
the dictionary sense to mean unevenness 
or lack of equality. Among the many kinds 
of inequalities (see Boston, 2013, for an 
overview), this article has a focus on social 
and material ICT inequalities.
Digital divides
A definition of New Zealand’s digital 
divides is more elusive. Many explanations 
resort to lists of ‘digitally excluded’ 
population cohorts, circumscribed by 
their physical location, socio-economic 
circumstances, age, ethnicity, lack of 
uptake or use of specific ICTs or digital 
ICTs in general, and so on. Others rely 
on descriptions of ‘digitally engaged’ or 
‘included’ cohorts or individuals, the 
corollary being that whoever does not 
fall within these categories constitutes the 
information or digitally poor.
In practice, however, any purported 
digital divide is a complex, multi-layered 
and evolving phenomenon (see Sylvester, 
Toland and Parore, 2017, for a recent and 
comprehensive review of the literature and 
analysis of the issues in marginalised 
communities in New Zealand). Further, not 
all aspects of the divide are cause for current 
societal concern. Nearly three quarters of 
New Zealand children aged 11 years and 
over own a mobile phone, for example, but 
for the bulk of children who do not, the 
reason is other than cost (Perry, 2017, p.97).
But concern about divides is justified 
when the absence of access to, and ability 
to use, ICTs hinders everyday activities that 
create social and economic value for the 
clear majority of New Zealanders, such as 
finding information and communicating 
with others. Smith et al. (2016) find that 
these divisions, as far as use of the internet 
goes, occur in New Zealand along 
household income, geographic and ethnic 
lines, and compound when these factors 
overlap. Those who are older, live more 
rurally, have a lower household income, 
and who are not New Zealand European 
or Asian use the internet less widely and 
less frequently.
Briefly, to give a sense of the numbers 
involved, 9% of New Zealanders surveyed 
in 2015 aged 16 years and over do not use 
the internet (Crothers et al., 2016). Using 
Statistics New Zealand population 
estimates with data from the first quarter 
of 2016, this equates to approximately 
319,250 people. An additional 11% very 
rarely use the internet (ibid.). Separately, 
Perry (2017, p.95) reports that 12% of 
children do not have good access at home 
to a computer and the internet for 
homework; for children living in New 
Zealand’s materially poorest households, 
the figure is 57%.
ICTs for development
New Zealand’s new Labour–New Zealand 
First government announced the goal of 
closing the country’s digital divides by 
2020 in November 2017 (Curran, 2017a). 
And, as the minister for government 
digital services, Clare Curran, stated a 
month later, international examples can be 
Box 1: Features of the ICT for 
development value chain
Domain Features
Readiness • Precursors are the systemic prerequisites to any initiative. They are 
predominately national-level and can be technological (eg, electricity, 
telecommunications infrastructure), data systems, human capabilities 
(eg, skills), institutional (eg, organisations or policies), vision, or drivers 
(eg, demand)
• Strategies turn precursors into inputs
• Inputs feed into individual initiatives, and can be technology, data, 
labour and knowledge, motivations, goals and objectives, money, 
incentives, leadership and political support
Availability • Implementation can occur via projects, programmes or policies
• Intermediates and deliverables are tangible products arising from 
implementation of an initiative, and can be locations (eg, public 
libraries), ICTs (eg, computers, phones) or software applications
Enablers (accelerators) and constraints (brakes) occur outside, and act on, the 
availability and uptake domains. They usually signify the presence or absence of 
necessary precursors and inputs from the readiness domain3
Uptake • Adoption is the rate at which a target audience takes on a deliverable, 
eg, by purchasing an initiative or going to or connecting to it. Adoption 
may depend on the audience finding the deliverable acceptable 
(Figuères & Eugelink, 2014, p. 216) or a degree of enforcement 
(Heeks & Molla, 2009)
• Use relates to a deliverable’s actual usage by a target population 
(Heeks, 2010)
• Sustainability is to do with mechanisms that ensure a deliverable 
continues to be used over time. It may depend on the continued supply 
and reliability of precursors and inputs (Figuères & Eugelink, 2014, p. 
202)
• Scalability to large numbers of people is required for the adoption and 
use of a deliverable to be sustained
Impact • Outputs are behavioural changes associated with use, eg, new 
communication patterns, new information and decisions, or new 
actions or transactions
• Outcomes are wider costs and benefits associated with ICTs, and can 
be financial and other quantitative or qualitative benefits, or disbenefits
• Development impacts are the contribution of ICTs to public goals and 
other impacts, whether intended or unintended, and may be positive 
or negative
Source: based on Heeks, 2018, pp.38–9, with other sources as indicated
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instructive in achieving such an objective 
(Curran, 2017b). Usually ideas are sourced 
from richer countries (see, for example, 
recent analyses by Zwimpfer et al., 2017, 
and Innovation Partnership, 2017). But 
another overlooked resource are the lessons 
from decades-long experimentation by 
international aid agencies and donor 
and developing countries with emerging 
ICTs and the alleviation of poverty and 
inequalities (see Figuères and Eugelink, 
2014; Heeks, 2018, ch.5; May, Waema and 
Bjåstad, 2014).
Heeks (2010) charts the evolution of 
huge annual expenditure on ICT-related 
development in poor countries over the 
previous 15 years. He finds that, broadly 
speaking, focus shifted from technical 
aspects of ICTs (including infrastructure) 
to their availability, to ICTs’ uptake by 
targeted communities, and, most recently, 
to their developmental impact. Heeks has 
also developed an ‘ICT for development’ 
value chain. Figure 1 shows a simplified 
version of the chain; Box 1 defines its 
features (Heeks, 2018, p.38).
Applying the framework
Choice of framework
In what follows, Heeks’ model is applied 
to New Zealand. But first a note on the 
choice of framework. Heeks designed it to 
show how ICTs can deliver development 
outcomes, illustrate the requirements for 
the creation of deliverables that enable 
development, and help identify which ICT 
elements and relations to focus on, given a 
desired outcome (Heeks, 2018, p.42). The 
chain is sufficiently generic that any public 
goal can be ‘plugged’ into it and provides 
the chance to analyse simultaneous 
initiatives. It also accommodates data from 
multiple sources obtained using different 
methodologies (Heeks and Molla, 2009) 
and data at different levels, from national 
to households and individuals.
But there are weaknesses in the chain 
itself or its application here. These include 
a suggestion of linearity ascribed to what 
could be characterised as complex 
adaptive systems, even in the instance of 
apparently simple ICT initiatives (see, for 
example, Eppel and Lips, 2016). Further, 
measuring and evaluating poverty, 
inequality, outcomes and achievement of 
broad public goals is not straightforward. 
Also at issue can be variability in the 
quality, specificity and availability of 
secondary data, and problems with 
aggregating and comparing data from 
different sources (van Thiel, 2014, p.112). 
Finally, the novelty of the analysis, 
especially for developed countries, means 
there are few comparators.
Use of the framework
Use of Heeks’ chain requires a goal or impact 
to be defined. To address the increasing 
problem of ICT-induced inequalities and 
exclusion, McKinsey and Company has 
suggested more ICTs for the poor (Manyika 
et al., 2016, p.100). The World Bank 
recommends upskilling employees into 
non-routine occupations in the ‘race’ against 
evolving digital technologies’ disruption of 
labour markets (World Bank, 2016, pp.20–1). 
The solution here is taken to be McKinsey’s 
one of more ICTs, and the desired outcome 
to be less hardship.
During the original research, the 
framework’s definitions were employed as 
prompts for sourcing documents and 
websites for analysis. Relevant ICT 
investments, activities and programmes 
were split across the chain’s domains, 
according to whether the lead actor was 
central or local government, non-
government organisations or individual 
citizens, or the private sector, including 
businesses’ philanthropic activities.4 A two-
year cut-off date was used, and the search 
confined to New Zealand initiatives aimed 
at reducing poverty or social or material 
inequality, with at least one ICT as a central 
enabler or driver of change, that were 
underway rather than concluded or 
planned. The analysis did not attempt to 
take in all initiatives aimed at all divides, 
nor all New Zealand research.
Only a fraction of the data can be 
presented here, although where possible it 
has been updated. Samples have been 
selected that enable discussion of central 
government’s role, what more it could or 
should do, and on what grounds, and 
possible policy mechanisms to extend more 
ICTs to digitally disadvantaged New 
Zealanders living in hardship. But the 
development and examination of 
alternative scenarios, such as market-based 
solutions, and discussion about the 
relativity of digital poverty in New Zealand 
is largely precluded. Box 2 shows the data 
according to Heeks’ four readiness, 
availability, uptake and impact domains.
Who is doing what?
The government’s role
The government has a large and active role 
in Heeks’ readiness domain. It establishes 
systemic precursors, devises strategy, and 
sources and allocates inputs to policies 
and programmes. Since the previous, 
National-led government’s election in 
2008, focus has been on faster and better 
network infrastructure, primarily for 
Figure 1: ICT for development value chain
Adapted from Heeks, 2018, p. 38
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economic reasons. These programmes 
are set to continue under the Labour-led 
coalition, but with an additional focus on 
digital inclusion and rights. Schools are 
the main vehicle through which the state 
is modernising the nation’s ICT skills. 
Central government inputs are near-
universal (for example, appropriations to 
build infrastructure) or highly targeted (for 
example, the few instances of payment of 
household ICT costs). Local government 
inputs tend towards the universal (for 
instance, public library resources), while 
non-government organisations’ and 
businesses’ philanthropic inputs are 
targeted, by focusing on children and 
their families or older New Zealanders, 
for example.
Box 2: ICTs for social development in New Zealand
Readiness domain - precursors, strategies and inputs
• The Labour-led government’s ICT goals include closing New 
Zealand’s digital divide by 2020, strengthening social inclusion 
and cohesion, and protecting New Zealanders’ digital rights 
(Curran 2018a)
• In August 2017, contracts were signed for the second phase 
of the Rural Broadband Initiative, which will extend improved 
broadband to over 70,000 rural households and businesses 
(Ministry for Business, Innovation & Employment [MBIE], 2017)
• From term 1 2018, schools and kura began teaching from 
curricula updated with new digital technologies content, with two 
years provided for full implementation of the changes (Ministry 
of Education, n.d.) 
• In 2016/17, the Ministry of Education funded delivery of digital 
inclusion programmes by the 20/20 Trust (2017, p. 3) to 1,805 
families with children in low-decile schools and refugee families
• Some libraries offer free internet access
• The 20/20 Trust (2017, p. 86) has a vision of “New Zealanders 
fully participating in the digital world”
• In 2015, SeniorNet (2016, p. 6) introduced 29,202 enrolees, 
96% of whom were aged 60 years and over, to computers, 
portable touchscreen devices and emerging technologies
• Of people surveyed by Crothers et al. (2016) who did not use the 
internet, the main reason was 33% were not interested or did 
not think it was useful, 20% did not know how to use or were 
confused by technology, 18% did not own a device capable of 
accessing the web, 13% had no connection, 11% found it too 
expensive and 5% did not have the time
Availability domain - implementation, intermediates and 
deliverables
• The remit of Minister Curran’s ministerial advisory group includes 
providing advice on a “blueprint for digital inclusion and digital 
enablement” (MBIE, n.d.)
• As at 31 December 2017, 304,574 rural households and 
businesses had the choice to connect to upgraded broadband 
internet (MBIE, 2018)
• Work and Income pays household ICT costs in some circumstances 
for some allowances, eg, Sole Parent Study Assistance guidelines 
designate internet or landline telephone expenses as allowable 
costs, provided a connection is necessary for course participation 
and not already in place5 
• The Ministry for Social Development (MSD) made its MyMSD 
app available in September (2017a, p. 34) See http://www.
scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1604/S00369/mymsd-puts-clients-
in-the-driving-seat.htm. The costs to clients of data to use 
some of the app’s services6 are negligible due to a deal with 
telecommunications companies
• The overall ratio of students per school-provided digital device for 
learning remains the same as 2011 levels (Johnson, Macguire 
& Wood, 2017, p. 28)
• Decile 1 to 3 schools are significantly more likely to report 
participating in the upgrade of network infrastructure and NGO-
led digital inclusion programmes (Johnson et al., 2017, p. 106)
• The 20/20 Trust (2017, pp. 4, 5) has several programmes, eg, 
Family Connect, a pilot digital literacy programme for adults 
with few or no qualifications funded by the Tertiary Education 
Commission
• The Spark Foundation’s Jump programme supplies free pre-
pay wifi modems to families with school-aged children, each 
preloaded with 30GB and which cost from $10 per month to 
top up7 
Uptake domain - adoption, use, sustainability and scalability
• As at 31 December 2017, 112,805 rural households and 
businesses had adopted upgraded broadband internet (ie, 40.3% 
of the 304,574 who had the option to connect) (MBIE, 2018)
• In 2016/17, 375,000 registrations for MyMSD had been made 
(MSD, 2017a, p. 5)
• Over 98% of students apply online for financial support and 
assistance (MSD, 2017b, p. 23)
• 80% of families graduating from the Computers in Homes digital 
inclusion programme took up the offer of a subsidised internet 
connection in their home (20/20 Trust, 2017, p. 27)
• One third of principals report their school accesses philanthropic 
support for learning with digital technologies, one third’s schools 
are considering it, and one third’s schools do not and are no 
considering it (Johnson et al., 2017, p. 26)
• The 2020 do not and are not Trust’s (n.d.) digital inclusion map 
plots the availability of community wireless networks, computer 
access and training, digital champions, and digital initiatives 
across the country; InternetNZ’s (n.d.) Trust’s digital divide map 
adds correlations between social well-being and digital inclusion
Impact domain – outputs, outcomes and development impacts
• In 2016/17, 66% of applications for financial assistance from 
MSD (2017a, p. 2) were completed online, up 10% from the 
previous year
• MSD (2017a, p. 17) saw the greatest online uptake increase 
in 2016/17 in the Sole Parent Support category, followed by 
supplementary benefits and Jobseeker Support
• 60% of MSD’s (2017a, p. 34) clients who work part-time use 
MyMSD to advise their weekly income
• Nearly one third of participants in Computers in Homes reported 
12 months after course completion that it had helped them find 
paid work (20/20 Trust, 2017, p. 19)
• Half of surveyed principals rate the impact of digital technologies 
on student learning outcomes as moderate; another third rate it 
as significant (Johnson et al., 2017, p. 75)
• Decile 1 to 3 schools are significantly less likely to publish 
website information, use email between teachers and parents, 
email newsletters and use parent portals (Johnson et al., 2017, 
p. 101)
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Having made ICT deliverables available, 
central government activity largely 
concludes, and in the uptake and impact 
domains the market takes over (see 
Commerce Commission, 2017; InternetNZ, 
2017). But the work of public libraries, 
schools and non-government organisations 
continues to support New Zealanders’ 
adoption and use of ICTs. The government 
re-emerges in the impact domain in the 
form of many organisations that, like the 
Ministry of Social Development, want to 
transact digitally with New Zealanders. 
Also active in the impact domain are a 
handful of government agencies, non-
government organisations, and researchers 
collecting and examining evidence of the 
use and influence of ICTs on social and 
educational policy outputs and outcomes.
Many gaps, few overlaps
Looking across Heeks’ domains in Box 2, 
and still concentrating on the government, 
the biggest gap is between the delivery of 
intermediates (such as internet fibre) and 
ensuring that there is effective non-market 
support for their equitable and wide 
adoption and use in the uptake domain. 
A second large gap in the data relates to 
government agencies’ activities in and 
between the uptake and impact domains.
The ultrafast broadband programme 
illustrates both points. Curran’s expectation 
in February 2018 was that by 2022, 87% of 
New Zealanders would have the option of 
connecting to higher-speed internet (Curran, 
2018b). By the end of 2017, 40% of those with 
access had chosen to connect (Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment, 
2018). But current policy settings preclude 
the Ministry of Social Development’s one 
million-plus clients receiving direct support, 
above their present eligibility, to act on this 
choice. Online interactions are wanted by its 
clients, and arrangements have been made so 
that the cost of data for some interactions is 
negligible. The benefits for its clients who 
transact in this way are said by the ministry 
to include savings of time and money, as well 
as it being more convenient (Ministry of 
Social Development, 2017b, p.27). First, 
Table 1: Policy options
POLICY MECHANISM TARGET POPULATION  
TARGET ICT(s)
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
1. Community Services Card 
subsidy-type arrangements (ie, 
vouchers), sufficient to offset 
some costs but not unlimited
• Low income households 
• Hardware, such as laptops, 
computers or smartphones 
• ICT-related services, such as 
setup and maintenance costs
• Sufficiently flexible to apply to 
sole parents, the elderly, urban 
and rural dwellers, low-income 
wage earners, and a range of 
ICTs 
• Well established in other 
sectors (eg, health) 
• Less expensive than universal 
assistance (Boston & Chapple, 
2014, p. 100)
• Blunt cut-off point 
• Higher administration and 
compliance costs, relative to 
overall assistance provided 
(Boston & Chapple, 2014, p. 
101)
2. Subsidies for access 
to ICTs, allocated from 
telecommunications 
development levies
• Low income households, via 
discounts on monthly bills 
and/or higher data caps from 
designated providers 
• Household broadband internet 
access and/or mobile voice, 
text or data services
• International examples to learn 
from (eg, United States, South 
Korea) 
• No overall increase in social 
assistance costs 
• Levies and telecommunications 
service obligations are already 
in place in New Zealand
• The levies are already 
being used for fast internet 
infrastructure, a new 
emergency caller location 
system, and services for the 
deaf (MBIE, 2017)
3. Higher families tax credits • Low income families 
• Any ICT 
• Also housing, electricity and 
data access
• Sound evidence of a link 
between income and ICT 
adoption and uptake (Crothers 
et al., 2016; Statistics New 
Zealand, 2015) 
• Families can determine their 
own needs 
• Highly targeted
• No guarantee funds will be 
spent on ICTs (Boston & 
Chapple, 2014, p. 100) 
• Less effective in the event 
of information asymmetry 
or uncertainty (Boston & 
Chapple, 2014, p. 99)
4. Substantial subsidies to 
targeted schools, based on 
decile ratings or other defined 
need
• School children and schools 
• Computers, software and 
broadband 
• Also data access and electricity
• Highly targeted and highly 
meritorious 
• Helps ameliorate schools’ 
concerns about hardware, 
software and online services 
costs (Johnson, et al., 2017, 
p. 83)
• If devices cannot be 
transported home, or there 
is no internet at home, wider 
educative benefits may be 
foregone 
• Staff ICT professional 
development is also needed 
(Johnson et al., 2017, p. 83)
5. Higher student loan thresholds 
for course-related costs and 
living costs
• Tertiary education students 
• Any ICT 
• Also data access
• Students can determine their 
own ICT needs 
• Well established in the 
education, social services and 
tax systems
• Higher indebtedness at 
graduation has risks and 
consequences (Shaw & 
Eichbaum, 2011, p. 261) 
that the disadvantaged may be 
least capable of bearing
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however, the precursors suggested by Heeks’ 
framework, such as possession of a 
smartphone, tablet or desktop computer, 
must be satisfied. As discussed shortly, for 
many New Zealanders this is non-trivial. 
Then support must be extended to others, so 
they can experience the same benefits and 
new divides are not created.
Public policy implications
Heeks’ framework is designed to provide 
guidance on decisions and actions in the 
pursuit of ICT-enabled goals, including 
those with social, economic or educational 
aims (Heeks, 2018, p.38). Three major 
observations about past and current 
government ICT policy decisions and 
disadvantaged New Zealanders arise. 
First, by concentrating most of a decade’s 
public ICT investment on infrastructure, 
the previous government in effect took 
New Zealand ‘back’ to the beginning 
of the value chain. This, of course, has 
happened in many other countries, and 
perhaps must occur periodically when 
new technologies – railway, electricity – 
fundamentally change the order of things. 
The commensurate evolution of social 
policy, however, has been neglected by 
successive governments to the extent that 
it is profoundly unfit for the digital age. 
ICT-related allowances and benefits that 
predominantly focus on access to landline 
telephones,8 for example, require radical 
overhaul and ongoing review.
Second, education features as a 
continuous thread throughout the chain. 
Actors are at work in all four domains, from 
readiness to impact. There are, however, 
still major gaps. The issue of school 
children’s universal access to devices and 
the internet at school and at home has not 
been resolved, for example. Until it is, ICT-
induced inequities and inequalities in New 
Zealand’s education system are expected to 
persist and compound (Starkey, Sylvester 
and Johnstone, 2017). More striking still is 
the apparent absence of the direct provision 
of public services at scale that support 
digitally-disadvantaged New Zealanders, in 
the same way that youth, families, working-
age people, students, those with disabilities 
and seniors are helped into secure housing 
and employment (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2017a, p.6). For these 
population cohorts, and to these core 
functions, it is arguably time New Zealand 
added at least some basic ICTs and the 
support to ensure their effective use.
Third, the available evidence is silent 
about many major questions to do with life 
in New Zealand today. What of 
disadvantaged young people and adults 
searching for work or enrolled in tertiary 
education, for example? Is it any longer 
possible, practically speaking, to undertake 
tertiary study without access to a computer 
or the internet at home? Can work be 
found without access to a mobile phone or 
the internet? And what are the additional 
costs incurred by the absence of these 
technologies and, in an era of social 
investment, who bears them?9 For these, 
and numerous other, questions there are 
sinsufficien answers.
Minimum ICT thresholds
New Zealand’s contemporaries are 
responding to digital divide issues in 
a variety of ways. In some instances, 
countries are adding new ICTs to their 
regulatory universal service obligations. 
Until recently, for many governments, 
including those of New Zealand, Australia, 
the United Kingdom and Japan, that 
generally meant providing citizens with 
reasonable access to a connection for a 
landline telephone, payphones and the 
like (Calvo, 2012). Achieving agreement 
on changes to universal services is not 
easy. The European Commission’s current 
reforms, for example, focus on updating 
affordability safety nets. But even as these 
changes, a decade in the making, were being 
finalised before the European Parliament’s 
involvement, they were judged outdated 
and lacking relevance in the context of an 
evolving internet (Renda, 2017).
Other challenges range from the 
ideological to the technical, and include 
at-times irreconcilable views on the 
relationships between ICTs and human 
progress, an unstable policy environment 
as new ICTs and research findings emerge, 
and large gaps in current data. The United 
Kingdom, however, declared in December 
2017 an intention to make citizens’ ability 
to choose to connect to fast broadband a 
legal right by 2020 (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport, 2017). But 
viewed using Heeks’ framework as applied 
here, this merely shores up broadband 
availability, and does nothing new to 
safeguard its equitable uptake.
ICTs, target groups and options for  
New Zealand
One immediate place New Zealand could 
start is with existing institutions and 
policy mechanisms. Table 1 presents five 
options for meeting the basic ICT needs 
of school-aged children from low-income 
families, disadvantaged adults enrolled 
in tertiary education, and low-income 
adults more generally. Each row contains a 
policy mechanism, a target population and 
suitable ICTs (and sometimes enablers, 
such as data access), and its strengths and 
weaknesses. The table does not estimate 
the potential costs or cost-effectiveness for 
each option, but these can be calculated, 
preferably using the most up-to-date ICT 
data possible.
The options, which are not mutually 
exclusive, are intended to illustrate how 
some ideas in this article might be put into 
action. None alone nor all of them would 
eliminate the incidence of digital poverty 
in New Zealand, even if that was a realistic, 
workable or desirable goal. The domestic 
and international evidence shows, for 
instance, that the targeting of families, 
children and individuals living in hardship, 
and encouraging their take-up of newly 
available ICTs, can be challenging. Reasons 
include the lived realities of some poor, 
such as a high degree of transience (20/20 
Trust, 2017, p.12), competition at home 
towards children or young people’s access 
to devices (Hartnett, 2016; Lips et al., 2017, 
p.33), lack of awareness about ICTs’ benefits 
or the motivation to adopt them (Sylvester, 
Toland and Parore, 2017), vulnerabilities 
of some kinds of policies to abuse by 
recipients and fraud (Davies, 2016), and 
ongoing concerns about the real and 
perceived costs of accessing and using ICTs. 
Also no doubt at play would be the 
influence of broader societal views, such as 
ideas that anyone who wants an ICT should 
pay for it, or that the poor are differently 
and especially ill-equipped to deal with the 
downsides of ICT’s (see Britz, 2004, for a 
survey). Objections from anti-poverty 
campaigners that money and other 
resources are being diverted from food and 
housing to ICTs could be rivalled by welfare 
opponents’ concerns about increases to 
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social assistance. But some or all of these 
may prove spurious arguments for 
withholding from the poor ICTs that 
benefit many other people, and few are 
insurmountable. The evidence shows 
increasing demand for more ICTs from 
New Zealanders who receive social services, 
and, when all elements of Heeks’ framework 
are tended to, their sustained and successful 
take-up of ICTs is possible.
Conclusion
New Zealand needs a full and complete 
ICT policy framework that reflects social, 
economic and educational goals for 
all New Zealanders. An explicit aim of 
the framework must be the creation of 
modern, complementary and cost-effective 
ICT social policies. Among the first target 
populations for these initiatives should 
be children and young people from poor 
families and low-income adults, including 
students. The entirety of the framework 
must be revisited often, more frequently 
than many others are, and not solely for 
economic development motives. Further, 
new core social development functions and 
public services should be considered that 
enable digitally-excluded New Zealanders’ 
sustained adoption and use of modern 
ICTs at scale. To support these changes, 
investment in ongoing research to expose, 
explain and address gaps in current 
knowledge is also required.
1 This article is based on research undertaken by the author 
as part of a Master of e-Government at the School of 
Government at Victoria University of Wellington. The research 
was awarded the 2017 Holmes Prize in Public Policy.
2 This article is necessarily based on assumptions that remain 
unexplored here about the relationships between society, 
ICTs and the role of democratically-elected governments in 
welfare states. In fact, many aspects of these relationships 
are unfolding rapidly and highly contested. See Gluckman, 
2018, for recent commentary on some of the issues.
3 For example, some would have it that the issues are wider, 
more systemic and solved not by focusing on technologies 
but on adequate minimum levels of income, equality of and 
achieving equity in education, and so on. See Dutton and 
Graham, 2014, pp.5–8 for a survey of different possible 
perspectives. Where this is especially relevant to New 
Zealand is the effects that higher minimum wages, fee-free 
tertiary education, and other enablers planned by the Labour-
led coalition will have on otherwise unassisted ICT take-up 
by the poor.
4 In practice, of course, this split quickly breaks down.
5 At https://www.workandincome.govt.nz/map/employment-
and-training/specific-employment-related-assistance/sole-
parent-study-assistance/internet-01.html on 18 March 2018.
6 For exclusions, see https://www.workandincome.govt.nz/
about-work-and-income/our-services/cheap-as-data/what-
services-can-be-used-with-cheap-as-data.html.
7 See https://www.sparknz.co.nz/what-matters/spark-jump/. 
8 See, for example, the guide to telephone costs for the 
disability allowance at https://www.workandincome.govt.
nz/map/income-support/extra-help/disability-allowance/
telephone-01.html on 18 March 2018.
9 By one account, being online can benefit individuals by 
nearly $1,000 annually (see Zwimpfer et al., 2017, p.2).
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